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Part 2 LEADERSHIP, 
TRANSGRESSION, 
MANIPULATION 
AND NEW POLITICAL 
CAMPAIGNS 

DELIBERATIVE FRAMINGS  
AND THE CONSTITUTION OF “GERINGONÇA”:  
FROM MEDIA FRAMES TO READERS’ COMMENTS. 
THE CASE OF “OBSERVADOR”1
João Carlos Correia2
Ricardo Morais3 
Abstract: This article analyses how the formation of the 
XXIst Portuguese Constitutional Government, supported by 
the Parliamentarian Left (Socialist Party, Communist Party 
and the far-left organization Left Block that holds together 
fringes from ecologists movements, Trotskyists groups, and 
ex-Maoists organizations) was framed by “Observador”, 
a right-wing online newspaper, ideologically opposed, 
from the editorial point of view, to the new Government. 
Simultaneously, we aim to understand if this framing pro-
cess was followed by the audience. The comments posted by 
the newsreaders on the website but also on Facebook were 
analyzed during the formation of the new political solution. 
The goal was to determine whether there was a relationship 
between the frames used by the medium, and the opinion 
expressed by its readers. The results show a higher presence 
of the game-strategy frame in the media coverage of XXIst 
Constitutional Government formation process, but a clos-
er look reveals that the most common employed narrative 
1.  This research results from the Ph.D. thesis titled “Participação e delibe-
ração online: o enquadramento mediático e os comentários dos leitores no 
debate sobre a formação do XXI Governo Constitucional” (Online participa-
tion and deliberation: media framing and readers’ comments about the de-
bate on the XXIst Constitutional), by Ricardo Morais, with the supervision 
of his tutor, João Carlos Correia.
2.  Labcom.IFP/Universidade da Beira Interior
3.  Labcom.IFP/Universidade da Beira Interior
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frames were on political impacts and conflict stories, resulting from an accentuat-
ed political turn to the left. Our analysis shows that the “Observador”’s audience 
triggered different interpretative frameworks always sharing an opposition to the 
formation of the left Government.
Keywords: Framing; online deliberation; readers’ comments; XXIst Constitutional 
Government
1. Introduction
The context that led to the XXIst Constitutional Government is one of the 
most striking moments of the recent Portuguese political history. The cir-
cumstances leading to the successive formation of two Governments during 
the short period of one month, following the electoral event on October 4th, 
2015, cannot be ignored. Therefore, this work analyzes how the formation 
process of the XXIst Government (also known as “Geringonça”) was framed 
by a particular medium of communication, the only national digital native, 
that seemed to position itself in an adversarial position to the establishment 
of the new Government solution. Bearing in mind to the characteristics of 
the newspaper, and in particular of its public, positioned on the right side of 
the political spectrum (according to Digital News Report 2017 from Reuters 
Institute for the Study of Journalism) we wanted to understand if this po-
sitioning could represent an increase of deliberative quality in the dialogue 
boxes and contribute to the formation of a counter-agenda against the new 
political solution.
Following the studies on framing, and the distinction between media and 
audience frames (Entman, 1993), we tried to understand how the news 
frames affect the discussions that may happen in the reader’s comments 
spaces and what if media frames influence online deliberation The anal-
ysis of the comments comes in the line of studies on online deliberation, 
considering the set of potential deliberative arenas that emerged within 
the Internet (Mendonça, Sampaio & Barros, 2016, p. 17). Configuring itself 
as a case study, this work points to the need to deepen the cross research 
between media and audience frames, in a line of research that considers 
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deliberative framing as a determinant in the construction of public opinion 
on different subjects
2. Literature review
2.1. The framing theory
In recent years, there has been a considerable increase in the number of 
studies on framing (Gradim, 2016, p. 17). Even though this is still a con-
cept to be explored (Correia, 2016; Cacciatore, Scheufele & Iyengar, 2016), 
its use has become heavily widespread, particularly in the Communication 
Sciences domain.
In this field of research, framing started to be used alongside other theo-
ries, such as agenda-setting or priming (McCombs, Shaw & Weaver, 1999), 
making their comprehension difficult (Kim, Scheufele & Shanahan, 2002, 
Correia, 2016). One of the main problems related to framing was and still 
is, the definition of the frames themselves. The oscillation between differ-
ent “conceptualizations” is precisely emphasized by Correia (2016), since 
frames are understood either as “principles of organization” (Goffman, 
1974, p. 10), either as “principles of selection, emphasis, and presentation” 
(Gitlin, 1980, p. 6) and, in the specific context of journalism, as models to the 
news writing production” (Capella & Jamieson, 1997, p. 39).
This semantic ambiguity is linked to the interdisciplinary roots of the con-
cept (it is not by chance that Entman calls it a “fractured paradigm”), and 
its progressive development, but in fact, it is one of the aspects that has 
preoccupied theorists of the field. In this context, one of the answers found 
by the researchers is the creation of a typology of frames that helps to the 
affirmation of the framework analysis in the scope of communication stud-
ies (Correia, 2016, p. 10).
Robert Entman’s worked on the clarification of this paradigm, being par-
ticularly relevant in suggesting a division between media frames and 
audience frames (1993, p. 74). Many of the following studies started to adopt 
this influent division in their analysis. It appears, therefore, a research line 
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that identifies the “frames” in the journalistic content, i.e., that’s to say the 
way how media made the coverage of certain problems (Patterson, 1994; 
Semetko & Valkenburg, 2000). At the same time, there is another line of 
studies concerned with the way individuals perceive, organize and interpret 
the information transmitted in journalistic pieces (Valkenburg, Semetko, & 
de Vreese, 1999).
This separation, however, also opened a space “for new works on the inter-
section between audience and media frames”, analyzing the frames in the 
news and the effects of these frames on the public (Cappella & Jamieson, 
1997; Iyengar, 1991). Our work is precisely interested in this intersection. 
Additionally, to the analysis of the news frames, one intends to watch if they 
influence the formation of public opinions, here represented by the reader’s 
comments. 
In journalistic studies, a frame is characterized by the selection, organi-
zation and emphasis of certain aspects of reality and exclusion of others 
(Gitlin, 1980, p. 7). According to the authors, we can also distinguish specif-
ic and generic frames. Specific frameworks handle subjects, while generic 
ones apply to a wide range of public issues. A more specific analysis al-
lows collecting data on the selection, organization, and elaboration of a 
well-defined question, presenting advantages in detail, but, simultaneous-
ly, raising problems of generalization and comparison. That is why more 
generic frames are used more frequently, in order to allow comparative 
studies, for instance, the coverage of the same event in different countries.
 The work of Iyengar (1991) on generic news frames is one of the best where 
we can find a distinction between episodic and thematic frames with its own 
terminology. The episodic pictures would address the specific cases and 
situations, while the thematic ones tried to identify more generic frames, 
that transcend the questions confined to a specific time and space. Among 
the more generic frameworks, the “strategy” or the “conflict” (Cappella and 
Jamieson, 1997) stand out as some of the most used frames, for example, 
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in the analysis of electoral campaign coverage. Thus, generic frames are 
addressed to broader issues and not an episodic event.
 The frameworks used to cover elections are particularly relevant. Over 
the years, several authors have focused their analysis on electoral cam-
paigns (Patterson, 1994, Capella & Jamieson, 1997, Wilke & Reinemann, 
2001, Lakoff, 2004, among others). Cappella & Jamieson analyzed three 
categories of frames: those “issue-oriented”, those related to “leadership/
personality qualities” and those that focus on “horse race”, a metaphor of 
the competitive fight among leaders.
In the first category, are considered the “frames” that address issues related 
to the type of policies to be implemented, such as the policies and meas-
ures included in the electoral program, but also opinions on issues such as 
economics, education, and health. In “leadership/personality qualities”, the 
authors focused their analysis on the aspects related to the qualities of the 
candidate and the personal and professional characteristics that can make 
a good or bad leader. Finally, in the category “game/strategy”, the strategic 
and tactical aspects of the campaign are considered, in a real logic of elec-
toral race (hence the designation “horse race”), that is, in which one only 
one can come out as the winner. The language used, namely the metaphors 
that refer to expressions of competition or war are particularly important 
for the identification of the framework.
We also consider how the study of the Project for Excellence in Journalism 
(2009) identified thirteen possible frames for news stories as the ones jour-
nalists use mostly. The frames were: “a) straight news account: no dominant 
narrative frame other than outlining the basic who, what, when, where, 
why and how; b) conflict story: focus on conflict inherent to the situation; c) 
consensus story: an emphasis on the points of agreement around an issue or 
event; d) conjecture story: a focus around conjecture or speculation of what 
is to come; e) story: an explanation how something works; f) outlook: how 
the current news fits into history; g) horse race: who is winning and who 
is losing; h) trend story: the news as an ongoing trend; i) policy explored: 
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a focus on exploring policy and its impact; j) reaction story: a response or 
reaction from one of the major players; k) reality check: a close look into the 
veracity of a statement made or information given; l) wrongdoing exposed: 
the uncovering of wrongdoing or injustice; m) personality profile: a profile 
of the newsmaker” (p. 4).
It is, therefore, from these categories that we proceeded to the analysis of 
the content of the journalistic texts, trying to identify the dominant frames 
and to evaluate how they are present in the comments of the readers.
2.2. Deliberative Frames in election times 
Frames are constructed in an active context of processed information in 
which they are mobilized to an ideological struggle. Frameworks are cog-
nitive occurrences that appear at various levels: in culture, in the elites’ 
minds and professional political communicators, in the texts and the minds 
of citizens, in social movements, public spheres, etc. (Entman, Matthes & 
Pellicano, 2009, p. 176).
At the beginning of the present decade, when the Governments were more 
aligned with the globalization policies, they emphasized as a structuring 
element of the key political framework “fiscal responsibility and the deficit 
control of public accounts”, while left and alternative critical movements 
classified those policies as “austerity policies” and alerted to a defense of 
social achievements.
Following Snow and Atheide, one may identify three kinds of frames, in what 
concerns with political mobilization: a) diagnostic frame, which implies the 
identification of the problem and an attribution of public responsibility; b) 
the prognostic frame, that implies an identification of the solution, the iden-
tification of the problem, for example, “reordering the forest to fight the 
fires” vs “contract spending to reduce the deficit”; c) the motivational frame 
implies a call to action and an identification of claims that justify a partici-
pation in an action to change a state of affairs; the motivational dimension 
of the framework includes building a vocabulary appropriately, for exam-
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ple: “ask the population for sacrifices or call for a demonstration against 
austerity”.
At the time of the elections, there was a frame that can be identified: the 
horse racing frame. It corresponds to a situation that results from bipar-
tisanism itself and contaminates, with efficacy, the western television 
language. The dominant framework in the electoral choices made so far in 
Portugal has insisted on the issue “Election of the Prime Minister”. For the 
dominant culture, there is a traditional constitutional interpretation of the 
elections that identify the Prime Minister as the leader of the winning party. 
This traditional understanding and this dominant framework have histori-
cal reasons. In the first place, we can verify the existence of a scarce policy 
difference between parties at the center of the political spectrum. Portugal 
lived what Gomes Canotilho called an “imperfect bipartisanism” with a ro-
tation between PS (Socialist Party) and PSD/CDS (Social Democratic Party/ 
People’s Party), remaining the left-wing political forces confined to the local 
power (CDU [Unitary Democratic Coalition] and, more marginally, BE [Left 
Bloc]). 
The 2008 crisis reflected the collapse of this ideological framework. Among 
the profound causes is the erosion of the welfare state, the sudden impov-
erishment of the middle class, the flexibilization of labor relations and the 
breakdown of the aspiration to social mobility.
Facing the imminent bankruptcies of social democracy, the current leader 
of the PS considered the possibility to explore constitutional routes, admit-
ting a paradigm shift in the Government formation, with a Government 
based on the parliamentary majority. This shift of political habitus nev-
ertheless implied a change of frame. Diagnostic frame questioned the 
dilemma: “economic growth and debt contention” versus “the reposition of 
labor incomes”, severely cut during Troika’s intervention. In the framing of 
prognosis came a new question: “what to do?”. According to the framework 
of the Socialist Party, it was possible to reconcile domestic consumption 
with economic growth. The prognosis frame supported by its opponents 
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was to reduce debt, increase growth through fiscal responsibility income 
and contain social spending. The motivational frame suggests the greatest 
difficulties: “How to mobilize the PS, one of the protagonists of one of the 
last episodes of the Cold War in the direct confrontation against the PCP 
and the extreme left as opponents?; How to mobilize a social base of support 
from CDU and BE that saw in the PS a traditional adversary?”
In turn, the conservative block had another dilemma, to mobilize legitimacy 
based on the victory of the elections against the legitimacy resulting from 
the formation of a majority in Parliament, to accentuate the differences be-
tween the supporters of the left Government. It has mobilized one of the 
oldest rhetoric commonplaces: “we got here; we cannot go back. If some-
thing started, it’s natural to end”.
2.3. Internet, readers’ comments spaces and deliberative framing
After reviewing the main aspects of framing theory, we highlighted how 
the Internet has changed many aspects of current societies, but especially 
how participation and deliberation can take advantage of the potential of 
this technology.
Without the euphoria of the 90s studies that searched inside the Internet for 
a new public sphere, one must admit that the digital networks have changed 
older communication models and provided new channels for the exchange 
of opinions and ideas (Mendonça & Amaral, 2016, p. 51). “The internet rep-
resents an extremely diverse environment for social interaction, whose 
characteristics transform and reorganize social practices. Communication 
between individuals and groups, as well as the organization of communities 
of interest and environments for discussion, are inherent characteristics of 
the evolution of the Internet” (Maia, Rossini, Oliveira & Oliveira, 2016, p. 
236 [translated to English from the original in Portuguese]).
Today there are unlimited spaces, like forums, blogs, sections for com-
ments in news web pages, social network sites, where one can participate 
in discussions about different issues. In this particular study, we focused 
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on comments sections in digital newspapers, because this was for a long 
time one of the most used spaces by readers to post comments and debate 
about public matters, regarding their accessibility, absence of costs, possi-
bility of anonymity and the immediacy in exchanging messages (cf. Silva, 
2013). However, in the last years, the number of users commenting on dig-
ital newspapers comment spaces decreased, mainly because the debates 
made on those spaces, began to be seen as unproductive, with no presence 
of real discussion or rational dialogue, and full of “flaming”, “trolls” and in-
sults (cf. Ruiz et al., 2011; Silva, 2013). Some sites even decided to end with 
these spaces to control what was becoming an image problem. In spite of 
that, no one can deny, the potential of these spaces to public deliberation. 
Today, “understanding the dynamics of online discussions is therefore to 
understand a fundamental dimension of today’s experience, in general, and 
of political practice in a more specific way” (Mendonça, Sampaio & Barros, 
2016, p. 12 [translated to English from the original in Portuguese]). 
Therefore, we analyzed the comment spaces as an environment with dis-
tinct opportunities and constraints for deliberation, considering “there is 
no discussion of the socially relevant issue that does not pass significantly 
through them (online arenas), crossing platforms as distinct as Facebook, 
Twitter, YouTube and blogs. The discussions between individuals, permeat-
ed by the content produced by newspapers or by bloggers, in texts, photos 
and videos, form a complex environment in which the main issues of public 
interest are approached by a multiplicity of actors” (Mendonça, Sampaio & 
Barros, 2016, p. 11 [translated to English from the original in Portuguese]).
It is in this sense, that we analyze the reader’s comments since we want-
ed to see how the news frames can affect the discussions that may take 
place in these deliberative arenas, following the idea of a deliberative fram-
ing (Barisione, 2012, pp. 4-5). We understand that this concept is what best 
represents the objectives of this work, considering on the one hand news 
frames and, on the other hand, deliberative comments. When the fram-
ing processes are applied in the context of deliberative practices it is of a 
deliberative framing that we speak of, as what is at issue is precisely the 
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interpretative “framework” in which deliberation can be made. Thus, mean-
ing that the media, when selecting certain points of view, emphasize certain 
elements to the detriment of others, suggest certain interpretive frames 
that, possibly, will influence the process of opinion formation and, there-
fore, the outcome of a deliberation (Barisione, 2012, p. 4-5). In this sense 
we must to think, when we analyze the opinion resulting from a journalis-
tic text, on a set of elements that help us to understand the interpretative 
“framework” within which a deliberation is constructed. In addition to the 
initial diagnosis related to identifying what the problem is, the framework 
will also indicate a possible causal interpretation of the problem, i.e. where 
it comes from, as well as an assignment of responsibility and prognosis or 
solution to the problem. In the background, the entire context of interpreta-
tion can be defined by the primary frame or, in turn, be deconstructed by 
the participants, giving rise to a new interpretive framework.
3. Research strategy and methodological design
In methodological terms, this paper aligns with the case studies, since 
this is “the most appropriate research strategy when we want to know the 
‘how’ and the ‘why’ of current events about which the researcher has little 
or no control” (Yin, 1994, p. 9). It is precisely in this situation that we find 
ourselves in this study, since we aim to understand how the process of for-
mation of the XXIst Constitutional Government was framed by the news 
and its readers. At the same time, we also seek to understand if there is an 
influence of the news frames on the formation of public opinion, measured 
here by the readers’ comments. 
The case study is also an approach “(...) that deals deliberately with a spe-
cific situation that is supposed to be unique or special, at least in certain 
aspects, trying to discover what is in it of most essential and characteris-
tic and, thus, to contribute to the comprehension of a certain phenomenon 
of interest” (Ponte, 2006, p. 29 [translated to English from the original in 
Portuguese]). As the goal of a case study is always “holistic”, once it seeks 
to promote “understanding as a whole” and an “intensive and detailed” 
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study (Coutinho, 2015, p. 335 [translated to English from the original in 
Portuguese]), it seemed to us that this methodological strategy was that 
which best suited our work. Case studies may be: intrinsic, if the inves-
tigator seeks to understand a case because it provokes specific attention; 
instrumental, when the case study functions as a tool to understand anoth-
er phenomenon (Coutinho, 2015, p. 338). In our work the case study it is 
simultaneously both intrinsic and instrumental. 
In terms of data collection, in a case study “multiple sources of evidence are 
used” (Yin, 1994, p. 13). In our particular case, we used the analysis of con-
tent and news, intending to identify news frames (in a frame analysis logic), 
but also the analysis of comments, identifying “frames” and assessing the 
quality of online deliberation.
3.1. Brief contextualization of the case under study: formation process of 
the XXIst Constitutional Government
The “case” under analysis here, is the debate surrounding the formation of 
the XXIst Portuguese Constitutional Government. To better understand this 
case, it is important to return to the day of October 4th, 2015, the date on 
which the Portuguese were, for the fourteenth time since April 25, called to 
choose the representatives for the parliament. The results of the electoral 
process gave victory to the coalition “Portugal à Frente” (PaF) (the result 
of the pre-electoral agreement between the Social Democratic Party (PSD) 
and the Popular Party (CDS/PP), although with a relative majority (38.5% of 
votes, corresponding to 107 members). The absence of an absolute majority 
and the percentage of votes of the remaining parties (PS - 32.3%, BE - 10.2%, 
CDU - 8.3%, PAN - 1.4%) let immediately forecast a difficult scenario for the 
winners. But the process around the establishment of the next Government 
was just beginning.
The lack of an absolute majority forced the coalition voted to establish 
agreements to ensure the largest number of seats in parliament and thus 
stable governance. The real debate about the formation of the Government 
begins then, with the coalition seeking to negotiate with the Socialist 
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Party, the only one available for this negotiation. Thus, it began a period 
of meetings between the two political forces, accompanied in detail by the 
media and leaving public opinion suspended to the formation of the XXIst 
Constitutional Government.
However, while meeting with the PaF coalition, the Socialist Party has initi-
ated contacts with the Left Bloc (BE) and the Unitary Democratic Coalition 
(CDU), given the negotiations for the formation of a Government of the left, 
with a parliamentary majority, which could make it impossible to form a 
new Government on the part of the coalition that had won the elections.
The electoral act, more than deciding the political situation of the country 
for the next four years, ended up throwing the country into a real debate be-
tween parties but also forced the public opinion to argue on which was the 
best Government solution. The hypotheses of a central bloc Government 
(PaF [PSD + CSD/PP] + PS) were put on the table; a management or interim 
Government (the winning coalition would govern until it was possible to 
call new elections, never in less than six months); a presidential initiative 
Government (elements of Government would be indicated by the President of 
the Republic); but also, the possibility that gradually gained strength: a left-
ist Government with parliamentary majority. Tight deadlines, presidential 
elections were at the door, forcing daily meetings, multiple political-party 
discussions and raised great uncertainty in the public opinion, with voices 
against and in favor of each of the options previously described 
António Costa, Socialist Party’s secretary-general did not agree to form 
a bloc with the winning coalition nor to support it in the assembly, rejec-
tions that gradually began to help define the future. Especially because on 
October 20th, Costa assured the President of the Republic of having the con-
ditions to form a Government-supported in the parliament by the Left Bloc 
and by the Portuguese Communist Party. The facts exposed so far would be 
more than enough to make this case a study, but the chronology of events 
makes it even more interesting, since, after an electoral act, the Portuguese 
would get to know two Constitutional Governments.
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The first, which was the XXth Constitutional Government, would end to 
being formed with the winners of the elections. Not having reached an 
agreement with any party with a parliamentary seat, the PaF coalition met 
with the President of the Republic, Aníbal Cavaco Silva, who after listen-
ing to all parties with representation in parliament, choose to nominate 
Pedro Passos Coelho (22 October 2015) as Prime Minister and lead him 
to form a Government. Five days later, on October 27th, 2015, the Prime 
Minister-nominee presented to the President of the Republic his proposal 
for the constitution of the XX Constitutional Government, which took office 
on October 30th, 2015. The leftist parties already had asserted that they 
will reject a new right-wing Government and even with the Government 
formed, guaranteed that it would not pass in parliament.
The XXth Constitutional Government would thus, be remembered histori-
cally as the shortest executive administration of the Portuguese democracy, 
as it would take only 27 days for the country to be introduced to a new 
political configuration. The meetings on the left pointed increasingly to 
an understanding no one believed to be possible. The news headlines ex-
pressed the doubts that many had (national digital native “Observador” 
questioned on October 7th: “What if Costa is not bluffing when he speaks 
of Government on the left?”), about the real possibility for the first time 
since the Constitution of 1976, Portugal had a coalition of left-wing parties, 
although post-electoral.
The month of November proved to be decisive. On the day that the new 
Government led by Pedro Passos Coelho had scheduled the debate on the 
Government program, the left parties signed the agreements that would 
later support the first left Government in history (PS minority Government 
supported in the assembly by BE, PCP, PEV and PAN). The XX Government 
would end on the same day, on November 10, after the rejection from the 
Socialist Party of the Government program.
Resulting from that, began the process of nomination of António Costa, 
on November 24th, 2015, and the inauguration of the XXIst Constitutional 
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Government on November 26th, the second Government based on the re-
sults of the legislative elections of October 4th, 2015.
Briefly summarizing the chronology of the facts, this situation provided a 
unique opportunity to investigate a public discussion process carried out 
around an unprecedented political solution in the country. After all the 
meetings and decisions taken, what is not known is the opinion of the 
citizens who, after the elections, did not have an opportunity to express 
themselves again. Far from imagining that it is possible to know how the 
public opinion has positioned itself concerning the development of the two 
Governments, we believe that the analysis of spaces where citizens’ opin-
ions are represented deserves at least to be considered.
3.1.1. Data collection and sample definition
Among the various spaces of participation placed today at the disposal of 
the citizens, we have opted to analyze those dedicated to the comments of 
the readers, as they correspond to private arenas of participation, where 
different opinions may occur. Considering the spaces made available to cit-
izens by the media, we understand that more participation is generated on 
newspapers’ websites. We then began to consider these spaces, however re-
stricting the analysis to a particular medium, the only national digital native 
of Portugal and also the one more ideologically tuned with the right-wing 
block. What drove us to choose this particular news organization resides 
in the fact that according to the Digital News Report of 2017 from Reuters 
Institute for the Study of Journalism, this medium is the one which pos-
sesses a more right-wing audience, but also has an ideological alignment 
and editorial positioning very divergent of the new Government. In this 
context, we also remember the work of Hallin and Mancini (2004), which 
emphasizes that the Portuguese media system is part of the “Polarized 
Pluralist Model” which is characterized by “an elite-oriented press with rel-
atively small circulation” and an “instrumentalization of the media by the 
government, by political parties, and by industrialists with political ties is 
common” (Hallin & Mancini, 2004, p. 73). It is by considering these two 
aspects, the type of audience and the characteristics of the media system, 
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that we justify our choice since one of the hypotheses that we put in this 
research has to do with the possibility of the media news to influence po-
tential debates generated in the spaces for readers’ comments. As we have 
needed to explain in a brief contextualization, the process of creation of the 
XXIst Constitutional Government had many particularities, and above all, 
developments occurring almost daily.
For the collection of data, we considered the period that began on October 
4th, the date of the electoral process, and lasted until the end of November, 
four days after the inauguration of the Government. From the definition of 
the period, we advanced to the research of the news and its comments. In 
the search system of the online newspaper “Observador” the search was 
made from two key terms: “legislative 2015” and “Government”. The re-
sult was composed of 281 journalistic items. From this selection, opinion 
pieces were left out, since these are the result of opinion makers, who are 
mostly linked to political parties and therefore defend their positions. As 
Márcia Galrão and Rita Tavares remember, these texts intend above all to 
“make ‘noise’ in the public opinion, or more importantly, in published opin-
ion” (Galrão & Tavares, 2016, p. 52 [translated to English from the original 
in Portuguese]).
The 281 pieces are distributed from a heterogeneous outside for the period 
under analysis, which reveals well the need to look at each day, as it is im-
portant to remember that it was through the media that the country itself 
was “almost watching the construction of a new political landscape” (ibid., 
21). 
Considering the 281 journalistic texts, we then looked at the number of com-
ments for each piece, and to operationalize the analysis we chose the most 
commented news on each of the days of the referred period, which resulted 
in a total of 58 pieces and 2944 comments. Because one of the purposes of 
the work was also to confront the differences of opinions between the com-
ments made on the website of the newspaper and the Facebook page, to this 
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number, we added 5885 comments that this same news generated in the 
profile of the newspaper on Facebook, reaching a total of 8829 comments. 
3.1.2. News and readers’ comments content analysis
As we have previously mentioned, we have opted to study news and 
comments through content analysis, since it “encompasses a set of commu-
nication analysis techniques that aim to obtain, by systematic and objective 
procedures for describing the content of the messages (quantitative indica-
tors or not) that allow the inference of knowledge regarding the conditions 
of production/reception of these messages” (Bardin, 1979, p. 42).
The option for content analysis also appears in the line of Tankard (2009) 
that suggests the adoption of a model that allows the quantification of the 
frames. “The reason is that individual frame identification runs the risk of 
being accused of being arbitrary, so it advocates an ‘empirical’ and ‘system-
atic’ approach that calls ‘the list of frames’”(cit. in Gradim, 2016 pp. 74-75).
Within the variants of this technique we choose a direct quantitative anal-
ysis, that is, the count of the answers as they appear according to the 
previously established categories. It is therefore important to explain how 
the analysis was operationalized, specifying, in particular, the categories of 
analysis and the indicators used.
3.1.3. Data and coding procedure for news frames and readers’ comments
Taking into account that “the very techniques of the news building – title, 
lead, inverted pyramid –, all presupposing opinion and selection, constitute 
framing devices designed to cut the ‘news’ of the amalgam informing ele-
ments that make up the event” (Gradim, 2016, p. 25 [translated to English 
from the original in Portuguese]), we began by considering these elements 
for the generic identification of the news theme.
Then, following the works of Iyengar (1991) and Cappela and Jamieson 
(1997), we considered, respectively, two types of framing (thematic or epi-
sodic) and three categories of frames: those concerning “substance”, those 
relating to “qualities of leadership/personality” and those that focus on 
João Carlos Correia & Ricardo Morais 27
“game/strategy (horse race)”. By “substance” we mean matters relating to 
the electoral program and measures that the candidates intend to imple-
ment; by “qualities of leadership/personality” the particular characteristics 
of the candidates, in a logic of creating a profile; and in the category “game/
strategy” we considered candidates’ positions and actions aimed at the 
conquest of power, in a competitive logic. Then, following the Study of the 
Project for Excellence in Journalism, we tried to capture other elements 
related to the presentation of news, namely: the trigger, considering what 
triggered the news organization to cover the story; and a more profound 
analysis of frames, considering narrative devices and approaches used by 
journalists in composing the story.
Table 1. Operationalization of variables and categories in news analysis
Variable Category
Trigger
Statement by government news maker
News organization enterprise 
Analysis or interpretation 
Preview of event 





















No dominant narrative frame
Focus on conf lict inherent to the situation or between players
Emphasis on the points of agreement around an issue or event
Focus around conjecture or speculation of what is to come 
Historical explanation of the process or something
How the current news fits into history
Who is winning and who is losing
The news as an ongoing trend
A focus on exploring policy and its impact
A response or reaction from one of the major players
A close look into the veracity of a statement or information 
The uncovering of wrongdoing or injustice
A profile of the newsmaker
Table made by the authors from the referred theoretical references.
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In addition to the framing of news, the presence of frames in comments was 
also measured with the same variables for each type of frame. On the other 
hand, we consider that “the definition and construction of the deliberation 
context (i.e., the deliberative frame)” (Barisione, 2012, p. 6), generates some 
categories we need to consider on the analysis of reader’s comments, be-
cause “the deliberative frame is a construct existing at a more implicit level, 
and for this reason, it may govern the procedure and even determine the 
outcome of a deliberation” (p. 7).




Diagnosis This is the problem
Causal interpretation Where the problem comes from
Responsibility Collective or individual actor responsible for the problem
Moral evaluation Such an actor is blameworthy
Prognosis How to resolve the problem
Table made by the authors from the referred theoretical references.
To analyze the frames, present in both the news and comments together, all 
comments derived from the 58 news stories selected and were included in a 
database along with these news stories. The database with the information 
derived from the comments was merged with the news stories database 
to examine the relationship between the types of frames in news and the 
reader’s comments.
4. Results
Looking first at the news, we noticed that the most common trigger, what 
motivated the news organization to cover the story in the first place, was 
the news organization itself. This particular trigger, with journalists ac-
tively going out and getting the story, represents almost half (48%) of all 
triggers. It is interesting to note that the trigger was in most cases the news 
organization although the statements by the Government were the second 
motive that justifies the news organization to cover the story (31%). 
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Considering the general framing of the text we realize that the most com-
monly employed narrative frame was game-strategy (60%), which highlights 
the modern tendency to explore disputes between candidates in a political 
game approach, as a kind of chess game. According to Capella & Jamieson 
(1997), this focus on political competition turns out to be normal, in that it 
represents the opportunity for a new story with winners and losers. 
Table 3. Most common frames in news
Types of frames %










However, in a more detailed analysis of the frames, we observed that in fact, 
the most commonly used frame was related to policies and their impact 
on society. The focus on exploring the political dimension and its impact 
was the narrative frame employed in 23% of news stories. We also real-
ized that the focus on conflict inherent to the situation or among players, 
known as the conflict story frame, appears in 21% of the news. Similarly, 
the conjecture story, the focus around speculation of what is to come, was 
a frame used in 15% of stories. Therefore, we perceived that, despite the 
game-strategy being the dominant framework, in a more detailed analysis, 
we identified as main frames the political measures and their impacts, in 
a logic of who wins and who loses with the presentation of a proposal, but 
also the conflicts between individuals and speculation about what will hap-
pen as the most used frames. 
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Considering both the triggers and the frames of the news, it is interesting 
to note a considerable difference in the frames used to compose the story 
taking into account what was the trigger. When the stores were initiated by 
the news organization, the most common frame was reaction story (32%), 
what means a response or reaction from one of the major players, closely 
followed by a focus on conflict inherent to the situation or brewing among 
the players (28%). On the other hand, when it was a news organization that 
triggered the story to become news, the predominant frame focused on pol-
icy and its impacts (42%) or in consensus stories, an emphasis was made on 
the points of agreement around certain issues (15%). 
In the analysis of the comments, a set of topics were identified that consti-
tute what we can call the frames of the readers, as they represent how they 
think, interpret, and assess the issue in their terms.
Table 4. Most common readers’ frames and interpretation of the issue under 
deliberation
Readers’ frames %
PS did not win elections therefore cannot govern 4%
Left must govern since it was majority 2%
There must be anticipated elections 2%
PS/António Costa just want to lead 6%
Right-wing parties destroyed the country 2%
The people will pay 2%
Trick from left parties 3%
Troika is coming back 2%
António Costa (PS) breaks the principles of the party 1%
Management or interim government 1%
Note: n = 2248. Considering that 75% of the comments don’t have a dominant frame. 
If we cross these frames from readers with news frames that we saw earli-
er, we realized how we can establish a relationship between those who are 
the most common news frames and the way readers reinterpret the issues. 
Considering policy and its impacts, the most common frame used on news, 
we realize that the audience interprets it saying “Troika is coming back” 
(53% of comments). Conflict story was the second most employed frame 
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on the news what in the comments appears in the sense that “PS/António 
Costa just want to be in power” (20%). The third most used frame on the 
news was a conjecture story, that readers express in comments through 
“PS/António Costa just wants to lead” (35%). This is, in fact, the frame that 
stands out most in the readers’ comments. Horse race frames on news were 
also commonly used, and in comments, it appears in the form of “PS did not 
win elections, therefore, cannot govern” (25%). 
We perceive therefore that in the comments of the readers there is effec-
tive, although not in a direct way, a connection with the dominant frames 
in the news. On the other hand, considering that “deliberative frames sug-
gest how an issue should be understood, read, and judged in some terms 
rather than in others, according to a given perspective, in a determinate 
light” (Barisione, 2012, p. 7), we realized that the identified reader’s frames 
represented a form of organization of the deliberation, that may suggest 
categories such as the attribution of responsibility, but also a prognosis for 
the problem. 
Table 5. Relation between readers’ frames and deliberative frames
Readers’ frames Deliberative frames
PS did not win elections therefore cannot govern Causal interpretation
Left must govern since it was majority Causal interpretation
There must be anticipated elections Prognosis
PS/António Costa just want to lead A moral evaluation
Right-wing parties destroyed the country Attribution of responsibility
The people will pay Prognosis
Trick from left parties Attribution of responsibility
Troika is coming back Attribution of responsibility
António Costa (PS) breaks the principles of the party Attribution of responsibility
Management or interim government Prognosis
Centre-party government Prognosis
PSD/CDS must fall Prognosis
PaF must govern Prognosis
In this way, we realize that in fact, deliberative frames were constructed 
by the readers at an implicit level, ultimately determining the course of the 
discussion, even if any participant in the deliberation was aware of it. We 
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consider that in some ways the news frames were deconstructed by the 
readers, giving rise to a new interpretive framework.
5. Conclusions
The main purpose of this work was to analyze the news coverage of the 
formation process of the XXIst Constitutional Government by an ideologi-
cally oriented medium, as well as to understand how the frames that gain 
visibility in the news, can affect the discussions that may take place in the 
reader’s comments space.
The results obtained from the analysis show no direct relationships between 
the media frames and the audience interpretative frames. We noticed the 
presence of deliberative frames related to the attribution of responsibility 
for the situation and the presentation of a resolution of the problem. These 
deliberative frames show that the “Observador” audience created new in-
terpretive frameworks but always in opposition to the formation of the left 
Government. Therefore, even if the general coverage of “Observador” seem-
ingly did not produce the effect of setting the media frames in the opinions 
of the readers, the analysis of deliberative frames shows some reframing, 
with the participants critically reflecting on the media frames in their own 
terms. 
An interesting finding was the significant relationship observed between 
the media frame related to policies and their impact, and the readers’ idea of 
“Troika coming back to the country” for one more rescue. Hence, if we can 
say that news stories have no power to set the ways for a public debate, they 
contribute at least with information for a deliberative reframing. 
The debate that emerged about the influence of the media’s coverage on the 
public needs further studies to understand how this reinterpretation works, 
but above all, in understanding the relationship between framing and delib-
eration, analyzing how deliberative frames, resulting from the interaction 
between actors in comment spaces, could dominate the group discussion. 
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POLITICAL COMMUNICATION AND ELECTORAL 
STRATEGY IN DONALD TRUMP´S CAMPAIGN 
José Antonio Abreu Colombri1
Abstract: In the political and media landscape many changes 
and profound structural alterations are taking place through-
out the world. Specifically in the case of the United States, all 
the socio-political and socio-communicative phenomena an-
ticipate what will be a trend in the coming years in a general 
way. The transition to the digital plane is causing an intense 
transformation of communication methodologies and has led 
to a phase of experimentation of electoral strategies since 
the late 1990s. Control and instrumentalization of the media 
have always been proposed as a first-rate political weapon in 
the United States, but in the last decades these attempts at 
control and instrumentalization have become a permanent 
industry of intellectual production, advertising creation and 
dissemination of propaganda.
In the specific case of 2016, with the Republican primaries 
and with the electoral process for the White House, Donald 
Trump launched a series of strategic initiatives that repre-
sent a true communicative revolution for all purposes. The 
campaign strategy incorporated elements of innovation into 
a basic structure of political tradition, which has generat-
ed a very effective synergy between traditional values  and 
techniques of circumstantial experimentation. The result 
has been a very complex and effective product to communi-
cate and disseminate political content. A product projected 
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through advertising media, social networks, programming formats and corporate 
links, both analogue and digital, which achieved a calculated electoral victory over 
the Democratic Party candidate.
This presentation will address key issues of the electoral process, such as the 
triumph of Republican political rhetoric, the charismatic leadership of Donald 
Trump, the symbolism and iconographic significance of the advertising material, 
the management of the demographic studies and the epistemological dosage of 
the Political language: clear, concise and repetitive. As an indirect consequence of 
the Republican Party campaign, some issues of the Democratic strategy and the 
leadership of Hillary Clinton will be addressed: the absence of strategic initiative 
throughout the campaign, the inability to exploit the personal and political scan-
dals of the opponent, the lack of foresight in the management of campaign financing 
resources in key states and the absence of real social debate in the big issues of the 
presidential campaign. All these issues will be seen from the prism of political 
communication in traditional media and in new digital media of information.
Key words: Presidential election 2016; mass media; social network; Republican 
Party; Donald John Trump.
1. Introduction
Political analysts and journalists specializing in political communication 
have always believed that they are living a key moment in the course of 
current events. Possibly, this belief is determined by the socio-political 
uncertainties and by the permanent interest in trying to intuit the future 
consequences of the events of the present moment. As a constant, in the 
case of US electoral campaigns it is very common to find, among the infor-
mation produced by the media, terms such as “historic” or “transcendent,” 
but in the case of the 2016 presidential elections, such terms are correct. 
Republican primaries and Trump ś race to the White House will be studied 
in universities around the world for very different reasons, as the cam-
paigns of the years 1980 and 2000 were studied in his day.
From the initial moment of the election campaign of Donald Trump, there 
was a flood of bibliographical publications, journalistic reports and audio-
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visual documentaries about the life and work of the businessman and about 
the political motivations of the controversial and inexperienced Republican 
candidate. All this informative and scientific production lacks absolute con-
sensus, making the research work of the social sciences more difficult due 
above all, to an excess of information and a great amount of elements of 
distortion. This difficulty is clearly perceived in the process of classification 
of sources and in the delimitation of a theoretical framework (that takes 
into consideration the most outstanding and recognized positions on the 
subject). However, this present investigation will try to address the precon-
ditions to Trump’s candidacy, the formation of working groups during the 
celebration of primaries and the promotion and design of the main strategic 
lines to weaken the 2016 Democratic candidacy. That said, this present in-
vestigation will avoid trying to assess the immense quantity of surveys and 
the possible repercussions of these on the public opinion.
The businessman Trump, like several members of his family, has had a very 
close relationship with the world of media since the 1980s. Trump’s hectic 
and popular social life, as a family man, real estate entrepreneur, financial 
investor, advertising agent and audiovisual producer, has led him to become 
an icon of pop culture and a consolidated commercial brand. Thus, the path 
to become a conservative political reference has been much shorter than in 
other cases of presidential candidates close to the power structures of the 
Republican Party. Much has been said about the good management of new 
information technologies and the effectiveness of their pre-campaign mes-
sages, but we must not forget the popularity factors and media presence 
prior to the beginning of the electoral race.
All the eccentricities and rhetorical qualities of Donald Trump were ac-
quired over decades through the relationship with the media and their 
production projects. Trump’s career had been very diverse; diverse in the 
world of entertainment and advertising (Fitzduff, 2017, pp. 13-20, Kellner, 
2017, pp. 1-15). This includes appearances in television interviews, adver-
tisements and cinematographic “cameos,” to collaboration in wrestling 
programs (WWE) and the production of his own contest (“The Apprentice”). 
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This explains the ability to interpret different roles and improvisation in his 
political staging, script reading skills (teleprinter) and mastering the techni-
cal elements of recording (regardless of the scenario) when competing with 
his party mates in the primary and with his Democratic opponent in the 
presidential campaign.
In the recording of “The Apprentice,” Donald Trump had the opportunity 
to publicize his personal charisma and his entrepreneurial idiosyncrasy, 
awakening conflicting positions among the audience, which transcended 
ideologically. Loved and hated, as a celebrity of the first rank, Trump was 
determined to enter politics, surrounded by his family and his closest asso-
ciates, as he had undertaken by challenge throughout his professional life. 
The last season of his contest ended in December 2014, and a few weeks 
later, at the same facilities of “Trump Productions” in New York, in January 
2015, Jared Kushner began to prepare the announcement of the nomination 
of Trump̀ 16 to design the strategic lines in advertising and communication 
and to configure the logistics and financial structure of the pre-campaign 
(Trump, 2015, pp. 1-5 and 7-18). From the very moment that the White 
House bid was announced in June 2015, all sorts of speculation about the 
true intentions of the candidate come out, which would be very beneficial 
for the interests of the Trump family and all its companies structure and 
organizations.
2. The republican primaries and the organizational structure
Since the repeated failures of the “Tea Party” against Obama, presidentially 
and legislatively, the Republican Party had not marked a clear leadership 
position. Before the emergence of the candidacy of Donald Trump, the 
big power groups within the party apparatus did not like the presence 
of an incendiary and controversial candidate (Rapoport and Stone, 2017, 
pp. 136 147 and Kates, 2017, pp. 8-18). Moreover, many important leaders 
were openly opposed to the figure of Trump in the primaries. The truth is 
that, step by step, the rhetoric of “Make America Great Again” was gaining 
popularity among the social mass of Republicans, to the point that Trump, 
with everything against him, won acclaim among his and one of the most 
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overwhelming victories in the history of the primary consultations of the 
“Grand Old Party.”
Table 1. The results of the primary in the Republican Party in 2016 by state 
Date State Trump % *Others %
February 9 New Hampshire 35.2 37.8
February 20 South Carolina 32.5 52.4
March 1 Alabama 43.4 44.2
March 1 Arkansas 32.8 59.0
March 1 Georgia 38.8 53.6
March 1 Massachusetts 49.0 45.1
March 1 Oklahoma 28.3 64.0
March 1 Tennessee 38.9 51.2
March 1 Texas 26.8 65.7
March 1 Vermont 32.3 58.7
March 1 Virginia 34.8 58.2
March 5 Louisiana 41.4 55.4
March 8 Idaho 28.1 68.7
March 8 Michigan 36.5 58.3
March 8 Mississippi 47.2 50.2
March 15 Florida 45.7 50.9
March 15 Illinois 38.8 58.6
March 15 Missouri 40.8 56.8
March 15 North Carolina 40.2 57.2
March 15 Ohio 35.9 62.6
March 22 Arizona 45.8 49.6
April 5 Wisconsin 35.0 63.3
April 19 New York 60.2 39.9
April 26 Connecticut 57.9 40.0
April 26 Delaware 60.8 37.2
April 26 Maryland 54.1 42.9
April 26 Pennsylvania 56.6 41.8
April 26 Rhode Island 62.9 34.9
May 3 Indiana 53.3 44.7
May 10 Nebraska 61.5 33.4
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May 10 West Virginia 77.1 17.1
May 17 Oregon 64.2 32.4
May 24 Washington 75.5 20.6
June 7 California 74.8 20.8
June 7 Montana 73.7 19.6
June 7 New Jersey 80.4 19.6
June 7 New Mexico 70.6 20.9
June 7 South Dakota 67.1 32.9
* The rest of the candidates in the primary elections: Ted Cruz, Marco Rubio and John 
Kasich. Source: own elaboration, according to Nelson, M. (2018). The Elections of 2016. Los 
Angeles: SAGE and CQPRES, pp.51-52.  
Table 2. The overall results of the primary in the Republican Party in 2016 
Trump *Others
Total vote 13,757,244 14,974,447
Percent 45.6% 49.6%
Number of primaries won 33 4
* The rest of the candidates in the primary elections: Ted Cruz, Marco Rubio and John 
Kasich. Source: own elaboration, according to Nelson, M. (2018). The Elections of 2016. Los 
Angeles: SAGE and CQPRES, p.52.  
Table 3. The results of caucuses in the Republican Party in 2016 by state
Date State Trump % *Others %
February 1 Iowa 24.3 52.6
February 23 Nevada 45.9 48.8
March 1 Alaska 33.6 55.6
March 1 Minnesota 21.4 71.0
March 5 Kansas 23.4 75.4
March 5 Kentucky 35.9 62.4
March 5 Maine 32.9 66.1
March 8 Hawaii 43.4 55.5
March 12 District of Columbia 13.8 85.2
March 12 Wyoming 7.4 85.4
March 22 Utah 13.8 86.2
* The rest of the candidates in the primary elections: Ted Cruz, Marco Rubio and John 
Kasich. Source: own elaboration, according to Nelson, M. (2018). The Elections of 2016. Los 
Angeles: SAGE and CQPRES, p.53.  
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Table 4. The overall results of the caucuses in the Republican Party in 2016
Trump *Others
Percent 26.9% 67.7%
Number of caucuses won 3 8
* The rest of the candidates in the primary elections: Ted Cruz, Marco Rubio and John 
Kasich. Source: own elaboration, according to Nelson, M. (2018). The Elections of 2016. Los 
Angeles: SAGE and CQPRES, p.53.  
As Trump cornered his Republican opponents in the primaries, progres-
sively, he reached tactical and formal agreements on joint collaboration and 
cooperation (Sabato, 2016, pp. 3-6). The great element of opposition in the 
interior in the organizational structure of the Republican Party focused on 
the set of organizations of the Christian Right.2 Ted Cruz and Marco Rubio, 
had the personal support and budgetary support of many Christian activist 
groups close to the confessional Protestant reformed block. These groups 
considered a life full of excesses, several marriages (and their successive 
divorces) and a multitude of sexual scandals were not the most appropriate 
elements to build an image of a conservative political leader. The second 
major element of opposition against candidate Trump was the Republican 
ruling party; many leaders and relevant members of the party considered 
that the experience had always been one of the electoral guarantees. From 
their perspective, a candidate like Trump would not only lead to an elec-
toral defeat, but would destroy the image of seriousness and confidence of 
the Republicans before the voters of the conservative “America.” George W. 
Bush mentioned the primaries3:
 “[…] ‘I´m worried,’ Bush recently told a group of Republican operatives 
in Dallas, according to Politico, [Magazine] ‘that I will be the last Re-
publican president’ […] Members of the Bush family have long opposed 
Trump […]” (Business Insider)
2.   The first relevant personality of the Christian Right in approaching Trump’s candidacy was Jerry 
Falwell Junior, through the communicative platforms of Liberty University, he covered the messages 
of the Republican candidate and paved the way for cooperation with other American religious leaders.
3.   However, when Donald Trump won his presidential victory in November 2016, a state of euphoria 
broke out among the Republican ranks. Even the most critical voices surrendered to the unlikely win-
ner. The animosity of the Bush family for Donald Trump was not new.
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Many Republicans prepared for a possible Trump defeat. At the same time 
they were trying to create firewalls, to prevent Trump’s political actions 
from damaging the traditional image of the Republican Party:
 “More than 70 Republicans have asked by letter to the party not to ded-
icate their economic efforts to the Trump candidacy to the White House 
[…]” (El País)
Surprisingly, the closest candidates to the conservative Christian move-
ments, such as Marco Rubio and Ted Cruz, did not know or could not exploit 
the sex scandals, the accusations of illegitimate children and adultery and 
the verbal excesses of a sexual component that leapt in the process of 
primaries around the figure of Trump. They could not assemble a moral dis-
course and presidential suitability, as other times it had been done against 
Democratic and Republican candidates. 
“[…] Trump, downplaying his remarks as ‘locker room talk,’ denied he 
had ever kissed or groped women without consent. […] ‘No one has more 
respect for women than I do,’ he said. […]” (CNNpolitics)
As the weeks and elections of the Republican primaries progressed, candi-
date Trump was becoming more popular and his message of regeneration 
was becoming more widespread and impactful. The staging, gesticula-
tion and aesthetic and linguistic symbols of Trump stole all the attention 
from the rest of the candidates, converting the pre-campaign debates into 
an improvised amplifier of his political message, favoring his aspirations 
of confrontation with the Democratic candidate and his pro-government 
stance. The simplification of language, theoretical reductionism and every-
day exemplification were all the rage among a mass of conservative voters: 
very disoriented by the previous Democratic victories, very disenchanted 
with the previous government alternatives and absolutely outraged by the 
drift of the socio-economic reality of the country. 
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“[…] Once the Republican primary season began in February, Trump 
continued to ride right, with his success achieved against a backdrop of 
large Republican turnouts. Trump won three of the opening four events 
in February (losing only Iowa), and in three of the four states more 
votes were cast on the Republican side than the Democratic. […] Trump 
continued to dominate the Republican race until the abrupt end of the 
contest in Indiana on May 3 […]” (Cook, 2017, p. 86)
In the face of this explosion of popularity (see Tables 1, 2, 3 and 4), pro-
gressively, virtually all of the positions contrary to Trump’s project turned 
into energetic support when they verified its effect of electoral revulsion 
throughout the whole country. The overwhelming dominance of Trump in 
the primary and the Republican Congress of 2016 hardly allows for compar-
ison from the historical point of view. 
3. The key strategy of the 2016 campaign
All the electoral defeats are painful, but the defeat of John McCain in 
2008 was practically assimilated among the Republican ranks, in spite of 
all the efforts made to contain the political project of candidate Obama. In 
2012, despite the popularity of Obama and the profound transformation 
of political scenarios and channels of communication with the electorate, 
Republicans continued to bet on old formulas and hoaxes that had worked 
in the past. However Mitt Romney was unable to take the initiative in the 
electoral campaign and the re-election of Obama was inevitable. The idea 
of having controlled the White House for only eight of the last twenty-four 
years (1992-2016) made many Republican leaders consider the possibility 
of exploring new strategies for the study and design of electoral objectives. 
For this reason, the Republican Party made a large investment to investi-
gate the counties and regions where they would have a greater chance of 
winning, beyond their traditional fiefdoms. This strategy sought the incor-
poration of new voters, the exploration of new issues of public interest and 
the demobilization of groups close to the Democratic Party (Konkik, 2017, 
Political communication and electoral strategy 
in Donald Trump´s campaign46
pp. 70-81, Stone, 2017, pp. 150-166). That structure of work, which began to 
be forged in 2012, found its best ally in the charismatic leadership of Donald 
Trump, despite the fact that all the original strategies had been proposed to 
have assist development within the ruling party of the large groups of the 
Republican Party.
If the great support of the party infrastructure was one of the main assets 
that facilitated the electoral victory against Clinton, there is no doubt that 
the personality and strategic approaches of candidate Trump and his direct 
surroundings were the most explainable cause of that surprise electoral 
victory in the fall of 2016 (Kates, 2017, pp. 285-288). Of all the factors and 
key issues that intervened in that electoral process (Trump, 2015, pp. 19 28, 
31-45, 77-88, 101-107, 127-133 and 159-169), taking the public speech of Trump 
as point of reference, can be observed the following thematic classification 
of the Republican campaign.
1. The constant evocation with the greatness of “America.” Candidate Trump 
appears before the public in general as an admirer of the best country in 
the world, as a winner and a defender of the “American dream.” In short, 
he is a citizen who is not willing to see how the values  and ideals that 
made the United States great have been diminished or are eliminated by 
spurious and corrupt interests. Of course, the Democratic Party and its 
historical leaders are the main culprit for this national degeneration.
2. The defense of the existence of a media conspiracy against Trump and his 
political project by the Democratic Party and the economic and financial 
elites of the United States. In this case, Trump appeared before public 
opinion as a defender of truth and justice, in front of the media of a liber-
al nature, which does nothing but distort the political and social reality, 
against the interests of millions of Americans. For this reason, confronta-
tion with the media is justified as a need to defend traditional values, as a 
matter of honor and as a circumstance of political survival. All freedoms 
and all individual rights would be guaranteed with the arrival of Trump 
to the Oval Office.
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3. The identification of the major political problems of the United States.
 · Internally. The corruption of institutional powers should not have a 
place in the most important democratic and free nation in the world. 
In this sense, candidate Trump and his entire team present themselves 
as self-sacrificing men and women who fight against social injustice 
and against the abuses of power focused on Capitol Hill. It was very 
common among those attending the political campaign events to shout 
“Drain the Swamp”, while Trump proclaimed himself a candidate with 
no political background, as an “Anti-establishment” candidate.
 · Externally. The great international organizations and the governmen-
tal commitments with allied countries represent a heavy burden for 
the taxpayers. The panorama of the international community is not 
beneficial for the whole of the United States, and for this reason, isola-
tionism has to be a pragmatic objective, except in cases where there is 
a tangible national security problem4. According to Trump, everyone 
takes advantage of the enormous economic and financial generosity of 
the United States, and for this reason, the allied countries have to take 
charge of the costs of their defense. After the idealistic globalism of 
the Obama administration, the opinion of Americans would be taken 
into account to design the presence of “America”  in the world. Islamic 
terrorism, which threatens US interests at the global level, is the result 
of a succession of nefarious interventionist policies and a misinterpre-
tation of the international situation by liberal ideology.
4. The identification of the great economic problems of the United States.
 · Internally. A nation can be governed as a multinational company or a 
family business: effort, perseverance and talent. The deindustrializa-
tion and relocation process has ruined entire regions and ruined the 
lifelong projects of millions of Americans. The industrial decline of the 
4.   The presentation of the isolationist “plan” was very controversial, because Trump, from one day 
to the next, defended the direct intervention on the instability foci and the increase of the defense 
programs. At this point he took many accusations of populist and irresponsible, inside and outside 
his party.
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United States must be reversed or it will drag the other sectors into a 
permanent crisis situation. The country and its economic circuits can 
not accept more immigration, and therefore it is necessary to combat 
illegal immigration for the normal functioning of the country and its 
institutions.
 · Externally. China’s unfair competition must be combated from the 
institutions. Likewise, new trade agreements must be signed bilater-
ally with trading partners and jointly with neighboring states. In the 
latter case, the reconsideration of NAFTA was inevitably linked to the 
construction of the border wall with Mexico. In the same line of ar-
gument, Europe, Japan and Korea would have to position themselves 
clearly before the economic and commercial interests of the United 
States.
5. The social and cultural preservation of the United States must be present 
in the next legislative agenda. The government has the obligation and the 
right to defend the social order, to restore security and to value the cul-
tural elements that have made “America”  great throughout its historical 
trajectory. Here issues like immigration re-emerge, because, according 
to the conservative interpretation, inmigrants are incapable of “adapting” 
to the American way of life and are closely linked with criminality, tax 
fraud and inactivity.
6. Permanent interpellation to citizens about their right to prosperity and 
their right to safety. These issues are interrelated, through Trump can-
didate’s argumentation processes, through factors such as delinquency, 
lack of opportunities, loss of purchasing power and lack of institutional 
support (companies and individuals) over the most depressed regions of 
the country. This grouping of topics includes allusions to illegal immigra-
tion, the disappearance of “Made in USA” records, wages and the price of 
“old time” fuel, the right to own a home, the right to carry weapons, etc.
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Table 6. The results of the presidential elections of the United States in 2016
Trump Clinton
Total vote 62,985,106 65,853,625
Percent 45.9% 48.0%
Electoral college vote 306 232
Source: own elaboration, according to The New York Times. (2018) “Presidential Election 
Results: Donald J. Trump Wins”. Retrieved from https://www.nytimes.com/elections/2016/
results/president 
The master column of the presidential campaign, on which all strategic 
structure is based, was to propose a search model of potential Republican 
voters, in two planes: geographical and sociological. In this case, the me-
dia and social networks were decisive for the study of the electoral mass, 
through the ebbs and flows of direct and indirect information (feed-back, big 
data). The media, in its analogue and digital version, was not only used for 
the dissemination of advertising and information content, but also provided 
invaluable information for selecting message rejection objectives (Dunn and 
Tedesco, 2017, pp. 99-115 ; Holloway, 2017, pp. 27-46).
Table 7. State victories in the presidential elections of the United States in 2016
Trump Clinton
Alaska: 163,387 (51.3%) E.V. 3 Hawaii: 266,891 (62.2%) E.V. 4
Arizona: 1,252,401 (48.1%) E.V. 11 Washington: 1,742,718 (52.2%) E.V. 12
Utah: 515,231 (45.1%) E.V. 6 Oregón: 1,002,106 (50.1%) E.V. 7
Idaho: 409,055 (59.2%) E.V. 4 California: 8,753,788 (61.5%) E.V. 55
Montana: 279,240 (55.6%) E.V. 3 Nevada: 539,260 (47.9%) E.V. 6
Wyoming: 174,419 (68.2%) E.V. 3 Colorado: 1,338,870 (48.2%) E.V. 9
North Dakota: 216,794 (63.0%) E.V. 3 New Mexico: 385,234 (48.3%) E.V. 5
South Dakota: 227,721 (61.5%) E.V. 3 Minnesota: 1,367,825 (46.4%) E.V. 10
Nebraska: 495,961 (58.7%) E.V. 5 Illinois: 3,090,729 (52.2%) E.V. 20
Kansas: 671,018 (56.2%) E.V. 6 Virginia: 1,981,473 (49.8%) E.V. 13
Oklahoma: 949,136 (65.3%) E.V. 7 Maryland: 1,677,928 (60.3%) E.V. 10
Texas: 4,685,047 (52.2%) E.V. 38 Delaware: 235,603 (53.1%) E.V. 3
Iowa: 800,983 (51.1%) E.V. 6 New Jersey: 2,148,278 (55.0%) E.V. 14
Missouri: 1,594,511 (56.4%) E.V. 10 New York: 4,556,124 (59.0%) E.V. 29 
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Arkansas: 684,872 (60.6%) E.V. 6 Connecticut: 897,572 (54.6%) E.V. 7
Louisiana: 1,178,638 (58.1%) E.V. 8 Rhode Island: 252,525 (54.4%) E.V. 4
Wisconsin: 1,405,284 (47.2%) E.V. 10 Massachusetts: 1,995,196 (60.0%) E.V. 11
Michigan: 2,279,543 (47.3%) E.V. 16 Vermont: 178,573 (56.7%) E.V. 3
Indiana: 1,557,286 (56.5%) E.V. 11 New Hampshire: 348,536 (46.8%) E.V. 4
Ohio: 2,841,005 (51.3%) E.V. 18 Maine: 357,735 (47.8%) E.V. 3
Pennsylvania: 2,970,733 (48.2%) E.V. 20
Kentucky: 1,202,971 (62.5%) E.V. 8
West Virginia: 489,371 (67.9%) E.V. 5
Tennessee: 1,522,925 (60.7%) E.V. 11
Mississippi: 700,714 (57.9%) E.V. 6
Alabama: 1,318,255 (62.1%) E.V. 9
Georgia: 2,362,631 (50.4%) E.V. 16
North Carolina: 2,362,631 (49.8%) E.V. 15
South Carolina: 1,155,389 (54.9%) E.V. 9
Florida: 4,617,886 (48.6%) E.V. 29
Maine: 335,593 (44.9%) E.V. 1
Source: own elaboration, according to The New York Times. (2018) “Presidential Election 
Results: Donald J. Trump Wins”. Retrieved from https://www.nytimes.com/elections/2016/
results/president.
From the strategic point of view, the key issues of the campaign could be 
synthesized in the following points:
1. The great impact of the Trump phenomenon lies in the abrupt disap-
pearance of objectivity in the presentation of data and information in 
the political debate. The theoretical, ideological and rhetorical correc-
tion disappear, to make way for the political messages raised from the 
psychological impact, theoretical reduction, empirical exemplification, 
grammatical simplification and linguistic vulgarization. In this way, 
messages of great impact were projected with three main purposes: to 
mobilize the traditional Republican voter, to try to attract undecided or 
disenchanted voters with other political options and to demobilize the 
traditional Democratic voter.
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2. The designers of the campaign made a great effort to become aware 
of the big issues of concern of the population. For this reason, Trump’s 
speech was so changeable and adapted according to the target audience. 
This is not a new circumstance in the American political strategy, but it 
does have a very obvious distinctive feature: the incorporation of market-
ing techniques and advertising consumption. In this way, messages that 
the audience expected to hear were projected, generating a psychological 
link with the political discourse and a common identity bond between 
the voters.
3. Although many of the arguments and exemplifications during Trump ś 
campaign caused explosions of hilarity among many communication 
professionals and many Democratic voices, and Hillary Clinton could not 
manage its apparent advantage. Despite having a larger campaign budget, 
the Democratic candidate failed to take the initiative in presenting origi-
nal proposals and was not able to break the emotional link between the 
Republican proposals and the people who had undergone the transfor-
mations of globalization, the disasters of the 2008 financial crisis and the 
lack of budget coverage during the Obama administration.
Once these two classifications (thematic and strategic) of key issues are 
raised, it is necessary to talk about the most decisive states in the 2016 
presidential elections. Despite having obtained the popular vote, with an 
advantage of more than two million, candidate Clinton had to see how the 
Republicans won with a difference of seventy-four electoral votes (see tables 
6 and 7). While Trump worked uniformly to preserve all the states of the 
central part of the country, mostly rural areas and very much linked with 
the Republican Party, he also launched to recover more fickle states (Florida, 
Ohio, West Virginia or Iowa) and with a long connection to the Democratic 
Party (Wisconsin, Michigan and Pennsylvania). The twenty electoral votes 
of the state of Pennsylvania raised many questions among the Democratic 
analysts, who were perplexed to see how deep the economic soflamas of 
Trump had been (Bradlee, 2018, pp. 13-27, Pollak and Schweikart, 2017, pp. 
103-126).
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The state of California deserves a special mention, as the Republicans made a 
very strong investment in advertising, apparently to try to get their fifty-five 
electoral votes, but the reality turned out to be different. Clinton made the 
mistake of spending time, campaign team personnel, and economic and 
advertising resources in a state that heavily favored the Democratic Party. 
In this way, Trump could turn to the states located on the East Coast and 
the Great Lakes region5, with the intention of pointing out the deepening 
economic issues, which very high percentages of the population had been 
experiencing. 
“[…] Trump keeps saying he ś going to spend $ 100 million on his cam-
paign […]” (The Washington Post)
3. Symbiosis of the new and the old: communication, publicity, message 
and leadership
One of the main causes of the scarce impact of campaign advertising of 
the Democratic Party in 2016 was the obsession with digital media and the 
purchase of minutes in the mainstream media. With more than twice as 
much money spent on advertising as her opponent, candidate Clinton could 
not capitalize on her supposed initial advantage, as opposed to a Republican 
discourse anchored on an advertising strategy based on a mixture of tra-
ditional elements and experimental elements (Myers, 2017, pp. 267-278; 
Rapoport et al., 2017, pp. 147-151). The Democrats came to the election di-
vided, with a presidential candidate who did not work on the consensus 
and the appeasement of the opposing sectors, with a triumphalist political 
discourse and an exhausted economic agenda, and with an important part 
of its electoral mass still suffering the consequences of the financial crisis 
of 2008.
5.   The most economically degraded region after the implementation of neoliberal policies: offshoring 
and deindustrialization. States renamed journalistic information as “Rust Belt”.
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“How Trump won by spending half as much money as Clinton […] ‘We 
had enough money and the right candidate. It ś as simple as that’, said 
Lewis Eisenberg, the Republican National Committee ś finance chair-
man. […]” (USAToday)
Trump announced his intention to appear in the Republican primaries with 
very clear ideas and predesigned messages. As already mentioned in the 
first section, his experience in the sales and advertising sector guaranteed 
him a good understanding and ability to work with the specialists of his 
political team. The speech for his first appearance in New York, on June 
16, 2015, was not only a declaration of intentions, but a kind of extract of 
slogans, promises and affirmations, which would be very present through-
out the electoral campaign (2016 ) and in his speech of his inauguration as 
president (2017). The poster with the motto “Make America Great Again” 
was present on candidate Trump ś stage, flanking the lectern and eight 
American flags, and with the song “Rocking in the Free World” (Neil Young) 
at full volume.
The dichotomy between the new and the old reflects the immense effort 
made by the team of candidate Trump in his attempt to fight for the young-
est electorate. It was intended to convey the message that in a large country 
all citizens had a place, regardless of their age or situation. Campaign ad-
vertising and the dissemination of information and political messages were 
a mixture of detailed programming and improvisation of the candidate 
at specific moments (Corder, 2016, pp. 13-20, Hendricks and Schill, 2017, 
pp. 121-130). This conjunction of factors could be compiled in the following 
classification:
1. The implementation of advertising objectives is established on a previous 
segmentation and a selection process based on the chances of success. 
The objectives close to the Republican Party are propped up, the objec-
tives close to the Democratic Party are ignored and the possibility of 
approaching the peripheral elements of all the political options is worked 
in depth.
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2. The construction of the concepts of empty meaning, flexible meaning 
and the open meaning. Simple and assimilable slogans are proclaimed, 
which the electors interpret and decode according to their ideological 
predilections and personal beliefs. In this sense, the phrases “Make 
America Great Again” and “America First” have multiple meanings and 
multiple interpretations. Trump supporters consider that making a big 
country again could mean: good jobs, high salaries, open factories, va-
cations as in previous decades, a country without immigration, fully 
English-speaking, the ability to go out to dinner on weekends, medical 
insurance in the company, the possibility of changing cars, owning a 
house, having solvency in a rural area, safe streets, being able to fly home 
for family celebrations, having access to higher education, etc.
3. The use of fear, despair and distrust, through vagueness, exaggerations, 
inaccuracies, popular myths, urban legends and false news, incorporat-
ed into the official campaign, in the front line of the political debate. The 
purpose of this use of ineffable and irrational elements is related to the 
gradual elimination of the theoretical and deontological components of 
the political debate and the media. This strategy was proposed for both 
mobilization and demobilization.
4. The thematic assault of the media and the news coverage of journalism 
professionals. When the journalistic approach is not appropriate for 
the interests of projection of favorable messages, candidate Trump al-
ways redirected the debates, the press conferences, the interviews and 
the interpellations by means of exaggerations, outbursts, controversial 
statements, falsehoods, victimizations, organizational resources, etc. It 
is what has been known journalistically as “taking the initiative in the 
debate,” at the price of skipping all tactical agreements and cordiality 
frames for public debate between Republicans and Democrats.
5. The permanent contact with the people throughout the Republican pri-
maries and the whole presidential campaign was an element of enormous 
impact among the public opinion. This process of approaching people 
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was carried out through causal encounters in the street, in political party 
events, in sudden visits to work places, in photographic meetings (selfies) 
with thousands of people, with the incorporation of the public in political 
scenarios and with the call of the campaign volunteers to take the initi-
ative. In this sense, candidate Trump presumed to be an ordinary man, 
a politician who listens to people and who knows the social reality. He 
boasted about having the most loyal followers and the most transversal 
and patriotic electorate.
6. The permanent evocation of the greatness of the United States, adapt-
ing messages and historical icons of the American culture to the point of 
mythologizing the socio-economic past. Under this premise, Trump did 
not miss the opportunity to be photographed under an old advertising 
poster, to be wrapped in retro stylistic elements, to have meetings with 
veterans, to participate in outdated cultural activities, to quote letters and 
dialogues of great musical and cinematographic successes, synthesize 
the great political issues of Republican rhetoric, etc. The denunciation 
of the negative drift of the country, also deserves a mention, as in the 
placement of posters and campaign stickers in closed factories, in evict-
ed buildings, activist seats, deteriorated infrastructures, entrances to 
ghettos, depopulated areas, etc. The projected image of the second half 
of the 20th century is an authentic historical distortion, but with a great 
sentimental component. The messages and products linked to the idea 
that any past time was better are very captivating for a large part of the 
population.
7. The creation of a common working framework between analogue com-
munication media and digital communication platforms. The foundation 
of media for the campaign (a paradigmatic example would be Breitbart) 
and the use of social networks (the most symbolic case would be Twitter) 
of all kinds to generate debates among citizens, was another step in the 
peculiar battle of Trump with the established journalistic channels. The 
need to disseminate marathon days of political activity, in three, four and 
five states or cities a day, was very well covered. In the same way, this 
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action reinforced candidate Trump ś attempt to convey an image of being 
an unconventional politician and victim of the intransigent liberal press.
8. The permanent affirmation that the excess of ideological planning had 
placed the economy and political institutions in a catastrophic situation 
throughout the country. Of course, in all this rhetorical dramatization, 
the Democratic Party, and its progressive approaches and the influence 
of its peripheral sectors had placed the country in this critical situation. 
In the crucial moment of 2016, candidate Trump came forward to solve 
all these problems, falsely arguing that he had no ideology, simply assert-
ed that he was gifted with talent for the economy and concerned about 
the suffering of the American citizenry. 
4. Conclusion
Taking stock of research on electoral issues, on political messages and on 
audiences, it is possible to verify the existence of a general tendency to use 
quantitative methods and mixed methods. There are research topics that 
match very well with statistical abstraction, but there are other research 
objects that can not be considered within a rigorous statistical study. This is 
the case of many of the communicative and sociological phenomena derived 
from the electoral campaign of Donald Trump. In a global investigation of 
the campaign so many variables emerge of a psychological, intangible and 
ineffable nature, which can not be addressed without multiple methodologi-
cal interconnections and without a final qualitative assessment.
All the elections are conditioned by a fundamental issue, and this topic usual-
ly has a great impact among the media and among the electorate. The theme 
“star” of the 2016 presidential campaign was the approach of the socio-eco-
nomic degradation of the United States and the serious consequences of 
the financial collapse of 2008. Candidate Trump knew very well how to 
transmit his message through multiple media and channels, coordinating 
their different strategies very well. On the contrary, candidate Clinton could 
not counteract the rhetorical effect of the popular slogans “Make America 
José Antonio Abreu Colombri 57
Great Again” and “America First”. The approaches of political logic and mac-
ro-economic reality of the Democrats were always in the shade.
The political justifications facilitated the impulse of hate speech and simpli-
fication of candidate Trump. Trump’s communication strategies broke the 
Democratic normality and undermined the pre-established electoral ethic 
in the United States, contributing to the creation of a highly polarized social 
scenario. There is a very clear tendency among the world press to describe 
Trump as “populist”. In a sense, there are some many elements close to 
populism, but they have been exaggerated by information professionals, be-
cause those same elements have not been emphasized in other American 
historical leaders. We must bear in mind that Donald Trump’s speeches 
have been a selective synthesis of the different programs and ideological 
positions of the Republican Party over time. In this sense, it can be said 
that the war started by Donald Trump against the liberal and progressive 
press had consequences on the criteria for the production of political con-
tent throughout the campaign.
The combined use of traditional media and new digital platforms are un-
doubtedly a key issue in the wide dissemination of political messages and 
programmatic content of the Republican Party. In recent years terms such 
as “post-truth” or “false news” have been generalized as elements of disrup-
tion at the present time, but they are exaggerated, because falsehoods and 
hoaxes have always existed. The Digital Revolution has given greater diffu-
sion to the “dirty game” in the field of American politics and come about the 
foundations have also been laid for a new code of conduct and a new cultur-
al identity between the different parts of conservative “America”.
Trump’s electoral victory would not have without his political communica-
tion strategy. This strategy included three objectives to seek an electoral 
victory: keep the traditional Republican voter, intensify the approach to less 
ideologized voters in areas with the possibility of Republican victory and 
seek electoral demobilization of the traditional Democratic voter in the most 
economically depressed areas. In relation to the communicative strategy, 
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the campaign of electoral publicity of the Republican Party was very well 
interconnected with the political messages and supposed a true invasion 
of the public spaces and of the communicative structures throughout the 
entire country.   
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THE PERFORMANCE OF POWER AND CITIZENSHIP: 




In this paper, I examine the mediated juxtaposition and 
interrelation of the performance of power and of citizen-
ship in the context of two TV programmes aired as part 
of the UK Brexit referendum campaign of 2016. The UK 
Prime Minister of the day, David Cameron, head of the 
campaign to remain in the European Union (EU) ap-
peared on the shows, one at the launch of the campaign 
and one days before the referendum. The shows were 
adaptions of the popular BBC current affairs panel dis-
cussion programme Question Time on which Cameron 
fielded questions from members of the public moder-
ated by a programme host. In the first programme, he 
was also interviewed by a political journalist in front 
of the TV audience before taking questions. There are 
several reasons why these shows are significant in re-
lation to political communication and the theme of this 
special issue “citizenship and performance”. First, the 
programmes are examples of the diversity of forms of 
political communication ranging from set piece party 
political broadcasts, political interviews, televised de-
bates, talk shows, and appearances by politicians on 
current affairs and popular programmes on daytime 
TV. Second, the direct engagement between the Prime 
Minister of the country and members of the public in a 
mediated exchange of views and ideas raises questions 
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about the role of the media in the public sphere and contemporary argu-
ments about the role of disruption, dissent, activism and populism. Third, 
as relatively unscripted public exchanges the programmes are performed 
by representatives of power and citizenship. I will argue that power is per-
formed by the PM as a construction of personal authenticity and political 
authority and by citizens as a disruption of the performance of power in 
the form of individualized dissent (Ruiz, ref). The context of the referen-
dum was also important as a major political event that stood in a complex 
relation to traditional party political affiliation and engaged the public in a 
relatively open debate between sides representing the answer to a single 
question; whether to remain in the EU or leave.
Cameron, it has been widely acknowledged, as an ex-PR man, was a con-
summate political performer across a range of media contexts (Craig, 2016). 
In a similar way to ex US president Obama he developed a style of political 
leadership that sought to overcome the excesses of spin and media manage-
ment characteristic of the Clinton and Blair years by sustaining a skilled and 
reflective approach to the mediated performance of power that combined 
accessible personal authenticity combined with political authority (Craig, 
2016). Up to the point of the EU referendum campaign, Cameron appeared 
as a highly skilled media performer accomplished at managing standard 
political communication contexts such as press conferences, interrogative 
interviews with political journalists and set piece speeches such as the annu-
al party conference. In addition, he was equally at home meeting the people 
in mediated town hall meetings (PM Direct), or sitting on the sofa of a cur-
rent affairs TV show as he was when debating in the chamber of the House 
of Commons. Craig (2016) argues that such multiply skilled performances 
across such varied contexts aim to manage, if not resolve, tensions between 
authenticity and performance, between the public politician and the private 
individual, between factual broadcasting and entertainment and between 
legitimacy based on expertise and public popularity. Such a leadership style 
also aims to avoid or overcome the public cynicism that potentially results 
from the visibility of media management and spin which draws attention 
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to the strategies of political communication rather than substantive claims 
and policy commitments (Capella and Jamieson, 1997). These diverse media 
practices adopted by Cameron aimed to establish popular appeal through 
the performance of personal authenticity thereby meeting the demands for 
personal information from social media and infotainment genres without 
sacrificing political authority. 
In the three weeks of campaigning between June 2nd and June 22nd 2016 fif-
teen mainstream TV programmes were aired across several genres. These 
included political interviews conducted by well-known political journalists, 
debates between leading representatives of the remain and leave cam-
paigns, audience discussion programmes with members of the public and, 
the programmes examined here, variants of Question Time in which key 
campaigners faced questions from members of the public. The BBC played 
a central role in staging ten of the sixteen TV (and one radio) programmes 
during the campaign. ITV held three events, Sky News 2 and Channel 4 one. 
Recent commentators (Chadwick, ref; Craig, 2016) have suggested that TV 
is finding its place in contemporary campaigns partly through innovations 
in programme forms and by complementing and intersecting with online 
and social media campaigns and public reactions.
This paper focuses on two TV programmes aired during the Brexit cam-
paign in which Cameron came face to face with members of the public to 
answer their questions. Cameron aimed to disseminate his campaign agen-
da through this mediated public engagement, inviting the audience to watch 
him in interaction with the studio audience who, however, attempted to dis-
rupt his skilled practice of the performance of power. They exerted pressure 
on Cameron by disrupting his performance and by pressing home political 
questions and social concerns that went beyond the agenda he was aiming 
to disseminate (Isin, 2002). As social practices these interactions involve 
performative skills, traditions and the constitution of political subjectivities 
(MacIntyre, 1981). The approach to analysis in this paper, therefore, focus-
es on the analysis of the mediated performance of a social practice taking 
as its starting point the centrality of argument and disputation in mediat-
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ed public spaces, analysing the genre conventions adopted in these hybrid 
programmes as a mis-en-scene. The paper starts with a discussion of key 
themes and questions at stake in thinking about the mediated performances 
of power and citizenship both in terms of thinking about the role of differ-
entiation between politics and the political and in terms of the genealogy of 
both performance of power grounded in authenticity and authority and the 
background to public acts of dissent and activism. These discussions are 
followed by an analysis of the two television shows and the paper concludes 
with reflections on the performance of power and citizenship. 
Political culture, Media and de-differentiation – the blurring of boundaries
These programmes stage an encounter between performances of power 
and citizenship (Goffman, 1961), that instantiates the blurring of bounda-
ries in political culture and society partly enabled by digital media (Isin and 
Rupert, 2015). Such encounters reflect the de-differentiation of politics and 
the political (Mouffe, 2005), system and lifeworld (Habermas, 1987) and 
questions of equality and freedom and social and cultural values (Rawls, 
1993). Isin and Ruppert 92015) demonstrate the affordances of digital me-
dia create new potentials for the performance of digital citizenship as acts 
that make claims to rights. Here I explore the way that these trends spill 
over into linear media in the way that citizens occupy the spaces of linear 
media to disrupt the performance of power a staged encounter as autono-
mous individuals in which citizenship is enacted (Gray, 2000). The ideas 
of rights claiming and politically autonomous acts of citizenship raise criti-
cal challenges to the liberal tradition that understand citizenship as a legal 
category of rights bearing individuals and suggests a process conception 
of both governance and forms of life in liberal democracies (Gray, 2000). 
Differentiations between the state and the body politic, between questions 
of politics and values, and between civil and uncivil discourses and actions 
are all potentially blurred in the current conjuncture. 
These engagements are performative in the way suggested by Alexander 
et al (ref): “individuals, organizations, and parties moved “instinctively” 
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to hook their actions into the background culture in a lively and compel-
ling manner, working to create an impression of sincerity and authenticity 
rather than one of calculation and artificiality, to achieve verisimilitude” 
(Alexander, Giessen and Mast, ref, 1)
In the context of a political campaign, television offers a key site for per-
formative embedding and engagement. The communication styles of 
political leaders have adapted to make use of the diverse forms and con-
texts of communication balanced by disciplined campaigning and media 
management strategies. In this paper, I argue that alongside the varied 
forms of performative engagement by politicians, the affordances of staged 
performance create opportunities for citizens to occupy mediated spaces 
and realise their political interests and aims through the disruption of the 
performance of power. Activist movements, civil society bodies, and indi-
vidual citizens exercising their rights to communicate taking advantage of 
these opportunities. In contrast to seeking compromise or consent (Mouffe, 
ref), participating in the public sphere (Habermas, ref) or civil disobedience 
(Rawls, ref), contemporary forms of activism and dissent innovate in vari-
ous ways including varieties of performative disruption (Isin and Ruppert, 
2015; Ruiz, 2014; Lekakis, ref). In this paper, I consider the idea that individ-
ualized forms of dissent make their way into the mainstream by tactically 
occupying positions provided for the expression of views and opinions in 
order to disrupt the performance of power. 
The Background to the EU Referendum
The campaign for Remain was modelled on the conservative party cam-
paign at the 2015 general election. Having governed as part of a coalition 
with the Liberal Democrats since 2010, the conservatives won an unex-
pected parliamentary majority in 2015. There was an increase in support 
for conservatives and labour, the collapse of the liberal vote and, notably, 
a radical increase in the nationalist vote as both the SNP in Scotland and 
UKIP in England dramatically increasing their vote. The Daily Telegraph of-
fered an insightful analysis of the election campaign organized by Lynton 
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Crosby that demanded discipline from members of the conservative party, 
a campaign agenda that focused on economic policy, negative campaigning 
against their main rivals Labour and the Lib Dems focused on the party 
leaders (Ed Miliband and Nick Clegg), and David Cameron fronting the cam-
paign in presidential style. 1
The use of Cameron ‘front and centre’ was partly justified by his high per-
sonal opinion poll ratings although these were moderated by perceptions of 
him as uncommitted and unemotional and negative reactions to his upper 
class social background. Craig (2016) discusses the strategy adopted to over-
come these public perceptions by deploying Cameron’s high-level media 
skills to make a direct appeal to the broader electorate. For example, Craig 
(2016) provides a detailed analysis of the way in which Cameron handled 
an interview on the BBC’s Andrew Marr Show by skilfully challenging the 
host’s framing of conservative policy, answering only the questions he want-
ed to answer and refusing to be drawn into areas that might be problematic.
The challenge facing Cameron and his advisors was to find ways of bringing 
his undoubted rhetorical and presentational skills into contact with a broad-
er public, to popularise his leadership. Consequently, skilful performance in 
political interviews was supplemented by a mixed communication strategy 
that kept Cameron in the public eye and aimed to soften his public image. 
This included a strategy that sought to use Cameron’s communication skills 
as a way of closing the gap between him and the public in the form of direct 
communication in Town Hall style meetings called PM Direct, transcripts 
of which were made available on the No 10 website and recordings load-
ed on YouTube. These ‘meetings’ were often held in places workplace (e.g. 
Caterpillar. Easyjet., Rolls Royce) or in the meeting spaces of NGOs, in 
which Cameron stood, often shirt sleeved, amongst the employees or mem-
bers who were seated at floor level with a bank of chairs behind him from 
the perspective of a single camera. This production format created a dis-




The shows were unmoderated so Cameron hosted the show, explaining, for 
example, to questioners that they should wait for the roving mike to reach 
them before speaking and he was, of course, also the ‘guest’ of the show, 
answering questions asked by the audience. An important feature of such 
encounters was that the questions were preselected and there was no fol-
low-up or supplementary questions by members of the audience. This lack 
of interactivity between questioner and answerer allowed Cameron the op-
portunity to treat questions as cues to which he responded by delivering 
well-rehearsed accounts of conservative policy.
The PM Direct format was adopted for the general election campaign of 
2015. These occasions were constructed in private spaces (for example an 
aircraft hangar) and constructed creating the impression of a public meeting 
but with control over who was present and limiting the communication of 
participants to asking pre-selected questions and applauding. The audience 
gave a performance of being members of the public but in fact are con-
servative supporters. Cameron’s performances focused on presenting the 
election agenda in the form of popular versions of campaign speeches and 
the ‘audience’ reacted positively and emotionally; he was fired up and they 
were fired up. This was a simulation of the traditional campaign stump, but 
in a highly controlled and disciplined occasion in which enthusiastic party 
members created a sense of spontaneity as a background to Cameron’s cam-
paign speeches. Perhaps, in the context of a general election campaign it is 
understandable to create what looks like a naturally occurring interaction 
as a managed show (Thompson, ref), but this stands in potential contradic-
tion to the performance of power as authenticate political authority.
The Programmes
Sky News
Cameron kick started the remain campaign with an appearance on a Sky 
News special on the 2nd of June 2016. The show began with an interview 
conducted by Faisal Ali, a political journalist, in front of a live TV audience 
and was followed by a moderated Q&A session with members of the studio 
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audience hosted by Kay Burley, a Sky newsreader and presenter. In the con-
text of a campaign in which the factual basis of claims made by both sides 
and the growing awareness of the idea post-truth, Islam opened his ques-
tioning by asking the PM to stick to the facts about migration by outlining 
the figures for net migration during his leadership. This was challenging 
ground for Cameron given his claims that the leave camp had adopted 
post-truth campaigning and also questions his political authority because 
of the promise in the 2015 election campaign to reduce migration to the 
tens of thousands a year. Cameron gave a straight answer by admitting 
that 600,000 more people had entering the UK than had moved to other 
countries since he came to power. When pressed whether he had broken 
a manifesto promise (challenging political authority) Cameron provided an 
intriguing justification shifting the ground from a manifesto ‘promise’ to an 
‘ambition’ and suggesting that the relatively better performance of the UK 
economy during his period of office compared to continental Europe had led 
to the creation of many new jobs which had attracted workers from across 
Europe:
When I made that ambition for Britain, at that time net migration between 
people leaving and people coming from Europe was broadly in balance. It 
was about trying to reduce migration from outside. But we have been living 
in extraordinary times when the British economy was growing strongly and 
we’ve created 2m jobs. There was a time when we were creating more jobs 
than other European countries put together. That won’t continue for ever.
Another important strategic element of this answer is that it shifts the fo-
cus onto Cameroon’s central campaigning agenda, the economic benefits of 
membership of the EU and the risks of leaving. He argues that the target 
“remains the right ambition for Britain” and that trying to cut immigration 
by leaving the EU and pulling out of the single market would be “madness”, 
because of the economic damage it would cause. 
A number of further questions followed from Islam, most significantly chal-
lenging Cameron’s references to the first world war to illustrate the potential 
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security dangers of Brexit, which Islam suggests is an example of fearmon-
gering by the remain campaign. After further questions which are less 
challenging, the show changes gear (and genre) and morphs into a mediated 
popular press conference or political talk show (Craig, 2016). Faisal Islam 
is replaced by a Kay Burley who moderates the subsequent Q & A question 
session with members of the audience asking questions of Cameron. This 
combination of production formats was a challenge to Cameron not least 
because the robust exchange with a professional journalist are followed im-
mediately by a context which required softer skills to engage members of 
the public; which are usually kept separate in different generic media. What 
becomes evident is that Cameron’s view of the exchanges with members of 
the public was to treat their questions as symptomatic of public concerns 
and triggers or cues for campaign soundbites as he had in PM Direct.
For example, one participant, identified as a businessman, asked the PM to 
reflect on the personal damage the scaremongering has done to your legacy. 
Cameron’s reply is interesting and reflects an appeal to personal authority 
as the core of his political commitments: I don’t accept it is scaremongering. 
I am genuinely worried about Britain leaving the single market. Cameron also 
links his campaign focus on the economic risks of leaving the EU to his po-
litical authority: Frankly, I think the job of the prime minister is to warn about 
potential dangers as well as to talk about the upsides and the opportunities 
there are by being a member of this organisation. In addition, Cameron articu-
lated his opposition to post-truth by emphasising his reliance on and trust in 
a variety of experts who support the claim that leaving the EU will be to the 
economic detriment of the UK and linking this to his political authority: But 
if I didn’t listen to the IMF, to the OECD, to the TUC, to the CBI, to the governor 
of the Bank of England – if I didn’t listen to any of these people, I would not be 
doing my job and I would not be serving this country.
Another questioner expressed concerns that during the Brexit campaign, 
the PM shared a platform with the Mayor of London who he had strongly 
opposed as the Labour candidate in the mayoral election of the previous 
year. In response, Cameron said:
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We had a lively election campaign in London, I didn’t think it was the 
right choice some of the people he shared a platform with. The right 
thing for the PM to do is to work together. Sadiq and I disagree about 
many things, we’ll try and work together and on this issue of Europe we 
agree. We buried our disagreements and appeared on a platform. 
From Cameron’s perspective, the contingencies of a referendum necessari-
ly realign politics across party lines and as leader of the conservative party 
and prime minister he would now find himself opposing the arguments 
and positions of some of his party colleagues and working for the remain 
campaign which included many liberal or left-leaning organizations, public 
figures and politicians. From the perspective of members of the public, how-
ever, the dissociation of Cameron from his role as leader of the conservative 
party and PM is not taken lightly. For example, one participant suggest-
ed that it was time to change the government reflecting the idea that the 
referendum was a vote of confidence in the government and in Cameron. 
Intriguingly, some political commentators ridiculed participants for such 
questions, but the difficulty of separating political commitments and alle-
giances from the question of membership of the EU is non-trivial as the 
ruling conservative party knew well.
Another reason Cameron adapted Town Hall meetings as part of the remain 
campaign, especially in the context of not agreeing take part in a televised 
debate in the 2015 general election and the Brexit campaign, was as a re-
sponse to the public perception of the lack of passion and authenticity. Town 
Hall meetings create a sense of Cameron among the people and of sponta-
neity through performance allowing Cameron to concentrate on delivering 
his campaign messages rather than engaging in discussion or debate with 
the audience. All this is well illustrated by his exchange with a literature 
student on the Sky News programme. The student, identified as Soraya 
Bouazzaoui made a statement of her concerns: “the entire campaign was 
nothing but scare mongering; no valid facts; no pros and cons” and that 
“everything I’ve seen makes voting into the EU look worse”. The campaign, 
in other words was high on persuasion and low of fact and argument and, 
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significantly, this intelligent, informed, articulate member of the public is 
thinking of the referendum as a choice between “voting in” in her terms 
and “voting out”. Referenda are usually deployed following parliamentary 
agreement on legislation for which there I parliamentary approval of leg-
islation that has significant constitutional implications and so is put to the 
public for their assent. Cameron’s original strategy was to make significant 
changes to the UK’s position in Europe through negotiation and then put 
these new conditions to the referendum in which case the question put to 
the public would have been do you agree/disagree with the new conditions 
for membership of the EU. However, Cameron was only able to negotiate 
adjustments to the UK’s conditions of membership and in this context, the 
referendum was drafted as an in/out vote giving equal weight to both sides 
and triggering more existential questions about membership of the EU than 
Cameron initially intended. Instead of approval for new relations with the 
EU, Pandora’s box was opened and with it a platform for conservatives who 
had always questioned the UK’s membership of the EU and nationalists who 
had always questioned the legitmact of European political institutions. 
Having expressed her concerns about the conduct of the Brexit campaigns, 
Bouazzaoui did not give way to cynicism but questioned the reassurances 
that Cameron had repeatedly made that remaining in the EU would make the 
UK safer in foreign affairs and specifically in response to terrorist threats. 
Using the concerned raised by middle East states concerning Turkey’s rela-
tions to terrorist groups, she questions whether being in the EU meant that 
there were no risks in foreign policy. Cameron’s response was interesting, 
saying that he would address the two issues that Bouazzaoui had raised: 
First, the positive case for staying. I think there is a positive case. I think we’ll 
be better off as a country, with more jobs. I think we’ll keep our country moving 
forward, we’ll get things done in the world, whether its tackling climate change 
or indeed standing up to Islamic terrorism … and also we’ll be safer; strength in 
numbers. At this point, Bouazzaoui interrupts Cameron:
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 “That’s not answering my question. Let me finish now, because I’ve 
seen you interrupt many people before. Let me finish.  I’m an English 
Literature student, I know waffling when I see it, OK. I’m sorry, but 
you’re not answering my question – how can you reassure people who 
want to vote out that we notare safe from extremism when we are will-
ing to work with a government like Turkey who want to be part of the 
EU when they are under heavy accusation?” 
Cameron’s discomfort was evident and he tried to get back on track by 
saying that he had ‘got it’ and addressed the question of Turkey’s potential 
accession to the EU – 
There is no prospect of Turkey joining the EU in decades. They applied 
in 1987, they have to complete 35 chapters. One has been completed so 
far. At this rate they will join in the year 3000. There are lots of reasons 
to vote one way or vote the other way. Turkey is not going to join the EU 
any time soon, every country, every parliament, has a veto. There are 
lots of things to worry about in this referendum campaign. I absolutely 
think that is not a prospect, it’s not going to happen.
This exchange illustrates a number of aspects of the interaction between 
the performance of power and of citizenship in this programme. It demon-
strates Cameron’s strategy of taking questions as cues to which he responds 
with rehearsed campaign speeches. The passage also demonstrates that an 
important aspect of the performance of citizenship in this context is refus-
ing the audience subject position, to bring power to account by insisting 
on the relevance of answers and of disrupting the performance of power. 
We can make sense of Cameron’s strategy as treating substantive political 
questions as expressions of concern which he takes as needing reassur-
ance, information or contradiction. However, on this occasion, the student 
questioner was on the evening news. 
At the end of the programme Cameron was given space to make a short 
summary statement: 
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I would just say to everybody: as we go home and wake up in the morn-
ing and look our children and our grandchildren in the eye and we think 
who we are responsible for through our pay packet, let us not roll the 
dice on their future. Britain doesn’t succeed when we quit, we succeed 
when we get stuck in and we work to improve these organisations and 
we safeguard the prosperity and the security of this great country. To 
me, that’s what it’s all about.
This pre-rehearsed set-piece ending does not address the studio audience or 
reflect on the discussions that have taken place in the programme. Instead 
it is another attempt to provide a newsworthy headline.
In contrast, anyone who had watched this programme would most likely 
come to the view that the programme had demonstrated precisely that the 
public were not in agreement with the remain campaign’s focus on the eco-
nomic consequences of leaving the EU and that a combination of substantive 
political questions related to immigration, the legal framework of the EU, 
the impact of migration on public services, and the efficacy of the govern-
ment’s austerity policies were all implicated in the vote in the referendum 
. Furthermore, Cameron’s deflection of such questions and his very skilled 
practice of turning to his own agenda raised serious questions about both 
his authenticity authority on which his enviable popularity ratings had been 
based up to this point.
Press reaction to the programme was interestingly split. Those who evalu-
ated he programme in terms of how well Cameron got his agenda and points 
across were broadly positive reckoning that he had managed well despite 
the distraction of the hostile interview and having to manage the relation-
ship with members of the public. Those who focused on the interaction with 
members of the public were less convinced. The consensus was summed up 
by Michael Deacon, writing in the Telegraph: The studio audience didn’t think 
much of him, and he knew it. It was no disaster. But if you wondered why Mr 
Cameron didn’t fancy a proper debate: now you know.2
2.  http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2016/06/02/i-know-waff ling-when-i-see-it-david-came-
ron-takes-a-brexit-roast/
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The BBC Programme
Shortly before the referendum Cameron appeared on a BBC programme to 
meet the people in an adaptation of the Question Time format, moderated 
by resident host David Dimbleby. This version of the programme also dif-
fered in significant ways from the standard version of Question Time. On 
the standard version of Question Time members of the studio audience are 
selected by the host, guided by the production team, to ask questions to a 
panel representing the main political parties plus celebrity guests. In the 
programme commissioned for the referendum there was no panel and in-
stead David Cameron fielded all the questions. The host invited questions, 
offering clarification when required, gave space for the PM to answer, 
pressing for clarification or bringing him back to the question if necessary, 
then invited the next question. The shift from a panel to a single individual 
changed the mis-en-scene for the performance of power and citizenship.
The producers and the host learnt from the first Sky News programme and 
dealt with Cameron’s tendency to not address questions and shift the topic 
onto his campaign agenda by clustering questions thematically. In contrast 
to the fragmented nature of questioning on the Sky News programme, on 
this occasion a number of questions on the same theme would follow one af-
ter the other. Consequently, although Cameron shifted topic in response to 
questions, he found himself back on the same ground in the next question. 
The effect of this returning to the topic was exacerbated by the programme 
format because, unlike in the panel version of the programme, in which 
different members of the panel get to give alternative responses to audience 
questions and to contest these among each other before the host turns back 
to the audience for supplementary questions and comments. In contrast, in 
this version of the programme one question to the PM followed another. In 
addition, the host was aware of the concern about Cameron not answering 
the question and hijacking the agenda and so sometimes brought the PM 
back to the question asked and explained that he understood that Cameron 
wanted to talk about the economy and that he would get an opportunity 
later.
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The first cluster of questions addressed the impact on political culture of 
the Brexit campaign suggesting that it had “soured the political climate in 
the UK”, by amplifying antagonism and linking this to the tragic death of 
MP Jo Cox. In an interesting answer, Cameron attempted to draw a line 
between political commitment or passion and aggression and to distinguish 
the use of reason and argument from rhetoric. He invites the audience to 
contemplate good and bad versions of political commitment and argument, 
implicitly claiming that he is on the right side of both oppositions because 
his politics are authentic and that his claims are backed by evidence. His 
opponents, by implication, are political opportunists and prepared to say 
anything to win.
Once again, however, Cameron has missed the point of the question, which 
made a subtler point that the contemporary media juncture amplifies au-
thenticity and authority claims. Furthermore, the robustness of political 
argument and the use of negative campaigning to discredit opponents (de-
capitation) thereby amplifying antagonism in the public realm. In his reply, 
Cameron presses ahead, aiming to justify the comparison between him-
self and his political opponents. He focusses on Nigel Farage, the leader of 
the populist United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP) and key figure in 
the campaign to leave the EU although not part of the official ‘leave’ group. 
Cameron refers to a Brexit campaign poster by UKIP which used a pho-
tograph of refugees crossing the border into Bosnia-Herzegovina with the 
headline Breaking Point. Cameron argues that Farage is ‘wrong in fact and 
wrong in motivation’ and that the Brexit campaigners “attempt to fright-
en and divide people”. In the campaign, the Brexiteers, particularly Boris 
Johnson, were able to turn this argument against Cameron by pointing to 
inconsistencies in his position on Europe challenging the authenticity of 
his position and to characterise his focus on the potential economic ills of 
leaving the EU as “project fear”. At this point the host intervenes to ask, 
“has your side been guilty of that”? articulating a commitment to impar-
tiality in an interesting form; as a referee in broader public debate/disputes. 
The theme continues including a question that challenges Cameron on the 
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‘Brexit budget’ prepared by the Chancellor to demonstrate the effects of 
leaving Europe on taxation and public spending. Cameron’s reply suggests 
that his concerns are authentic, expressing his genuine concern for the eco-
nomic impact of leaving the EU and citing the support of independent experts 
(OECD, IMF BoE, IFS).
Following the exchange on the conduct of the campaigns a series of ques-
tions and answers on Cameron’s own future; will he resign if the country 
votes to leave, would he call a general election if the vote is to leave the EU? 
These questions reflect the central role that Cameron played in the cam-
paign and he tries to argue that it is not about him and shifts to his main 
agenda that we should remain for the sake of the economy, jobs, safety, 
security, and because being part of Europe strengthens the UK: “It comes 
down to a question of the economy and we need to work together – to grow 
the economy and beat terrorists” 
The staging and performance of power and citizenship
Ironically, these potentialities arose in a reframing of the genre of public 
participation. 
Conclusions
How did Cameron find himself in such a difficult, compromised perform-
ative context? In the language of the history of the present (Foucault refs; 
Garland, ref) then we can trace a line back to his previous ‘meetings’ with 
members of the public in PM Direct allied to a leadership style that aimed 
to combine personal authenticity with political authority and a disciplined 
approach to campaigning that included a presidential style with Cameron 
at the centre, negative campaigning against rivals and a focus on economic 
policy. The field of emergence for this configuration of leadership and cam-
paigning styles being coalition government and the attempt to develop a 
political leadership style that averred spin and media management yet was 
media savvy. In contrast to previous meetings with the people that were 
‘managed shows’ in which Cameron selected the place and audience and 
Peter Lunt 77
set the rules of interaction the two shows in which he met the people in the 
Brexit campaign were managed by the broadcasters and gave opportunities 
for the performance of disruptive citizenship. Instead of a controlled context 
that afforded the illusion of public engagement while allowing Cameron to 
deliver his campaign message he found himself involved in a contested per-
formative space.
The difficulties experienced by Cameron and the opportunity afforded to 
citizens were a function of the production format of the programme as a 
mis-en-scene for the performances of power and citizenship. The transfor-
mation of the programme format from its regular instantiation preserved 
many of the characteristics of the genre, but introduced a number of trans-
formations that placed a greater focus on the PM as a single recipient of 
questions in comparison to the panel format usually adopted in Question 
Time. As a consequence, an important aspect of the dynamic of the pro-
gramme was missing arising from the different perspectives that are 
represented by panel members in their responses. The programme usually 
proceeds in a sequence in which the host invites a question from the studio 
audience and then invites panel members, one after the other to answer 
questions Question Time is characterised by contestation, argument and 
often conflict between panel members as they debate alternative answers 
to the questions under the scrutiny of the programme host. The host then 
goes back to the audience for supplementary questions and reactions to the 
answers provided and the debates aired and finally the person who asked 
the question gives their reactions. In Cameron’s managed show of PM Direct 
much of this was stripped away and questions were followed by a short 
campaign speech by Cameron before taking the next question. In the two 
Brexit programmes analysed here, elements of the original Question Time 
format were implemented as the host intervened, there were supplemen-
tary questions and interventions from the studio audience. However, the 
absence of the panel altered the dynamic of the programmes in significant 
ways. There was no variety of responses to questions, just Cameron’s and 
also no display of divergent views or contestation in front of the audience. 
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The rhythm of exchanges and arguments and the emotional flow of the pro-
grammes were altered considerably by these changes, becoming a series 
of questions and answers rather than a question followed by a robust ex-
change and opportunity for further audience engagement. In terms of the 
flow of emotions also, instead of a dispersed exchange of feelings as well as 
views the direction of sentiment was always in the direction of Cameron.
The programmes therefore reflect the focus on Cameron in the Remain 
campaign and created a sense of contestation with the audience and ten-
sion between the performance of power and citizenship. In addition, the 
programmes became a meta-commentary on the Remain campaign in gen-
eral and Cameron’s role in particular. Cameron addressed the questions 
through two frames of reference; as cues to themes in his campaign themes 
rather than substantive questions and as concerns that required a combina-
tion of information (let me put you right) and reassurance. These features of 
his responses were seen as symptomatic of a government and a campaign 
that was not listening to public concerns and avoiding substantive political 
issues. 
The analysis suggests that these are strategic performances of both power 
and citizenship reflecting Goffman’s (1959, 1974) dramaturgy in which peo-
ple act out social roles by adjusting their performance in relation to others in 
a social context constrained by rules. This account contrasts with accounts 
that argue that performance is the playing out of discursive scripts or inter-
actional accomplishments. Here I suggest that the disruptive interventions 
and occupation of the television studio are examples of political agency in 
the form of individualized dissent. 
In these examples, the mediated performance of disruptive citizenship 
presents itself as individuals disrupting power rather than forming or rep-
resenting loosely bounded social movements or collectives (Bennett and 
Segerberg, 2012). These disruptive encounters appear to be the work of indi-
viduals asserting their rights to visibility in public and to communicate in a 
performative practice akin to Isin and Ruppert’s (2015) account of digital cit-
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izenship as rights claiming practices. However, the key to these disruptive 
practices is not the claiming of rights in and of itself but the disruption of the 
performance of power. These are political acts undertaken by individuals 
expressing their autonomy by occupying a space in which the performance 
of power is made visible and realised through the interaction with the per-
formance of citizenship. In this citizenship is realized as a performative act 
rather than as a legal status in a context in which the performance of power 
and of citizenship are mutually constituted by players on the same stage 
(Goffman, 1959). 
These individualised forms of dissent resonate the increasing visibility of 
and debate about new protest movements that have gained high levels of 
public visibility through digital and linear media and recent instances of 
activism and protest. The invasion of the TV studio and programme reflects 
the transgressions of space by protest movements (Rovisco and Ong, . The 
performative dimension of the occupy movement as a practice of disrup-
tive invasion of privatised public spaces contrasts with social movements 
that aim to enter the mainstream by building support and membership 
(Bennett and Segerberg, 2012). New protest movements seek to galvanise 
media contexts and Along with occupation of space, the occupy movement 
experiments with but providing examples of opposition through dissent and 
the invocation of radical democratic practices in reclaiming the square (Ong 
and Rovisco, ref). Just as digital and social media provide social movements 
with new resources that ameliorate to some degree the lack of access to 
mainstream media resources of those challenging established power so too 
performative disruption and radical democratic practices seek to influence 
through their visibility and public impact and by providing models of alter-
native political practices.
What then, are the politics of individualised forms of performative visible 
dissent? One way of thinking about this may be as a combination of po-
litical autonomy and democracy as a modus operandi (Gray, 2000). In the 
examples discussed here dissent is performed as an expression of individu-
al political autonomy as:
The Performance of Power and Citizenship: David Cameron meets 
the people in the 2016 Brexit campaign80
 “social actors, embedded in collective representations and working 
through symbolic and material means, implicitly orient towards others 
as if they were actors on a stage seeking identification with their expe-
riences and understandings from their audiences” (Alexander, Giessen 
and Mast, ref, p 2).
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HUNGARIAN MEDIA POLICY 2010 – 2018:  
THE ILLIBERAL SHIFT
Monika Metykova1
Viktor Orbán’s political career was arguably spear-
headed by a memorable speech delivered in Budapest’s 
Heroes’ Square on 16 June 1989. The then 26-year-old 
Orbán – a founding member of Fidesz (Fiatal Demokraták 
Szövetsége, the Alliance of Young Democrats) that was 
established in March 1988 – spoke on the occasion of 
the reburial of Imre Nagy and other martyrs of the 1956 
Revolution. Re-reading or re-watching his 1989 speech 
(for a transcript in Hungarian see e.g. Magyar Nemzet, 
16 June 2014) makes one acutely aware of the transfor-
mation that Hungary’s Prime Minister underwent since 
his youth as a liberal defiant of the governing Hungarian 
Socialist Workers’ Party who demanded free elections 
and the withdrawal of Soviet troops and praised the 
virtues of European civic society. The change in Viktor 
Orbán’s ideological leanings and his open embrace of 
so-called illiberal democracy has been discussed ex-
tensively. In this article I outline key developments in 
media policy making between 2010 and 2018 as these 
are symptomatic of and at the same time play a cru-
cial role in legitimizing Hungary’s shift to illiberalism. 
Hungary’s case represents a major challenge for those 
studying media and democracy as the recently intro-
duced and implemented media policies depart from 
normative ideals associated with media in democratic 
societies yet their originators have been democratical-
1.  University of Sussex, UK. 
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ly elected with significant popular support and the laws have been passed 
following standard democratic legislative processes. Indeed, at the time of 
writing in April 2018 Orbán secured another two-third majority victory in 
national elections and there are already signs that he and his newly formed 
government will continue on the illiberal path. 
Viktor Orbán first became Prime Minister of Hungary in 1998, his coalition 
government stayed in power till 2002. Following the 2010 parliamentary 
elections he took office again when the coalition of his party Fidesz and 
KDNP (Kereszténydemokrata Néppárt, Christian Democratic People’s Party) 
gained a two-third majority (this has been referred to as supermajority and 
it is particularly important as with such a majority changes to the coun-
try’s constitution can be introduced). Developments in Hungary attracted 
international attention (and even alarm) following the Orbán government’s 
changes to media laws and to the Hungarian Constitution (re-named the 
Fundamental Law of Hungary) with some of these criticized as a as depar-
ture from liberal democracy towards authoritarian rule. The European 
Commission (see e.g. EC 12 January 2012), the Council of Europe (see e.g. 
Venice Commission 20 June 2013) as well as a range of non-governmental 
organizations (see e.g. Human Rights Watch 18 September 2013) have 
voiced strong concerns about the changes undermining the rule of law, 
judicial independence, the independence of the country’s Central Bank as 
well as restrictions on human rights. Orbán’s 2014 supermajority victory 
brought the continuation of criticized policies, moreover, their development 
has been paired with strong anti-European Union rhetoric. 
In July 2014 Viktor Orbán made a speech at the 25th Bálványos Free 
Summer University and Youth Camp2 in the Romanian Băile Tuşnad that 
has generated a lot of international interest. The Hungarian Prime Minister 
pointed out that western liberal democracy failed on a number of levels – the 
2.  The Summer University was established in 1990 and runs annually since then. The original declared 
aim was to bring Hungarian and Transylvanian politicians together and maintain a dialogue across the 
Hungarian Romanian border. Fidesz played a key role in establishing the University with prominent 
Fidesz politicians – including Orbán himself – acting as regular speakers. For more on the broader 
issue of diaspora politics in post-1989 Hungary see Waterbury 2006.
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shortcomings were highlighted particularly following the 2008 financial 
crisis – and went on to state that Hungary needed to rebuild from scratch 
and the way in which to achieve the country’s renewal was to divert from 
the western liberal democratic model and instead build an illiberal nation 
state. “The most popular topic in thinking today is trying to understand 
how systems that are not Western, not liberal, not liberal democracies and 
perhaps not even democracies can nevertheless make their nations suc-
cessful.” The non-liberal democracies that The Prime Minister referred to 
included Russia, China, Turkey, India and Singapore.3
Fareed Zakaria – who coined the term illiberal democracy in 1997 – re-
sponded to the speech arguing that “Orbán has enacted and implemented 
in Hungary a version of what can best be described as ‘Putinism’ [whose] 
crucial elements … are nationalism, religion, social conservatism, state cap-
italism and government domination of the media. … Orbán has followed in 
Putin’s footsteps, eroding judicial independence, limiting individual rights, 
speaking in nationalist terms about ethnic Hungarians and muzzling the 
press” (Zakaria, 2014). In contrast to Zakaria’s conclusion, Buzogány (2017: 
1309) argues that the shift towards “authoritarian great powers” was not 
based on ideational proximity with Vladimir Putin/Russia. 
Rather, it was preceded by growing alienation between the EU and Hun-
gary that left little space for the Hungarian government to find other 
allies. Confronted with acute political criticism for its constitutional re-
forms by its Western allies, Hungary has increasingly become inclined 
to diversify its foreign policy. The economic crisis Hungary has faced 
since 2008 made the country’s opening towards Eastern interference a 
primarily economic interest-based strategy, helping to balance financial 
pressure from Western lenders. At the same time, while the Hungarian 
government provided rhetorical support for Russia in cases where its 
3.  For a Hungarian transcript of the speech see e.g. Farkas 2016; the official English translation is 
available at http://www.kormany.hu/en/the-prime-minister/the-prime-minister-s-speeches/prime-
minister-viktor-orban-s-speech-at-the-25th-balvanyos-summer-free-university-and-student-camp
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interests were at stake (energy issues, EU sanctions), it never left the 
common Western line but tried to increase its bargaining position on 
both sides (2017: 1309). 
Whether we share Zakaria’s or Buzogány’s standpoint or indeed agree with 
others writing on the topic (see e.g. Csillag and Szelényi 2015, Halmai 2014), 
there is no doubt about the intentional nature and impact of policies intro-
duced by Prime Minister Viktor Orbán’s governments since 2010. Although 
– in the international context – changes at the national level characterized 
by a “powerful tendency toward centralization, extending political con-
trol over state apparatuses and other sectors of society” (Hajnal and Rosta 
2016: 10) received most attention in mainstream media, it is also Orbán’s 
sub-national governance reforms introduced between 2010 and 2014 that 
“fit in a new, broader, ‘illiberal’ tendency in Central and Eastern Europe” 
and represent an intentional manifestation of top-level political will (ibid.: 
19). Such a manifestation of political will from the highest echelons of lead-
ership is also evident in the sphere of media and communications and it is 
crucial to keep the significance of such influence in mind as 
Media systems do not emerge spontaneously from the logic of commu-
nication technologies, or from the business plans of media corporations, 
or from the imaginations of creative individuals. … Media systems are 
instead purposefully created, their characters shaped by competing po-
litical interests that seek to inscribe their own values and objectives on 
the possibilities facilitated by a complex combination of technological, 
economic and social factors (Freedman 2008: 1).
A lot of the criticism of Hungary’s media laws introduced in 2010 has fo-
cussed on changes to public service media that seriously impacted on their 
independence from government, however, we should also keep in mind that 
government policies shape privately owned media, in Robert McChesney’s 
words “all media systems are the result of explicit government policies, sub-
sidies, grants of rights and regulations. ... Indeed, to have anything close to 
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competitive markets in media requires extensive government regulation in 
the form of ownership limits and myriad other policies” (2003: 126). 
Hungary’s case is a stark reminder that the political and judicial arenas 
play a key role in deciding about normative issues, in this case about how 
the media should operate if particular goals (promoting – or de-legitimizing 
– certain social values among them) are to be attained. Policy making is 
far from being a neutral, largely administrative and technical process, it 
involves a range of stakeholders who 
make claims within a political system on behalf of goals (favoured end- 
-states) which are said, in the light of certain fundamental, or commonly 
held, values to be of general benefit to the whole society, community or 
public, over and above individual wants, satisfactions or utilities. These 
claims are specified in terms of preferences about a communication sys-
tem or its performances which correspond to the advocated end-state 
(McQuail 1992: 27).
Orbán’s supermajority governments have implemented media policies (as 
discussed further in this article) that are in contrast with long established 
ideals of media policy in democratic societies, in Ellen Goodman’s words 
such policy “consists of regulatory interventions specifically designed to 
promote communicative opportunities” (2007: 1211). Such media policy can 
be characterized as universalistic, with the aim of ensuring the public in-
terest in communication, “including the equality of access to the media for 
all. By contrast, some non-consolidated democracies such as Hungary have 
engaged in particularistic media policies in an effort to enhance private 
interests. A primary means of the latter practices is the favouritist distri-
bution of media resources, as a result of which public assets are channelled 
into private pockets” (Bajomi Lázár 2017: 170-1). In addition, there is another 
issue with media policy making in contemporary Hungary: although poli-
cy making is not a neutral process, in depoliticized settings it is informed 
by expert knowledge, however, as we see – perhaps in a magnified man-
ner – with Hungary’s shift to illiberalism, “in politicized settings, research 
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and expertise are much less likely to be used as an authoritative source of 
policymaking, as this could be interpreted as a threat to political prima-
cy. When expertise itself becomes increasingly politicized, research–policy 
relations are more likely to vary over time with shifts in political power”4 
(Scholten and Verbeek 2015: 189).
Fareed Zakaria highlighted government control of the media as a charac-
teristic of an “illiberal democracy.” For those following developments in 
Hungarian media regulation and ownership and the government’s broader 
interventions in the field of media, the shift away from established liberal 
democratic practices has been evident for at least the past ten years. The 
long-established democratic roles of media – the public sphere, the fourth 
estate, the watchdog etc. – have eroded in a number of so-called new de-
mocracies that emerged after the fall of the Berlin Wall, however, this trend 
may be specially marked in the case of Hungary. Between 2010 and 2018 
Orbán’s governments developed a range of strategies and policy interven-
tions that enhanced the government’s control of the media, the most widely 
discussed among these is the 2010 Media Law5 that brought about changes 
seen as restrictive of media pluralism and freedom among others by the 
OSCE, Council of Europe as well as the European Parliament. Evidence of 
direct and indirect interventions in public service media has surfaced reg-
ularly since Orbán’s victory in 2010 and by 2017 Hungarian public service 
broadcasters effectively became the government’s propaganda tools. Many 
of the special roles that the normative ideal of public service broadcasting 
has been associated with in liberal democracies ‒ including the provision of 
4.   The broader issue of the questioning of expertise itself in relation to political decisions/policies is 
not restricted to Hungary, of course. The UK’s Brexit vote is a widely known example when politicians 
openly attacked expert knowledge. In the Hungarian government’s 2018 national election campaign 
investigative journalists, representatives of NGOs and academics were labelled mercenaries of the US 
financier and philanthropist George Soros, and in the aftermath of Viktor Orbán’s April 2018 victory, 
Figyelő, owned by an Orbán ally, published a list of individuals designated as such mercenaries, it is 
perhaps worth adding that the general public has been encouraged to supply further names for the 
list, see http://figyelo.hu/itt-a-vegleges-lista, for an article in English that explains the case see e.g. 
Gorondi 2018. 
5.   Due to restrictions of space, I am leaving aside changes to the Hungarian constitution that 
prompted Guy Verhofstadt, the leader of the liberal ALDE group in the European Parliament to call for 
a suspension of Hungary’s voting rights (enabled by Article 7 and often understood as the EU’s nuclear 
option), see e.g. http://www.politics.hu/20120111/leader-of-liberals-in-europeanparliament-presses-
for-sanctions-against-hungary
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impartial and balanced news, programming that represents a wide range 
of interests in society, contents that are deemed of high societal value etc. 
‒ have been eroded or outright eliminated and the changes implemented in 
connection with the 2010 Media Law have centralized control over different 
aspects of public service media. 
Each of Hungary’s public service media outlets – three national TV, three 
radio stations and one national news service – are now supervised by a 
single body headed by a chairperson appointed by the Media Council. 
The assets of these outlets have been transferred to a newly established 
public media fund, which is managed by the Media Council. News con-
tent for all  public media stations is produced centrally by Hungary’s 
national news service, MTI, which is headed by a new director who 
was nominated by the Media Council chairperson. Opponents claim 
the measures have eliminated the independence of Hungary’s public 
service media, bringing all aspects – from programming to funding to 
regulatory supervision – under the Media Council’s control (Center for 
Media and Communication Studies 2011). 
Importantly, questions have been raised about the public service me-
dia’s independence – which “has been elevated to the status of a principle 
of European human rights law” (Venice Commission 19-20 June 2015: 
Paragraph 81). The Council of Europe’s Venice Commission concluded that 
the re-structured supervisory bodies potentially jeopardize the broadcast-
ers’ independence:
In sum, the Media Act does not secure pluralistic composition of the 
bodies supervising the PSM [public service media]; its provisions enable 
the ruling party/coalition to ensure the loyalty of the Media Council, of 
the MTVA [the cooperation of the four public service media organiza-
tions: Hungarian Radio (Magyar Rádió), Hungarian Television (Magyar 
Televízió), Duna Television (Duna Televízió) and Hungarian News Agen-
cy (Magyar Távirati Iroda)] and of the BoT [Board of Trustees], and, 
through them, to control finances and personnel of the public broadcast-
Hungarian media policy 2010 – 2018: the illiberal shift88
ers. This creates space for covert intrusion into the journalistic freedom 
in the public media sector – an intrusion which is not always possible 
to discern, because it does not manifest itself as formalised orders and 
sanctions, and which cannot therefore be prevented by means of judicial 
review (ibid.: paragraph 86). 6
Similar concerns have been highlighted in a report by the Centre for Media 
Pluralism and Media Freedom on media pluralism in Europe, more precise-
ly in 28 EU member states, and in two candidate countries – Montenegro 
and Turkey:
… four are at high risk when it comes to political influences over differ-
ent dimensions of their media operations – two of which are EU member 
states (Hungary and Slovenia), and two candidate countries (Montene-
gro and Turkey). Hungary is the only EU country that scores high risks 
for all five indicators in this area [the extent of the politicisation of the 
media system, media organizations, newsrooms, media reporting and 
the public service media], with most concerns being related to the al-
location of state subsidies and advertising, and independence of PSM 
governance and funding (Brogi et al. 2017: 4). 
However, the impact of the new media policies was felt beyond public ser-
vice media and in order to understand the broader context, Peter Bajomi 
Lázár’s concept of the party colonisation of media provides a fitting frame-
work as the phenomenon 
may be defined as a strategy aimed at extracting from the media resources 
such as airtime, frequencies, positions and money, and channelling them to 
party loyalists in order to reward them for various services. It may target 
all media – public and private alike – but its primary targets are the 
6.   A few concrete examples can be provided to highlight some of the issues involved: the Media 
Council has five members and is chaired by the President of the Media Authority who is appointed 
by the Prime Minister for indefinitely renewable 9-year terms. The other members of the Authority 
are nominated by an ad-hoc committee composed of delegates of each parliamentary faction. 
A particularly worrying issue ‒ in the context of Orbán’s supermajority – is that the votes of the 
members of the nominating committee are weighted according to the proportion of each faction’s 
representation in the Parliament.
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regulatory authorities and public service broadcasters that parties may 
oversee more easily than private outlets, as the appointment mecha-
nisms of their regulatory boards are designed in ways that enable them 
to delegate their supporters into these institutions (2013: 76, emphasis 
original). 
Bajomi Lázár goes on to outline objectives of party colonisation of media 
and these are all applicable to the case of Hungary: parties can call on con-
stituents that they would not reach otherwise; the colonised media enable 
parties to gain new resources for indirect party funding; colonised media 
become pawns in party patronage; parties can use colonised media to ex-
clude rival parties from participating in these (ibid.: 84). 
I have already outlined some of the issues related to the colonisation of 
public service media, in the following section I highlight some policy 
interventions in the commercial media sector that contributed to the col-
onisation of these media by Fidesz. In the aftermath of the 2008 financial 
crisis a number of foreign media owners left the Hungarian market and a 
radical re-structuring of ownership occurred with oligarchs loyal to Viktor 
Orbán not only gaining ownership of some of the media but also guaranteed 
income from government advertising (a particularly important Orbán ally, 
Lajos Simicska, ran a media empire supporting Fidesz until the two parted 
ways in 20147; for an analysis of Simicska’s media empire see Bátorfy 2015). 
In the already mentioned report by the Council of Europe’s Venice 
Commission concern is expressed about the “disproportionate distribu-
tion of discretionary advertising revenue by the State”8 and also about 
restrictions on political advertising that impacted on the April 2014 general 
7.   It has been argued that after the fallout, efforts were made to prevent Simicska from acquiring 
further media assets and “new” Orbán allies gained government backing for their media acquisitions. 
A major one involved Andy Vajna – Hollywood producer and since 2011 the Hungarian government’s 
representative (kormánybiztos) for the film industry – who acquired the national commercial 
television channel TV2 after a legal battle with Simicska. It is perhaps worthwhile to mention here 
that Vajna secured the channel with a loan from state-owned Eximbank that was set up to support 
Hungarian exports and the government had to pass an amendment to a law to enable Vajna’s loan (see 
Byrne 2016 and also Czinkóczi 2017). 
8.   In 2017 12% of the overall television advertising revenue originated from the Hungarian government 
and importantly there has been an eightfold increase in the government’s television advertising 
spending between 2010 and 2017 (Szalay 2018).
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elections and according to the OSCE/ODIHR Limited Election Observation 
Mission “in the current media environment, the absence of other political 
advertisements on nationwide commercial television, combined with a sig-
nificant amount of government advertisements, undermined the equal and 
unimpeded access of contestants to the media, which is at odds with par-
agraph 7.8 of the 1990 OSCE Copenhagen Document” (Venice Commission 
19-20 June 2015: paragraphs 93-99).
Following Orbán’s landslide victory in 2014 the government also introduced 
(or proposed) changes that have had a serious impact on the funding of 
media, among these was the 40% tax on advertising income (which dispro-
portionately impacted on RTL Magyarország which forms part of the RTL 
Group) and the proposed tax on Internet services which was scrapped after 
large-scale protests. At the end of 2016 local and regional newspapers were 
also snapped up by those close to Orbán, “with the purchase of the local 
newspapers, it is estimated that some 90% of all media in Hungary is now 
directly or indirectly controlled by Fidesz. … The only independent media 
still standing in Hungary are a few outlets, including the investigative re-
porting operations Atlatszo and Direkt36 and the news server 444.hu. Their 
audiences pale in comparison with the Orbán-aligned media” (Dragomir, 
2017, see also Reporters without Borders 2017). More subtle ways of gov-
ernment interference involved, for example, the online news site vs.hu 
which received £1.5 million covert funding from the Hungarian Central 
Bank’s foundation (ten of its journalists resigned once the information about 
the funding surfaced but at the time of writing the website continued to 
function). 
The Hungarian government’s grip on media – public service as well as com-
mercial ones – is playing out in political discourses in a manner that can 
only be characterized as propaganda. Indeed, Bajomi Lázár and Horváth 
(2013: 220) argue convincingly that “in contrast to the period 1998–2010, 
the Peace Marches and other communication campaigns launched since 
Orbán’s government took office in 2010 have marked a paradigm shift 
in political communication, best described as the revival of old-school 
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propaganda,” keeping in mind that “political propaganda is intended to 
establish ideological hegemony, while political marketing is based on the 
acknowledgement of ideological pluralism” (ibid, p. 222). As part of public 
communication campaigns (including election campaigns) certain types of 
– often Christian – nationalistic discourses9 have been promoted by the gov-
ernment, these tend to focus on the “nation’s enemies”, including refugees, 
NGOs, the EU and the Hungarian-born US financier George Soros. In the 
2018 election campaign the use of hate speech as part of political commu-
nication has increased markedly, with the U.N. Human Rights Committee 
voicing concerns at “the prevalence (in Hungary) of hate crimes and about 
hate speech in political discourse, the media and on the Internet targeting 
minorities, notably, Roma, Muslim, migrants and refugees, including in 
the context of government-sponsored campaigns” (Nebehay 2018, see also 
Article 19 2018).
The range of changes to Hungary’s media policies that were introduced be-
tween 2010 and 2018 and indeed their impact have been varied and complex 
and in order to gain a fuller picture further scholarly work is needed not 
only on the area of media and communications but also on education and 
cultural policies as these will help capture the “temperature” of Hungary’s 
current state. None of the developments – whether in policy or in owner-
ship or indeed in the distribution of advertising revenue by the government 
– are illegal yet their impact – as I have outlined above – is already erod-
ing the democratic roles of media. As Bajomi Lázár concludes in relation to 
Hungarian particularistic media policy making, 
this practice is legal, by virtue of the current media regulation adopted 
by the same parliamentary majority that now enforces these measures. 
But not all that is legal is legitimate: the particularistic distribution of 
media resources is a form of institutionalised corruption and party 
9.   The scope of this article does not allow me to discuss cultural and educational policies but these 
have also played an important role in the promotion of Christian nationalist values and discourses, see 
e.g. Bajomi Lázár and Horváth 2013, Fekete 2016. 
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patronage, and has had a devastating impact on some of the key compo-
nents of democracy, including media freedom and pluralism, as well as 
the equality of access to the media (2017: 171).
Also, as I suggested at the opening of this article, there are also issues 
with the current policy making process as such, the practice of using the 
government’s supermajority to introduce a wide variety of policies is defi-
nitely of concern in terms of the health of Hungary’s democracy, the Venice 
Commission “objected to the use of cardinal laws for issues that, in the 
normal course of affairs, should have been left to ordinary legislation: ‘The 
more policy issues are transferred beyond the powers of simple majority, 
the less significance will future elections have and the more possibilities 
does a two-third majority have of cementing its political preferences and 
the country’s legal order’ ” (2015: paragraph 17). 
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THE AGRI IS TECH, THE AGRI IS POP, THE AGRI IS 
POLITICS: THE “RURAL WORLD” AND THE RISE  
OF THE AGRIPOLITICIAN IN BRAZIL
Pedro Pinto Oliveira1
Summary: The present work analyses the performance of a 
public persona that has been active in Brazil’s political land-
scape for at least two decades: the so-called “agripolitician”. 
He or she is characterized by its simultaneous actions in ‘both 
sides of the counter’, that is, in the world of politics and in the 
agribusiness. We begin by describing the utopia that presents 
the Rural World as a perfect place for economic power and 
market logics. It subsumes all the other relations in world of 
life to producing/profiting/living. With Philosophers Günther 
Anders (2011) and Michel Foucault (2016), we put in context 
this idea of “completeness”. As operator concepts, we used 
Erving Goffman’s (2004) notion of performance, as well as 
Communicability, which derives from Alfred Schultz’s (2005) 
Social Phenomenology and John Dewey’s (1929) Classic 
Pragmatism. We have selected an emblematic figure for this 
proposed analysis: Blairo Maggi, former Governor of Mato 
Grosso; Senator and Minister of Agriculture. He is known in 
the media as the “Soy King”, a hero to rural businesspersons, 
but also as the “Golden Chainsaw”, a villain for environmen-
talists and adversaries.
Keywords: Communication; Politics; Philosophy; Perfor- 
-mance; Brazilian elections.
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Introduction
In the past 25 years, a new public persona category has arose in Brazil’s 
political landscape, occupying substantial spaces in State and Federal legis-
latures, besides mayoral and State governor tenures. The ‘agripolitician’ is 
characterized by its simultaneous actions in ´both sides of the counter’, that 
is, in their political tenures and in the agribusiness. Our study case is about 
an agripolitician that was emblematic in consolidating the participation of 
these public figures in Brazilian politics: Blairo Maggi, former Governor of 
Mato Gross for two terms; Senator and Ministry of the Agriculture during 
the Temer administration.
The Rural World is presented by these public figures as a utopia, a com-
plete world where market logics organize life and imposes its own values: 
modern rural practices, top-notch technology for production, and the idea 
that the rural world sustain the urban world. The key statement on this 
intended superiority, in fact a slogan, has been repeated ad nauseam – “city 
people should thank countrymen for the food they are eating today”. This 
arrogance undermines appreciation from other groups of people, as put by 
Sidney Hook (2000), making it harder to put together empathy of the socie-
ty as a whole with the issues related to the Rural World ś modern men. To a 
certain extent, an institutional ad from TV Globo emphasizes this image of 
self-sufficiency and of prime efficiency. It is, in other words, a certain Brazil 
that worked out: The agri is tech, the agri is pop, the agri is everything”. The 
values portrayed in the piece are about the self-made rural men, and about 
an Urban World that depends on the rural superiority, as well as on the food 
it produces.
This is what normal is like in the modern Rural World: it is automatized 
and connected to variations in the price of commodities and in quotations 
worldwide. A complete world, according to Anders (2011): actions, opinions 
and sentiments in this universe are given as if they were an order though 
they are not perceived as an order. It is “natural” that they are like this. 
Small family agriculture producers complement this universe as part of a 
backward rural world that was overcome by a new power – the economic 
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power of Brazil’s big and medium rural producers, which demands a share 
of political power.
As pointed out by Foucault, according to Brown (2016), there is a peculiarity 
of neoliberalism that, in the context of creating agripoliticians, generaliz-
es the form of market economics and effectively generalizes the corporate 
form into the social fabric or the social theory. It gives an Economics shape 
to the entire social field. Neoliberalism means the instauration of strictly 
mercantile relations in society. The emphasis is placed in the entrepreneur-
ial spirit, in entrepreneurship, in consumerism and in satisfaction.
Throughout this analysis, we will briefly present the character that repre-
sents this new category of public persona, acting simultaneously in politics 
and in the agribusiness: Blairo Maggi, a billionaire rural businessman that 
inspired dozens of agribusiness millionaires in Mato Grosso to go into par-
tisan politics and run for office.
Our research is based on Communications’ relational idea, with two oper-
ator analytic concepts: Performance, according to Erving Goffman’s (2004) 
notions, and Communicability, a concept we developed since doctorate out of 
the communication ideas of Philosophers Alfred Schultz (2005) from Social 
Phenomenology and John Dewy (1929), from Classical Pragmatism.
Finally, we assess the first findings of the research: our main character 
speaking about himself, of his path in production until he entered into po-
litical affairs; about how the agripolitician is “cultivated” within the relation 
between weak parties and strong producers’ associations, as well as the 
groups’ initiatives as a non-partisan Front in Congress aimed at sectoral 
interests. 
Blairo – from an ally of Lula, Dilma and Temer to a Bolsonaro campaigner
Blairo Borges Maggi was born in Torres, Rio Grande do Sul (RS) in 1956. He 
is an agronomic engineer, billionaire businessperson and is ahead of a fam-
ily business group established by his father, André Maggi, initially based in 
the state of Paraná.
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Like thousands of Brazilians from the South of the country, Blairo migrat-
ed in the 1970s with his family to Mato Grosso, in the Center-West region. 
Migrants from Rio Grande do Sul, Paraná and Santa Catarina were the ones 
who opened the lands of Cerrado for agriculture, mainly for soya production.
Before going into politics, Blairo Maggi was already a widely known public 
figure in Mato Grosso, as well as nationally on agribusiness specialized me-
dia outlets. He was known as the “King of Soya” due to his huge production 
areas, which are considered a success model to be followed. In his first term 
as Governor, Blairo was awarded with the title of “Golden Chainsaw”, an 
ironic laurel given by a TV comedy show. The alias stuck on him and would 
be used by adversaries for quite some time.
Blairo Maggi ran and won his first Mato Grosso Governor elections in 2002. 
He was reelected in 2006 and became a Senator in 2010. In the 2018 elec-
tions, he did not run for office.
During his political career, he was a member of three parties: PPS, PR and, 
now, PP. He coordinated in Mato Grosso the presidential campaign of Luiz 
Inácio Lula da Silva (PT) in 2002 and 2006, as well as Dilma Rousseff (PT) 
presidential campaign in 2010 and 2014. He would then support Dilma’s 
impeachment in 2016 and become the Minister of Agriculture in the Michel 
Temer (PMDB) administration since the beginning of Dilma’s Vice-President 
term. In the 2018 elections, though not running for office, he made a public 
declaration in support to Jair Bolsonaro (PSL) for President.
This feature of backing candidates with bigger chances to win in the elec-
tions and of siding with their governments is common in the agribusiness 
sector. This feature is actually inscribed in the business logics, as it was 
further described in the own accounts by this public figure: to back and be 
part of the administration, any administration, is a form of controlling the 
actions of the sector’s interest in Congress and in the Executive branch, 
which demonstrates the sheer frailty of Brazil’s partisan system. Partisan 
fronts are secondary. In fact, interest-based fronts, like the Agriculture 
Parliamentary Front, are the ones with an influence in the Parliament. They 
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position the political relationship with the Executive branch in issues relat-
ed to the economy.
The seed and the agripolitician’s “planting machine”
Blairo Maggi can be considered the “seed” of this new category of public 
persona in regional politics. He is an emblematic figure of a model that re-
sembles other state’s models in which the economic profile relates to big 
agriculture production and is led by millionaire rural businesspersons, who 
hence became active in politics.
We can describe, then, the agripolitician as someone who operates, simul-
taneously, in “two sides of the counter”: he or she holds a political mandate 
and is a rural businessmen, taking care of their private business and busi-
nesses of interest to their sector to a certain extent – be it of median or big 
producers.
These rural businesspersons’ entry into politics is motivated by the pres-
tige they harness among their entities and, mainly, by their own economic 
power. According to data from Mato Grosso’s Electoral Justice, the biggest 
amounts of resources invested in elections along this century came from 
candidates related to agribusiness. Even in the 2018 elections, when the 
Party Funding was approved, candidates that either donated or received 
donations in bigger amounts were agripoliticians. The most important pro-
jects, either in city or state elections, are led by the richest agripoliticians 
or those backed by the richest rural businesspersons. Other candidates 
connected to the sector have a secondary role, running for proportional 
positions.
Other than this economic-related aspect, the agripoliticians’ rise reveals 
frailties in Brazil’s partisan system. These candidates move from one party 
to another with no moral constraint. There are no programmatic differenc-
es or order issues that get in the way of initiatives, for instance, led by the 
Front in the sector’s economic interests. Thus, parties serve as a legal and 
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electoral disguise for the agripolitician’s initiatives, and it is very common 
along their career to include multiple and occasional party changes.
The agripolitician subverts the electoral market in a similar way described 
by Norris (2009) on the ideological spectrum of the right in Europe – a regu-
lated political market that distinguishes voters’ “demand” from the parties’ 
“supply”. In both cases, they operate in the context of electoral laws.
Parties controlled by agribusiness’ leaders articulate to organize an elec-
toral market with no concern to offer some party ideal, social values or an 
agenda that exceeds the interests of rural businesspersons. Their agenda 
comes down to maintaining both continued economic gains and specific 
advantages for median and big producers, as well as companies related to 
agribusiness.
Agribusiness-focused initiatives despises any partisan politics’ logics of an 
electoral market that, in Brazil, does not quite fit the model established by 
Norris. For agribusiness, parties are merely “planting machines” of their 
candidates. In practical terms, major political debates, the definition of pub-
lic policies, and the exercise of organized power are carried out in class 
associations: a locum where personal aspirations arise and where agripoli-
ticians are nurtured.
In Norris’ terms, it is also important to analyze the impact of their lead-
ers, as well as their rhetoric and style, because it gives inputs on how they 
build their popularity, especially when it comes to adjusting their speeches 
to demands from urban populations from bigger cities around agribusiness 
areas. These cities do not rely so much on agribusiness, but see agripoliti-
cians as “natural” leaders of the political process and elections.
From their leaders’ performance, it is also possible to assess how commu-
nication networks are organized to connect their “parties” with their class 
entities, social movements and other organized groups and institutions. 
Particularly, relations built on mediatized processes seek to occupy media 
spaces for their leaders and speeches.
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Therefore, we incorporate the notions of performance and values that cross-
cut these interactions between the agripoliticians and the public. Eventually, 
they start using media and places of confrontation, where tensions arise be-
tween the economic power, a market logic that celebrates entrepreneurial 
success, other social interests of urban citizens, and their demands. They 
become subject to the frequent scrutiny of their public personas.
Performance and values of the new public persona
Media visibility is, in the political sphere, the way in which political person-
alities attempt to ensure the acknowledgement of their existence, to project 
their public identity and insert themselves in the public’s daily life. For now-
adays’ politician, it is their main arena and practically the only stage before 
the audience. Not being in this arena means not existing; and seeming like 
a bad person is actually being bad in the audience’s eyes in the political 
theater.
We agree that the “theatrical” metaphor is useful for explaining this kind 
of social interaction that politics is, which adds up to the exam of ethical re-
sponsibilities that, in the case of our study, entail the agripolitician’s actions.
Goffman’s assumption is that social interaction can be well understood 
through the principles of drama. In social interaction, there is not only pre-
tending, there is no audience as a third element of representation, and the 
other are at the same time actors representing roles for us and the audience 
for our scene.
In this drama context, as Gomes (2004) argues, we have then an objective, 
an occasion, an argument and an instrument to achieve it. The objective is 
to direct and regulate the others’ impression over us. In order to achieve it, 
we must control our expressions during interactions. Our expressions’ con-
trol over others could be correctly described if we understand it through an 
analogy with theatrical representation.
It is clear that the impressions’ social management as put by Goffman 
(2004) is not a complete theory of political dramaturgy. On the other hand, 
The agri is tech, the agri is pop, the agri is politics: the “rural world” 
and the rise of the agripolitician in Brazil104
it is evident that the understanding of the impressions’ management in so-
cial interactions, translated into a theory of political dramaturgy, seems 
conveniently tailor-made for a theory of opinion and public image manage-
ment through the political spectacle. Precisely identifying the elements and 
aspects of political activity and democratic means of life that have been 
changed, scaled and invented for mass communication and culture, its 
media, resources and languages. This attention to transformation can be 
also explained because this phenomenon of interactions between commu-
nication and politics are not yet stabilized. New phenomena arose, trends 
hitherto evident did not become reality, and other, which seemed of no im-
portance, became important alternatives (GOMES, 2004, p. 13).
The issue concerning the configuration of political personality is part of com-
munication strategies in this new era of media visibility: it is not only about 
being seen, but mainly about being recognized as a well-reputed, reliable 
politician. As in everything in this negotiation of senses, political personal-
ity is subject to the risks of tensions and mutual affectations opened up by 
interaction.
Subject to public scrutiny, political personalities make an effort to empha-
size aspects of common individuals, with values like sincerity and honesty, 
which are highly valued by society. However, while seeking to seem sincere 
and honest, political personalities call attention to these values as virtues 
that will be demanded by the public when it evaluates their performance in 
the public arena. Integrity in the public life is a moral value in the eyes of 
the public.
This way, social values determine that the political capital to be accumu-
lated be not only fame, but rather fame with credibility. For the political 
personality, thus, being inside the spectrum of media visibility is also seek-
ing to integrate to their personality the value of reliability and reputation in 
the eyes of public scrutiny. It must be part of a group of features that are 
publicly acknowledged as belonging to a certain personality.
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The politician’s credibility, which is a value to be achieved, is balanced in a 
permanently tense axe in the relational dynamics. What the politician says 
is always under scrutiny and is confronted with their experience in life, as 
well as articulated with other sources of information. These are frequently 
concurring in different contemporary media, such as social media, and in 
beliefs shaped in other relations and associations connected to the public’s 
daily life, such as family, education and religion.
The aspiration of being accepted and recognized by the political person-
ality, on the other hand, gives the public a sort of “judgmental” authority. 
This “judge” position is, according to Dewey (1929) what “excites the human 
heart”. It is the desire of authority, of being an authority. Much of our ex-
istence, in the Deweyan line of thought, is in tune with its share of praise 
and censorship, absolution and condemnation. From this conscience of the 
public’s judgmental role, given by reflexive action, the political personality 
projects his or her model of performance in the spectrum of media visibility, 
and keeps his or her communicability efforts in managing the social role.
As any other public figure, the agripolitician is subject to public scrutiny 
in the media. He or she is subject to the very characteristics of the media 
process, like the speed and intensity of affectations, as verified in Social 
Networks with instantaneous evaluations by the audience in the interac-
tion, like responses resulting from an action or a speech in a certain public 
personality. This comes through as more complications for those who are 
scrutinized in the dimension of construed judgments based on beliefs and 
prejudices.
The biography, the past and the “rural roots” are strategic conditions in the 
construction of a successful personality, particularly for the modern polit-
ical personality that makes an effort to seem like one of us, an ordinary 
person. A modest background and a struggling past, like that of the small 
rural producer turned successful businessperson, are intrinsic parts of the 
acknowledgement of a “person like us” or of “rural man”.
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Communicability
In the analysis of Blairo Maggi’s performance, we used the relational no-
tion of communicability as a complement. The concept of communicability 
has communication’s relational paradigm as theoretical axe. Our efforts 
focus in the connection between relational instances for reflecting the com-
municative process globally, from John Dewey’s idea of communication in 
which communication is instrumental and final.
Thus, communicability is seen as the individual’s common “effort” in rela-
tion for a certain reciprocal understanding. Communicability here can be 
understood as a quality of interaction and of speeches in order to be made 
understood. This would be final sense of communication in a joint action.
Communicability is not given a priori. It is elaborated in the very interaction 
(transaction) process with the other and with the world. It is this relation 
between understanding efforts and the interaction process among subjects 
that borrows a pragmatic nature to communicability.
Communicability is part of the configuration of sociability modalities in 
the communication process, as well as in terms of context. Each moment, 
activated communicability efforts depend on how the available forms of 
communication work and are used along the transaction.
The results of the efforts applied in communication are subject to the 
subjects’ intentions engaged in their objectives. It goes beyond the mere 
knowledge of used codes, as it comprehends, especially, variations in the 
context it is inserted and the nature of the very course of action. These condi-
tions influence different quality degrees in the experience’s consummation.
The idea we present here of a gradient in the communication processes 
is aimed at highlighting variation in these processes in relation to differ-
ent contexts regardless of a “standard model” defining quality degrees. 
Communicability’s nature in this context is related to gradiency: variations 
in divergence or consensus in the communication efforts.
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The concept of communicability allows for an analysis of values that are 
activated in a relation that comprehends both the aspect of transmission, 
as shapes communication strategies take, and finalities put in action by the 
subjects.
The notion of communicability out of the relational paradigm places the 
thought on social interactions in the realm of uncertainties, of the plurality 
of intentions and gestures, in different shapes and contents that character-
ize communication processes as something peculiar of the human nature. 
In this sense, we must understand the different communication efforts: 
making something common may not necessarily be a common purpose or 
the purpose of at least one of the parties in the process. In the communi-
cation efforts, people reverberate one another and are able to listen to each 
other mutually. By incremental processes, they can modify themselves out 
of multiple and intertwined inputs. In the same way, historically, they can 
modify institutions. However, these changes can come about independent-
ly from the interaction’s initial efforts. These purposes change during the 
communicative action process.
In the following section, we present some excerpts from our character’s 
speech, the agripolitician Blairo Maggi. They highlight both the values that 
emphasize this idea of the superiority of a perfect Rural World in relation to 
the Urban World and values that activate his performance in a political and 
agribusiness context, acting in both sides of the counter.
Southern migrants and the occupation of the political space by rural 
businessmen
In an interview in March 2018 in Cuiabá for this research, Blairo Maggi 
describes the roots of how this new category of political personality was 
formulated from the Rural World. The hands-on migrant condition of an 
entrepreneur in the agribusiness, is highlighted as a distinctive value:
“We, who came from other parts of Brazil, understood the following…
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Listen, at that point we were the main motor of the state’s economy, 
as the state was living off agricultural incomes, its derivatives and its 
things. But we didn’t have a political representation in this. I mean… 
Politics was made up by a group of people and the economy was made 
up by another group of people… There was no communication.
We created a political group that was called GAR, Rondonopolis Support
Group, because then the city politics was also difficult. Agribusiness 
leaders were all there in Rondonopolis. After we established the group, 
we started to discuss politics and we came to the conclusion that we 
would eventually have to be available to work in politics.”
Politics and agribusiness
The reason for entering into politics was to gain control of the initiatives of 
interest to the Rural World:
“I started to travel a bit around the state of Mato Grosso in order to cre-
ate a political project, to try and influence politics. It was not only me, 
but also other leaders here in Mato Grosso. The idea was running for an 
election to get a grip on what it was, because, once again, that old story 
of working in politics with a glass of whiskey in your hands seems very 
easy. But actually sitting on the Executive Branch or having to be ahead 
of a state is entirely different. We wanted to give it a go and, in case we 
made it, to make the state ś economy and politics walk side-by-side in 
the definition projects for the state of Mato Grosso.”
Agribusinessmen Associations: true planting machines of agripoliticians
Blairo emphasizes that developing rural leaders to run as agripoliticians did 
not take place in political parties, but rather in class associations: 
“The factories of political leaders in our state are located in our associ-
ations. He goes there, completes his term, moves on to a second term, 
and then leaves. He will do other things, among them, politics. So, it’s 
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a very open-minded state, and this is different from many other states, 
where entities are perpetuated for decades, are occupied by one person 
and there is no space for new faces in politics.”
Agripolitics as a project of power
The current Minister of Agriculture says that agripoliticians may be in 
different parties, but what is important is their struggle for the common 
interests of the Rural World:
“Yes, I recognize that it was an important moment for the state, and it 
left important landmarks, I would say. We were known at that time as 
the “group of the boots”, because our campaign slogans was that the 
group of the boots, the group of countrymen, the group of the “agri” 
was coming to politics… and I think it worked. It was an interesting 
movement that nowadays continues on its own feet. There are already 
other leaders, too, and it is completely natural that some today’s run-
ning mates compete against each other tomorrow.”
The environment seen as a business environment
Blairo goes against a petition in Congress to transform the Cerrado biome 
into Natural Heritage. His logics are mercantile:
“Well, I… I even asked EMBRAPA and I still don’t have this data… But in 
EMBRAPA, we have a territorial monitoring center that is able to check 
each property what’s inside and what’s not there, which reserves are 
part of it. In my opinion, when you transform it into a World Heritage 
Site and things like that, you create bureaucracies and a bad market 
landscape. So, I am against it.
Final Remarks
As in any political movement, the lack of a leader has consequences in the 
electoral process. When Blairo Maggi gave up running to reelection in the 
Senate, it broke a dispute among agripoliticians. Out of the 11 candidates 
running for Mato Grosso’s two seats in the Senate, three were agripoliticians 
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with economic means that went beyond public funding. The three of them 
did not succeed, but one of them, Senator Judge Selma Arruda (PSL) has as 
first alternate an agribusiness millionaire. She has already formally entered 
the Agriculture Parliamentary Front (FPA), claiming to be a defender of the 
interests of agribusiness. Another elected Senator, Jayme Campos (DEM), 
a rich agribusinessman and former Governor of Mato Grosso, started with 
an open opposition to the interests of agribusiness, demanding taxation on 
the profits of agribusiness tycoons. This was part of a media confrontation 
that gained momentum and, now, agripoliticians do not count of a leader in 
an upper term, so they are facing it for the first time.
There is another important aspect that should be highlighted: the “new 
political order” inaugurated by agribusiness has resulted in a weakening 
opposition in the countryside and in a lack of public figures from popular 
movements. In a strong position during the 1970s and 1980s, these move-
ments were led by, for instance, Bishop Don Pedro Casaldáliga, a public 
figure from the Catholic Church. They lost internal political strength within 
leftist parties, as PT and PC do B became first-minute allies of Blairo Maggi, 
participating in his two administrations in State and in City Halls led by 
agripoliticians.
In this period, leftist parties did not prepare nor had a expressive candidate 
for office, one that could represent small rural producers and establish an 
opposition to the agribusiness. Candidates from this ideological field in the 
past two decades came from urban movements, such as teachers’ unions or 
from the public health sector.
As long as it cannot be pointed out as the single cause, it is not a minor thing 
that leftist parties in the case of Mato Grosso have a substantial share of re-
sponsibility in this hegemonic position of the agribusiness. In fact, the same 
responsibility can be attributed to right-wing parties, particularly PSDB. 
Ahead of the State Government from 1994 to 2002, the party was the first 
to be engulfed by the power of millionaire businessmen from this “perfect” 
Rural World.
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Part 3 IDENTITIES  
AND LIFE POLITICS 
IN A HYPER-MEDIATED 
SOCIETY 

DYSTOPIA AS A WAY TO IMPACT REALITY  
AND CREATE FANS CIVIC COMMITMENT:  
“THE HANDMAID’S TALE” SERIES CASE
Marine Malet1
Abstract: This article offers a consideration about dystopian 
fiction capacity to impact the real life. Based on the analy-
sis of two media objects, the goal is to study and enlighten 
the various levers at the disposal of “The Handmaid’s Tale” 
series to catalyze viewers’ civic engagement and raise fans’ 
awareness to the women cause. By portraying an imaginary 
dystopian society where women lost their benefits and their 
most essential rights, this series allows leaving viewers fac-
ing tangible situation and effects, permitting to produce in 
reverse reflection about our society. In order to shine a light 
on reception mechanisms, this paper constitutes an analy-
sis of two media objects responding to different logics. The 
first object responds to an institutional initiative and is the 
product of a collaboration between a militant association for 
women’ rights and “The Handmaid’s Tale” television series. 
The second object corresponds to the exchanges between 
series fans inside the official Facebook discussion group ded-
icated to the series. These two objects are a testament, as we 
will highlight, to the dystopian narrative capacity to present 
itself as a lever of consciousness sociological awaken as well 
as the active reception of fans.
Keywords: dystopia; feminism; awareness; fandoms; the 
handmaid’s tale 
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“The Handmaid’s Tale” is a dystopian American television series created 
by Bruce Miller and produced by the VoD platform Hulu. The first season 
broadcasted in 2017 is a faithful adaptation of Margaret Atwood’s novel pub-
lished in 1985. The second season, in turn, is a free creation released in 
the spring of 2018. The series plot takes place in a dystopian and totalitari-
an society called “The Republic of Gilead”. In a near future, pollutants and 
STDs have increased infertility which caused a drastic fall of the birth rate. 
An extremist politico-religious sect took advantage of the strained political 
climate to seize power, eliminating all dissidents and those they considered 
as a pariah – to wit homosexuals, Catholic priests, Muslims, etc. The soci-
ety has been reorganized according to a religious and patriarchal project: 
women have been disposed of their citizen status and rights first and then 
allocated according to their duties. Actually, there are five different women 
kinds: Wives – sterile women married to politic leaders and wealthy men; 
Econowives – fertile women married to poor men; Marthas – assigned to 
governing families, they perform all household chores, Aunts – religious 
women who train and supervise handmaids; Handmaids – fertile women 
dedicated to reproduction, they are assigned to a high-ranking families to 
give them a child. The series relates the story of a handmaid, June, renamed 
Offred. Because in Gilead, each handmaid has to adopt the first name of 
whichever man she is assigned to, along with the prefix “Of”. Here, the com-
mander of Offred’s family is named Fred Waterford, so his handmaid will 
be necessarily named “Offred”. A way to reinforce the women objectifica-
tion: they are nothing more than a men’ property, a “disembodied womb 
on legs”.
If the second season, broadcasted in the spring of this year, has not been to 
everybody’s liking, the first season has for its part won unanimous support. 
Often described as a masterpiece, it already nourishes press articles and 
current research works, owing to its sociological contribution – especially 
about the United States circumstances since the season has been broad-
casted in the wake of Donald Trump’s election.  The Handmaid’s figure has 
become a symbol, used by some feminist movements in their mobilizations 
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like those against the Obamacare repeal project or MeToo2 movement for 
example.
This article emphasizes how, in the case of “The Handmaid’s Tale” television 
series, a dystopian fiction set itself up as a new symbol of feminist activ-
ism and powers awareness discourses about women rights. The analysis of 
two very different media object will demonstrate the boundaries porosity 
between fiction and real life, as well as the societal impact of this dystopia.
1. “Hope Live in Every Name” – Awareness campaign created by activist 
association for women’s rights in collaboration with “The Handmaid’s 
Tale” TV series
“Hope Live in Every Name” is an awareness campaign and a call to mo-
bilization, launched by the international association Equality Now in 
partnership with “The Handmaid’s Tale series”. The campaign has been 
launched during the second season broadcast. Available on the association’s 
website3, it consists of a video showing the main actors of the series wear-
ing daily life clothes and reading in turns testimonies of women who have 
endured violence and abuses. On the website, the video is introduced by the 
following text: 
“This is not a fiction. This is not “The Handmaid’s Tale”. Equality Now has 
partnered with season two of the Emmy-award winning Hulu series “The 
Handmaid’s Tale” to show how Hope Lives in Every Name.”
Since then, we can guess that this campaign movie is a hybrid object. It’s 
the product of two different spheres – entertainment and activism, which 
reinforces its significance. The analysis of this campaign movie and more 
specifically the speech analysis emphasized the backs and forth between 
fiction and reality. It’s also from the blurry boundary between these two 
2.   Margaret Atwood, The Handmaid’s Tale novel author, voiced concerns about #MeToo movement and 
called for due process in the case of a former university professor accused of sexual misconduct in an 
essay publised in the Globe and Mail on January 13, 2018. 
3.   Campaign website: https://www.equalitynow.org/hope_lives_in_every_name?locale=en
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spheres that the video draws its power. Here is an extract of some texts read 
by series actors: 
“My teacher got wind that I was pregnant and told me to leave school.”; 
“Because I would infect my classmates with my bad character”; “The 
men knew I was I child, but they didn’t care. They bought me anyway”; 
“One day I had a headache. He gave me two pills.”; “I woke up, and find 
myself violated. My family forced me to marry him to save the family 
honor.”; “I had a ceremony. I didn’t understand what it was, but I knew 
it hurt.”; “After female genital mutilation, they give you a new dress”; 
“The color cloth you wear goes from purple to red.”; “My culture en-
couraged it.”; “My government let it happen.”; “They do not see you as 
human.”; “They do not see that I have rights.”; “And I deserve justice.”; 
“My battle continues. I will not give up.”; “To make a change, we must 
resist together.”
In the first seconds of the video, nothing clarifies the reality of these testi-
monies. But the terms used echo some scenes of the series. It talks about 
“ceremony”4, “red clothes”, “bad character”, governments that legitimize 
and encourage violence against women… so many expressions and situa-
tions related by the series. It’s only at the end of the video that women’s 
names are quoted and one of the actors says clearly: “this is not a fiction, 
this is not “The Handmaid’s Tale”. All long the video, the doubt persists: 
what are these stories; are they from the series? This process enables to 
shows the violence of these testimonies and the fact that dystopia is finally 
more than fiction. 
Also, even if the actors don’t wear their series costume, the video esthetics 
is similar to the one in the series. The colors desaturation and the domi-
nance of grey tones which create a cold atmosphere without empathy, the 
same which makes the series oppressive and freezing. The difference is in 
the clothes colors: in the series, colors are primary and brutal while in the 
4.   In the series, the Ceremony is a highly ritualizes sexual act that high-ranking men, their wives and 
their handmaids undergo to conceive children. Handmaids having no choice in taking part, it’s a form 
of ritualized rape.
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video, they are smoother and various. They enlighten the actors and the 
words they relay. The way that the video is built allows capturing the at-
tention of the series fans, especially during the second season broadcast 
period. If the movie campaign origin isn’t immediately identified, as it’s of-
ten the case when it’s shared on social media, the video could pretend to be 
a series appendix promoting or giving new information. Viewed out of its 
context, this video could belong to fiction register, or anyway seems to be 
linked to the fiction. 
The process is particularly clever as it allows to root this dystopia in some 
sort of reality. By suggesting that the testimonies described belong to the 
dystopian tale, this video gets the public to realize that fiction is finally very 
realistic. It echoes Margaret Atwood’s words about her novel: “my rule for 
it was, nothing goes in that didn’t have a precedent in real life – somewhere, 
sometime”5. Shared on the Facebook and Twitter accounts of the series, 
the channel, the actors the author, this video uses the series popularity to 
awareness. The speech analysis highlights the link between testimonies 
read and fiction scenes. So, if “The Handmaid’s Tale” series is watched and 
decoded by some people as a simple entertainment, the series lovers can 
still find this militant content on various platforms and social media due to 
multiple sharings. Then thinking of watching a video related to entertain-
ment, it will finally go through a militant and awareness content. 
In other words, being broadcasted this way, such a media object manages to 
aware people who are unfamiliar to violence endured by women. Viewers 
are confronted with real testimonies yet so close to fiction, from distant cul-
tures and countries but also from western countries like the United States 
or the United Kingdom. Dystopia is no longer a futurist and remoted world 
and viewer is no more necessarily safe. Obviously, the dystopia with its 
strong and violent images did upset the public. But, how to extract the pres-
ent thematics from the entertainment sphere? This first element shows us 
5.   Settodeh, Ramin. “Margaret Atwood on How Donald Trump Helped The Handmaid’s Tale”. Variety, 
10 April 2018 [online: https://variety.com/2018/tv/news/margaret-atwood-handmaids-tale-trump-fe-
minism-1202748535/]
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how an institution, in this case, an association involved for the women’s 
rights, benefits from the series popularity and used the present thematics 
to raise awareness and earn commitment to its cause. Such a campaign is 
an opportunity to highlight the dystopia acuity, proving that what is shown 
on the screen and read through fiction prism is already a reality for some 
people. Extending the fiction is a way to trigger a reflection on our reality 
and bring about commitment or other activist behaviors.
Here, it’s a proposition to join an association by signing our name or making 
a donation, but the series also has motivated other sorts of commitment on 
fans’ initiative as the second object analysis will demonstrate.
2. #MAIDEZ – The official Handmaid’s Tale Discussion Group on Facebook 
(now titled: The Handmaid’s Tale – Official Fan Group) 
The series official discussion Facebook group was created by the HULU 
communication services in an entertainment logic. It’s managed by the 
official Facebook page “The Handmaid’s Tale” and so by the community 
managers of the channel. Group moderators are in the meantime the com-
munity managers.
Since April 2018 and the second season broadcast, the group structuration 
has been modified. Moderators have changed the policy settings and the 
name of the group, now titled “The Handmaid’s Tale – Official Fan Group”. 
These elements can be understood as a marketing and business strategy6. 
But when the survey research started, the group discussion was “private”, 
encouraging contributors to speak frankly, and was titled “#MAIDEZ – The 
Official Handmaid’s Tale Discussion Group”. To quote David Peyron, the 
title given to a fandom could be considered as a founding act of the commu-
nity and contributes to update and impact the group existence: “the name 
6.   To learn more about how Hulu built this social community, consult the web page: https://www.
facebook.com/community/education/stories/hulu-the-handmaids-tale/
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can be a symbol of this group of shared traits and values, and affirm it is 
like to join it”7. 
Here, we have to focus on the #MAIDEZ. In the series, Mayday is the se-
cret resistance group that works to destroy Gilead from the inside out. In 
real life, Mayday is the universal expression to call for help, a distortion 
of the French sentence “Venez m’aider”. The Hulu services chose to pick 
the French etymology, pulling the group in some reality as shown in the 
description text: “What if we were to bring Mayday to life, here in our own 
world, together?”. The presentation speech of the group is lively and offers 
the fans to take fiction as a starting point to think over our reality, extending 
the enthusiasm and the indignation aroused by the series. But this group, 
created by an economic actor of the cultural industry, has been also very 
quickly invested by the fans: they seize and appropriate it, turning it into a 
hybrid object.
To understand better the reception practices which are playing out here, the 
Internet as an analysis tool has to be taken on and used. The study must be 
about virtual practices on digital fandoms, thanks to the analysis of numeri-
cal and socio-numerical marks. A digital fandom can be defined as a “social 
group of people sharing common interests, gathered by membership”8.  
The corpus of this survey is constituted of the whole of publications and 
comments shared on the group through November 2017. All posts are in 
English and the majority of contributors are American. There are some pro-
files identified as men, but they are a minority.
A sum of 98 publications was posted during this month including texts, 
images, videos, and articles sharing. They have generated more than 1446 
7.   Translated by author. David Peyron, “Enjeux identitaires et communautaires des noms de fan-
doms”, Revue française des sciences de l’information et de la communication [En ligne], 7 | 2015. Original 
quote: “Le nom peut ainsi être un symbole de cet ensemble de traits et de valeurs partagés et l’affirmer 
c’est y adhérer”.
8.   Paul Booth, Digital fandom. New Media Studies, Peter Lang Publishing, 2010, p.22.
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comments, which shows a real activity and exchange inside this fandom. 
Publications can be split into five categories: 
 · News about linked to the series: 9 posts
 · Creative practices and community animation: 33 posts
 · Trading about the series (request for opinions, information or theories): 14 
posts
 · Relay of societal and political news: 40 posts
 · Civic and militant commitment: 2 posts
Those productions match with the typology of fan activities9 defined by 
Melanie Bourdaa: they testify of collective intelligence in the fandom, cre-
ative process or even creation of social links. Moreover, it appears clearly 
that civic commitment and awareness of the politic news hold a very impor-
tant place in exchanges.
A lot of the publications are part of this category and bring about many com-
ments, giving rise to arguments based on personal experiences, political 
and/or religious opinions or even scientific sources quotes. For example, a 
user posted a video about women voluntary sterilization and added the cap-
tion “I am for birth control and a women’s right to choose, but I had to step 
back and think about this one. Any thoughts?”. This publication generated 
more than 390 comments and was the most commented of all analyzed 
posts. The analysis of this fandom shows an absolute content hybridization. 
Entertainment stands alongside reality, fiction mingles with real life and 
one becomes a reading grid of the other, and vice versa. 
Political publications focus mainly on women condition in the world and 
the restriction of their rights in the United States, on Donald Trump and on 
other political outrages. On November 2017, many publications were about 
the Roy Moore case while more recently, publications were about the Brett 
Kavanaugh case. Indeed we can notice a calendar effect: publications issues 
9.   Mélanie Bourdaa, “Les fans de Hunger Games : de la fiction à l’engagement”, InaGlobal, 2015, http://
www.inaglobal.fr/cinema/article/les-fans-de-hunger-games-de-la-fiction-lengagement-8191?tq=3
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are linked to political current affairs. In the discussion group, many news 
were relayed and we can notice debates increase regarding those subjects. 
This fandom could be as a political news relay, a source of information al-
lowing awareness of fans by other fans. Far from violent and instinctual 
reactions, reading comments also reveals that ideas expounded are neatly 
argued and developed, leading to long debates. Personal experiences and 
scientific articles often support the remarks. Finally, to understand inter-
actions in this fandom, users can’t be only a fan of the series. It’s essential 
to be up with political news topic of the United States, by way of example 
understanding debates or publications significance requires to have taken 
note of Roy Moore or Brett Kavanaugh cases. 
This activism is mainly virtual, but data survey shows this virtual fandom 
also relays real mobilizations where dystopia is central. For example, one 
of those publications show photographs of a student demonstration in the 
United Kingdom. It reveals a placard with the following slogan: “Nolite Te 
Bastardes Carborundum” translated by “Don’t let the bastards grind you 
down”. Like so it’s clear that fiction is a reading grid of reality and vice ver-
sa. By exacerbating some disturbing facets of our society, plausible dystopia 
allows arousing interest and supply activist initiatives. It also makes au-
dience mindful of societal problems linked to the fiction, here the women 
cause.
Conclusion
This case study highlights the porous nature of boundaries between fic-
tion and real life. It also emphasizes the fiction ability to impact reality. The 
activist campaign informs us that The Handmaid’s Tale series has firmly 
assumed its feminist vocation and its politicization. It could be understood 
as a will to awake viewers’ sociological consciousness via dystopia.
On the other hand, the fandom brings to light a specific decoding of this 
dystopia by fans. According to them, “The Handmaid’s Tale” enlightens 
real situations and reinforce the idea that women’s rights are uncertain. 
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It also legitimates worries about Donald Trump’s or more recently Jair 
Bolsonaro’s politics and justifies feminist mobilizations. In the novel as in 
the series, Offred speaks in this way: “I was asleep before, that’s how we 
let it happen. When they slaughtered Congress, we didn’t wake up. When 
they blamed terrorists and suspended the constitution, we didn’t wake up 
either. Nothing changes instantaneously”. Her speech is biting and topical, 
received by many viewers as a warning signal. This dystopia designed an 
imaginary but credible society. Making use of anguishes and fantasms of 
our time, “The Handmaid’s Tale” holds the keys to awake viewers’ “socio-
logical consciousness”10 and to prompt a backward consideration on their 
condition. As Yannick Rumpala wrote, “In a fictionalized form, they [sci-
ence-fiction works] can test the swaying into another technical system and 
arrange situations allowing to glimpse induced effects”11. 
Finally, these elements show that as fables or philosophical tales, dystopia 
triggers reflection about our reality. Even if it’s a distorting mirror of our 
society, it’s still a mirror and it makes the period anguishes concrete. The 
power of “The Handmaid’s” Tale lies in its timelessness: written in 1985, the 
current situation makes it prophetic, reinforcing its ability to aware. A power 
used by feminist movements which they make the Handmaid a figurehead 
of the struggle. To conclude, showing concretely what could be extreme ef-
fects of totalitarianism and women enslavement,  the “Handmaid’s Tale” 
dystopia have exceeded the fiction: it has become a way to start a common 
reflection about what future we want for our society.
10.   Antoine Faure, Emmanuel Taieb, “Les “esthétiques narratives” : l’autre réel des séries”, Quaderni, 
vol. 88, no. 3, 2015, pp. 5-20.  
11.   Translated by author. Yannick Rumpala, “Ce que la science-fiction pourrait apporter à la pensée 
politique”, Raisons politiques, vol. 40, no. 4, 2010, pp. 97-113. Original quote: “Sous une forme roman-
cée, elles [les œuvres de science-fiction] peuvent tester le basculement dans un autre système tech-
nique, agencer des situations permettant d’entrevoir quels pourraient être les effets induits”.  
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AUSTRALIA’S IMMIGRATION POLICY AND THE 
SCAPEGOATING OF LEBANESE MIGRANTS
Mehal Krayem & Judith Betts
Abstract: This paper examines the degree to which the 
Australian media draws on independent documentation to 
build understanding and challenge the government’s fram-
ing of a complex and multi-dimensional issue. Late last 
year, the Australian Minister for Immigration and Border 
Control, Peter Dutton, provoked controversy when he re-
ferred to migrants who had escaped Lebanon’s civil war 
and came to Australia in the mid-1970s as the then Prime 
Minister Malcolm Fraser’s ‘mistakes’. Dutton pointed to 
the representation of second and third generation Lebanese 
Muslims amongst those charged with terrorism offences to 
support his argument. Media coverage was sharply divided 
between those who saw Dutton’s comments as ‘truthful’ 
and a necessary contribution to debate and those who saw 
them as ‘scapegoating’ Lebanese Muslims and stoking 
Islamophobic fears within the community. The media’s re-
sponse to Dutton’s comments provides a case study to explore 
the media’s ability (or preparedness) to examine complex 
issues, drawing on independent documentation. A content 
analysis of Murdoch’s Australian and Daily Telegraph and 
Fairfax’s Sydney Morning Herald and The Age, suggests that 
media coverage conformed with the predictions of Bennett’s 
‘indexing’ model. Independent documentation when cited, 
tended to be in support of an already established frame, rath-
er than to reveal the complexities of the situation faced by the 
newly-arrived refugees in the 1970s or the exact nature of the 
public policy failure. 
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Introduction
The Australian Minister for Immigration and Border Protection, Peter 
Dutton, provoked controversy with his assertion that the then Prime 
Minister, Malcolm Fraser, made a mistake in admitting Lebanese-Muslim 
immigrants affected by the Lebanese civil war during 1976-1977. In sup-
port of his position, Dutton claimed that ‘out of the last 33 people who have 
been charged with terrorist related offences in this country, 22 are from 
second and third generation Lebanese Muslim backgrounds’ (Hansard, 21 
November 2016). The Minister’s singling out of a particular ethnic commu-
nity marked a departure from past practice, when the person occupying 
that position saw themselves as an advocate for both the immigration pro-
gram and for multiculturalism. 
The media’s response to Dutton’s comments provides a case study through 
which the media’s ability (or preparedness) to examine complex issues, 
drawing on independent documentation, can be explored. A content analy-
sis of Murdoch’s Australian and Daily Telegraph and Fairfax’s Sydney Morning 
Herald (SMH) and The Age, suggests that media coverage conformed with 
the predictions of Bennett’s ‘indexing’ model, failing to reveal the complexi-
ties of the situation faced by the newly-arrived refugees in the 1970s and the 
exact nature of the public policy failure. 
The bifurcated media debate directly reflected the debate that was taking 
place in Parliament between the Government and the Opposition. Media 
coverage was sharply divided between those who saw Dutton’s comments 
as ‘truthful’, and a necessary contribution to an honest and open debate, 
and those who saw Dutton as ‘scapegoating’ Lebanese Muslims and stoking 
Islamophobic fears within the community for his own political ends. The 
‘facts’ were constructed as incontestable, in The Australian and the Daily 
Telegraph, while the Fairfax papers, SMH and Age argued that Dutton’s re-
marks unfairly labelled a whole community as culturally incompatible with 
Australian society and values.
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This article examines the degree to which the Australian media drew on 
independent documentation to build understanding and challenge the 
Government’s framing of what is a complex and multi-dimensional social 
issue. It draws on Bennett’s indexing model of agenda formation (2007). 
The paper is structured in three parts: Firstly, it looks at models of agenda 
formation and framing with a view to identifying which best describes the 
Australian media’s coverage of Dutton’s remarks. Secondly it examines the 
context, origins and impact of Dutton’s remarks, including the threads of 
the different media narratives in the subsequent debate. Finally, this paper 
examines the evidence on which Dutton’s assertions were based and points 
to the inconsistencies of that evidence, whilst also examining the nature 
of Fraser’s ‘mistake’ (if indeed there was one), and the degree to which the 
media cited independent documentation to support rather than challenge 
government frames or facilitate informed debate about the public policy les-
sons to be learned from the Lebanese experience. 
Models of agenda formation
Journalists use frames and framing to make sense of a story and to engage 
the reader. Cultural theorist, Stuart Hall, suggested that frames were or-
ganising principles that “call our attention to the dominant perspectives...
(to) suggest what is relevant and irrelevant” (McCombs, 2004, p.89). We 
rely on journalists to explain not just what is happening, but its significance 
in context. Framing has the “power to structure thought, to shape how we 
think about public issues, political candidates or other objects in the news. 
Frames have been described as ‘schemata of interpretation’” (McCombs, 
2004, p89). Journalism professor, Kirk Hallahan, explained that “framing 
operates by biasing the cognitive processing of information by individ-
uals” in at least two ways: through priming and “by providing contextual 
cues that guide decision-making and inferences” (1999, p208). For example, 
presenting an occurrence as negative is more likely to attract attention be-
cause our fear of loss or risk means that “negative information is weighted 
more heavily than positive information” (p208). Priming uses our cognitive 
structures or schemas by “association and expectation to make inferences 
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about events and to impute meaning not manifested in the message itself” 
(Hallahan, 1999, p208).
Frequently journalists will get their clues about what is going on from the 
positions that elites or experts take. Bennett identified a practice known 
as indexing which he described as the “journalistic practice of opening or 
closing the news gates to citizen-activists (and more generally a broader 
range of views) according to level of conflict among public officials and es-
tablished interests involved in making decisions about an issue” (2007, p6). 
This model focuses on the power of already influential voices in influencing 
the media agenda. Indexing points to a tendency in the media to give voice 
to the already powerful. The result is that when there is open disagreement 
amongst political elites in a democracy and public officials are debating is-
sues openly, the news tends to index the range of views expressed by elites. 
The media adopt the frames the elites use in their debate and when issues 
are complex, for example in discussion of economics and foreign policy, me-
dia coverage often tends to reflect the official line (Bennett, 2007). 
Context and Impact of Dutton’s remarks
In November 2016, Australian Minister for Immigration and Border 
Protection, Peter Dutton, sparked a heated public debate when, in an in-
terview on Sky News, he agreed with conservative, right wing journalist, 
Andrew Bolt, that the then Prime Minister Malcolm Fraser had made a mis-
take in ‘bringing some people in [as migrants], in the 1970s’ (Dutton, 2016a). 
Bolt was seeking to make a point about crime and ‘young men of African 
descent, many of them Sudanese’ (Bolt, 2016). He suggested that the Fraser 
Government had ‘got the Lebanese refugee programme wrong...Did we 
make another mistake with the Sudanese refugee programme?’ (Bolt cited 
in Dutton, 2016a). Dutton responded by suggesting that it was ‘still an open 
question in terms of what percentage of a particular community…[was] do-
ing the wrong thing’ and then raised the issue of foreign fighters (Dutton, 
2016a).
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The other interesting aspect – and we see this from foreign fighters – we 
end up looking at people from second and third generations. So the orig-
inal people that have arrived here, that have sought refuge for example 
have done well, they’ve worked hard, they’ve educated their children, 
and it’s the second or third generation that’s going off to fight and so we 
need to have a proper look at what has gone wrong (Dutton, 2016a).
On the first parliamentary sitting day after the Bolt interview, Bill Shorten, 
Leader of the Opposition, used question time to push the Minister on the 
subject: ‘Which people, from which country, does the minister believe 
should not have been allowed into Australia when Mr Fraser was Prime 
Minister?’ (Hansard, 21 November, 2016). Dutton replied: ‘The advice that I 
have is that, out of the last 33 people who have been charged with terrorist- 
-related offences in this country, 22 are from second and third-generation 
Lebanese Muslim backgrounds’ (Hansard, 2016).
 His words sparked an intense media and community debate which con-
tinued for weeks and left many speculating about Dutton’s motives in 
generating such a controversy, seen by many to undermine both the immi-
gration program for which he is responsible and counter-terrorism efforts 
which rely on the assistance and goodwill of communities in addressing 
youth marginalisation. The following section examines the print media cov-
erage of the ensuing debate.
Media Content
The heated debate sparked by Dutton’s remarks played out in the major 
print dailies – Fairfax’s Age and Sydney Morning Herald (SMH) and News 
Ltd’s Australian, and the Daily. This analysis draws on coverage in these pa-
pers between November and December 2016, the period which followed the 
minister’s statements. A total of 54 articles were analysed for this study: 10 
from the SMH, 14 from the Age, 22 from the Australian and eight from the 
Daily Telegraph. Articles were analysed with a view to identifying dominant 
themes, narratives and lines of argument. 
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While each media title published articles representing more than one view, 
there were recurring themes and publications tended to fall into one of two 
categories. The Australian and the Daily Telegraph, both Murdoch papers, 
supported Minister Dutton’s right to ‘tell the truth’. We have called this the 
‘truth-telling’ frame. This frame presents Dutton’s comments as incontest-
able facts that the ‘left’ is refusing to acknowledge in a desire to maintain 
political correctness. On the other hand, Fairfax media publications, the 
SMH and the Age, expressed discomfort with the social implications of 
Dutton’s remarks and at the public labelling of Lebanese as somehow cul-
turally prone to terrorism. We have called this the ‘scapegoating’ frame and 
argue that articles framing the debate in this way ‘call out’ the minister for 
his remarks, but do not necessarily interrogate what Dutton has present-
ed as ‘fact’. With just one exception (see discussion of Gordon article of 26 
November 2016), it is this lack of interrogation that we believe leads even 
‘sympathetic’ media to inadvertently perpetuate an inaccurate understand-
ing of the nature of Fraser’s ‘mistakes’. 
The ‘truth-telling’ frame 
Twenty four of the 30 articles in The Australian and the Daily Telegraph de-
fended Dutton’s comments, mostly on the grounds that he was ‘being honest’ 
and that it was to the benefit of society to have an open and honest con-
versation about the ‘“preponderance” of that community in terror-related 
activity’ (Wallace and Lewis, 24 December 2016, p4). This perspective 
was framed as a matter of ‘fact’, as uncomfortable as those facts might be. 
Articles of this persuasion offer two stances which contribute to the fram-
ing of Lebanese and Muslim cultures as ‘incompatible’ with Australianness. 
The first, taken primarily by Gerard Henderson and Miranda Devine, ‘ex-
poses’ the migration scheme under which Lebanese Australians were 
allowed entry into Australia in the 1970s. Henderson and Devine refer to 
the 1976 cabinet submission prepared by the Immigration minister at the 
time, Michael Mackellar, but cherry-pick the document in a misleading way 
to support their case. The second stance is reflected in a series of articles 
which urge us to face the ‘facts’ about the problems within the Lebanese 
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Muslim community, relating primarily to terrorism. These articles draw 
on a more recent document prepared by terrorism scholar Andrew Zammit 
(2011), who has protested that his position has been misrepresented in the 
debate.
In ‘Fraser’s Lebanese concession became a disaster’, Gerard Henderson 
(2016) described how, at the behest of the Maronite Christian Lebanese com-
munity in 1975, Australian Prime Minister, Malcolm Fraser, agreed to accept 
Lebanese fleeing from the civil war. Henderson points out, ‘they were not 
refugees in the strict definition of the term, since they were not fleeing per-
secution. Rather they were caught up in armed conflict’ (2016). Henderson 
refers to this policy as ‘the Lebanon concession’ and suggests that:
...few Maronites wanted to take advantage of the Lebanon concession…
[and] under the relaxed selection criteria, to enter Australia...a person 
only had to state that they were fleeing civil war and that they had a 
relative in Australia. Few, if any, applicants were rejected. Immigra-
tion Department staff sent to the region to administer the program had 
no way of checking whether the applicants had a relative in Australia’ 
(2016).
In an attempt to explain how a cohort of ‘undesirable’ migrants set down 
roots in Australia, Henderson frames the migration scheme as ‘lax’ to the 
point of being ‘out of control’. Henderson suggests that there had been ‘no 
way of checking whether the applicants had a relative in Australia’ (2016). 
In fact, Australian-based relatives (sponsors) were required to complete 
nomination forms – and sign maintenance guarantees which made family 
members ineligible for social security benefits or their sponsors liable for 
repayment (NAA 1976). 
Henderson argues, as does Miranda Devine in the Daily Telegraph, that 
90% of those who entered Australia under the relaxed immigration provi-
sions were Muslim (2016). By virtue of discontinuing the special program, 
Henderson argued, ‘the person who first realised the Lebanon concession 
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was a mistake was Fraser himself – four decades ago’ (2016). Both the 90% 
figure and Fraser’s admission of a mistake are misleading.
The “scapegoating” frame 
Nineteen articles, primarily from The Sydney Morning Herald (SMH) and 
the Age criticised Dutton’s linking of terrorism with past levels of Lebanese 
Muslim immigration, suggesting he was doing immense damage with his 
remarks. The issue with the articles that did engage in a critique of Dutton’s 
comments was that they did not interrogate the so-called ‘facts’ but rather, 
suggested that given the largely anti-immigration and anti-refugee senti-
ment currently prevalent in the electorate, pointing to these links were not 
helpful. 
John Hewson, former Liberal leader, suggested that the Coalition was en-
gaging in ‘cheap political arse-covering’ (McIlroy, 2016). Hewson called on 
Prime Minister Malcolm Turnbull to show leadership. ‘I am sure that suc-
cessive governments have made similar “mistakes”...and probably so too 
with the present government, that will emerge in the future...but why make 
this point now? Is this a cheap attempt to appeal to the anti-immigration, 
anti-refugee movement?’ (McIlroy, 2016).
Jacinta Carroll, head of the Counter Terrorism Policy Centre at the 
Australian Strategic Policy Institute, sought to challenge the significance of 
Dutton’s numbers. While Carroll acknowledged that Dutton’s figures were 
correct, in the SMH and the Age (23 and 24 November), she wrote that they 
were very low and as a result ‘don’t tell us much that is helpful’ (2016a). 
‘The figure of 22 represents less than 0.01 per cent of the about 180,000 
Australians of Lebanese background...That this group is overrepresented 
among terrorism offenders...is concerning. But it is not surprising given the 
global trend of Islamist extremism, which has identity politics at its core’ 
(Carroll, 2016b). 
Carroll and Brendan Nicholson, defence editor of The Australian, were con-
cerned that Dutton’s comments would make it tougher for counter-terrorism 
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forces who were ‘dependent on the goodwill of the Muslim community 
for warning timely enough to save lives’ (Carroll, 2016a, Nicholson, 24 
November 2016, p11). Nicholson suggested that counter-terrorism forces 
‘face a tougher job when whole communities are branded for the actions 
of a minority’. Both defences however imply that the minister’s comments 
were irresponsible rather than inaccurate. This paper argues that the lack 
of interrogation of the discourse perpetuated by Dutton may have inadvert-
ently contributed to a belief that his claims were based in fact. 
The Media’s Use of Independent Documentation 
In a debate with two clear positions – the ‘truth-telling’ frame and the ‘scape-
goating’ frame – this study found that it was the journalists supporting the 
former rather than the latter frame who quoted from independent documen-
tation. Furthermore, the independent documents referred to by journalists 
including Henderson and Devine – namely the 1976 cabinet submission 
on Lebanese Migration (calling for a halt to the special arrangements for 
war-affected Lebanese) and Andrew Zammit’s 2011 paper ‘Explaining the 
Australia-Lebanon Jihadist Connections’ – were ‘cherry-picked’ for evidence 
to support a pre-determined position, rather than a balanced interrogation 
of the facts. Journalists putting the ‘scapegoating’ frame did not revisit or 
challenge the way that original documents were being cited, perhaps as-
suming that a re-examination of the documents would do little for their own 
positions in the debate. Alternatively, journalists may have feared that to 
acknowledge any mistake on Fraser’s behalf risked being misconstrued as 
a slur on the Lebanese community, rather than an acknowledgment of a 
past wrong. 
Misrepresenting the numbers 
In support of their ‘truth-telling’ argument, Devine and Henderson exagger-
ated the numbers of Lebanese Muslims admitted under the special program. 
Devine suggested that 12,000 people were admitted under the more relaxed 
criteria, when archival records (NAA, 1976, folio 23) and Malcolm Fraser’s 
memoir (Fraser and Simons, 2010) suggest that only around 4,000 Lebanese 
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entered Australia under the relaxed criteria. The 12,000 figure appears to 
have been taken from immigration statistics and relates to total migration 
from Lebanon in the 1976-77 year: a figure which includes those who met 
normal migration criteria. 
Devine (2016) chose to represent the program as having been ‘rorted by 90 
per cent Muslims’ and Henderson (2016) said that the government had ‘lost 
control of the program’. ‘Rorted’ and references to ‘lost control’ suggest wide-
spread corruption of the process, when the only reference in the Cabinet 
submission that might support this assertion is to ‘misrepresentation and 
deliberate attempts to conceal vital information [that] are prolonging inter-
views’ (NAA, 1976, p3)). The 90% figure is also a mis-reading of the cabinet 
submission. An applicant’s religion is not disclosed (and was not disclosed 
then) on the application form, the nomination form or at interview and, as 
a result, the immigration department does not have details of the religious 
breakdown of Lebanese who migrated at the time. The 90% reference in the 
cabinet submission is instead an estimate on the part of a visiting chief mi-
gration officer (CMO), of the composition of applicants waiting in displaced 
persons camps in Nicosia. As the fortunes of each side waxed and waned in 
the civil war, so did the mix of Christians and Muslims fleeing the country. 
Seven months into the nine-month-long special program, and after the pro-
gram office had moved first from Beirut to Damascus and then Damascus 
to Nicosia, the CMO estimated that ‘the balance between Muslim and 
Christian applicants had risen [authors’ emphasis] to 90% Muslim’ (NAA, 
1976, folio 28). This was not a statement about the composition of the entire 
program.
In the absence of immigration data about religious affiliation, census 
data provides a picture of the change in the composition of the Lebanese 
community in Australia during that period. In the five years between the 
1976 and 1981, according to the census, the Lebanese-born population in 
Australia grew from 33,400 to 49,600 or by 16,200 (ABS, 1981). During that 
time, the Muslim Lebanese population grew from just 7,000 (around 21% 
of the Lebanese-born population in Australia) in 1976 to 15,600 or 31% in 
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1981. Immigration statistics show that around 18,500 visas were issued to 
Lebanese migrants between 1976 and 1981, which resulted in a net migra-
tion rate of around 16,200, of which an estimated 53% would have been 
Muslim (based on figures from ABS, DIBP and Betts and Healy, 2006). 
Henderson’s and Devine’s reference to ‘90% Muslim’ appears to be a grave 
overstatement in support of their suggestion that the immigration program 
had been ‘rorted’ (Devine, 2016).
The nature of Fraser’s ‘mistakes’ 
The second document that was referred to by the ‘truth-telling’ journalists 
was a 2011 paper written by Andrew Zammit, at the time a researcher at 
Monash University’s Global Terrorism Research Centre. Devine says:
We are unique among Western countries, (in that) individuals involved 
in jihadism in Australia have predominantly been of Lebanese descent, 
and several Australians have been arrested in Lebanon for alleged ji-
hadist activity...While the activities of at most a few dozen people do not 
reflect on the roughly 70,000 Lebanese-descendant Muslims in Aus-
tralia, they do highlight a phenomenon... in jihadist militancy’. Zammit 
points out, that 20 of 33 people prosecuted in Australian courts as of 
2012 over alleged terrorism offences ‘motivated by jihadist ideology’, 
were of Lebanese descent (Devine, 2016).
Devine’s argument was that we needed to learn from Fraser’s ‘mistakes’, 
but she presented those ‘mistakes’ as being related to a flawed migration 
selection process. She concluded that:
The vast majority of Lebanese-Muslim Australians are law abiding and 
non-violent. But in order to keep all of us safe from more homegrown 
terrorist attacks and to ensure future social cohesion, the government 
needs to be transparent and rigorous about our immigration program, 
and avoid the mistakes of the Fraser government in 1976 (Devine, 2016).
Malcolm Fraser has admitted that mistakes were made regarding the entry 
of Lebanese affected by the civil war, but not in relation to the decisions 
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about who entered Australia, rather about the lack of settlement support 
provided on arrival.
...if there was a failure of government in those early months it was in re-
settlement programs and planning. The proper approach to problems of 
integration is to find out what the problems were and what can be done 
about them, rather than to conclude that ‘bad’ people have been allowed 
in, or that is was wrong to show compassion (Fraser and Simons, 2010).
The irony of Devine’s position is that in her selective quotation from Zammit’s 
paper, she missed the point he was making. While not all experts agree 
on the role played by social disadvantage in radicalisation (Hegghammer, 
2016), Zammit argued that, in the case of Australian-Lebanese jihadis, the 
evidence suggests that social disadvantage and marginalisation both ap-
pear to have played a role in their radicalisation: a pattern that appears 
to be unique to Australia and is not repeated in other countries with large 
Lebanese communities (2011). Zammit linked social disadvantage to their 
(parents’ and grandparents’) arrival as refugees from civil war, at a time of 
a downturn in low-skilled manufacturing jobs, which happened as tariffs 
were being dismantled in Australia (Fraser and Simons, 2010). But Zammit 
also explained that their experiences, and unemployment rate, were similar 
to those of Vietnamese-Australians who arrived at the same time, also es-
caping war (Zammit 2011, Betts and Healy, 2006, Fraser, 2010).
Archival documents show clearly that the Government at the time decided 
that Lebanese affected by civil conflict would not be eligible for the settle-
ment support that other humanitarian and refugee groups received: that 
their relatives in Australia would have to bear that burden. The Cabinet de-
cided, inter alia, that: 
g) The Government [would] not take responsibility for the cost of 
transportation and transportation arrangements for Lebanese mi-
grants; [and]
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h) action [would] be taken to promote greater responsibility with-
in the Lebanese communities for the post-arrival settlement in 
Australia of Lebanese migrants (NAA, 1976).
Julie Bishop, Minister for Foreign Affairs, appears also to believe that the 
issue was related to the lack of settlement assistance. She stated in media 
interviews that all Dutton was saying was that ‘many years ago there were 
not the support services available for those who were brought to Australia 
under refugee humanitarian visas’ (Gordon, 2016). Despite her assertion, 
we were unable to find any public acknowledgement on Dutton’s part of the 
lack of settlement assistance provided to Lebanese in the mid-70s, although 
as minister it is safe to assume he would have been briefed on this.
In their 1985 book, The Lebanese in Australia, Andrew and Trevor Batrouney 
highlighted the lack of government settlement support given to Lebanese 
arriving from war-torn Lebanon at that time. ‘Since 1976, the sheer weight 
of numbers and the nature of the assistance required exceeded the capaci-
ty of informal welfare structures to assist these people’ (p101). They noted 
that the Australian government, ‘despite protestations from the communi-
ty, did not accord Lebanese immigrants refugee status and the benefits that 
entailed’ (1985, p101). Only in the early 1980s was this problem officially 
recognised’ (1985, p101).
In 2012, Gerard Henderson drew on Zammit’s paper in an article for the 
SMH entitled ‘Threat from enemy within makes anti-terrorism laws in-
dispensable’ (SMH, 2012). Zammit responded with a letter to the editor 
in which he rejected the suggestion that Australia ‘should not have given 
refuge to thousands of people fleeing a brutal civil war because of a cou-
ple of failed terrorist attempts decades later’ (2012). He also disputed that 
the activities of so few people could be used to make generalisations about 
Lebanese-Australian Muslims as a whole (Zammit, 2012). 
Henderson is correct to point out that the ‘Lebanon concession’ – the 
Fraser government’s expanded intake of Lebanese civil war refugees in 
1976 – was poorly implemented and that Lebanese Muslims often had 
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little support on arrival. However, the findings in my paper do not sup-
port Henderson’s argument that the ‘Lebanon concession’ was wrong 
altogether. The paper did examine Lebanese immigration during the 
civil war period and consequent social disadvantage; it did not state 
that convicted terrorists were necessarily children of those who arrived 
during the ‘concession’, which was only a short-lived episode in a large-
-scale immigration intake. 
The greatest irony is that Zammit’s paper pointed to the role that stigma-
tising and marginalising Lebanese-Australian Muslims, by ‘sections of the 
public, media and some politicians’, played in their radicalisation (2011, p9). 
In his research into the criminal cases of prosecuted jihadis, Zammit found 
evidence of radicalised young men feeling that ‘Muslims were discriminat-
ed against in Australia’ (2011). He quoted Justice Whealy’s judgement when 
sentencing a member of the Sydney Pendennis cell: 
It appears that the events of September 11, 2001 changed things radi-
cally for the offender… He himself was abused and called ‘Osama bin 
Laden’ and a ‘terrorist’ by non-Muslim workers he encountered. At a 
more abstract level, the offender perceived the threat in terms of all 
Muslim people being under attack, where the ‘war against terror’, as it 
was described, was translated by some Muslims into meaning a ‘war’ 
against all Muslims. This notion, so far as the offender was concerned, 
was then reinforced by the invasions of Iraq and Afghanistan. He was an 
uncritical user of the Internet and other news sources, and this served 
to reinforce his attitudes concerning the threat and the need for action 
(R v Touma, 2008: 91, cited in Zammit, 2011).
While the Lebanese community is over-represented amongst Australian ji-
hadis, the numbers are statistically too small to tell us anything (Carroll, 
2016, Zammit, 2012) and there is no direct proven link between the young 
men arrested recently and those admitted in 1976-77 on humanitarian 
grounds. Zammit’s research suggests that stigmatising and marginalising 
Lebanese-Australians may have played a role in their radicalisation. This 
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may be the only tenuous link between Jihadis and the Lebanese who came 
in the mid-1970s: the lack of settlement support having forced families into 
high density living and social disadvantage as they relied on each other for 
support.
Conclusion
Dutton’s comments fuelled a heated debate in the parliament which was 
then picked up and elaborated on in the media. The media were quick to 
take sides, indexing the debate in the media along the lines of the parlia-
mentary debate: with the Murdoch press supporting the minister’s right to 
‘tell the truth’ and the Fairfax media criticising the minister’s inflammatory 
remarks as racist, demonising and ‘scapegoating’ the Lebanese community 
by association with radical jihadism. Once the papers had taken sides, how-
ever, there was little indication that journalists taking the ‘scapegoating’ 
frame went back to interrogate either of the two independent documents 
quoted by those on the other side of the debate. Only one Fairfax journal-
ist, Michael Gordon of The Age, raised questions about the exact nature of 
Fraser’s ‘mistakes’ (2016). This may have been because he had been leaked 
a departmental document some months before that raised questions about 
the link between the lack of settlement support for the 1976-77 Lebanese 
and inter-generational disadvantage (Gordon, 2016)
The failure to interrogate the two independent documents cited in the de-
bate, and the subsequent failure to challenge both the minister’s ‘facts’ and 
those in the media arguing the ‘truth-telling’ frame, suggests time pres-
sure and the limitations of mainstream journalistic practices and culture. 
Fairfax and News Limited have gone through several down-sizing exercises 
in recent years, ‘letting go’ a number of more experienced journalists. Many 
attributes of this case study, of a media bifurcated along the lines of the par-
liamentary debate fit with Bennet’s model of indexing where elite debates 
tend to be replicated rather than challenged by the mainstream media.
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Abstract: The Web and the technological revolution from the 
network society allowed women an unprecedented access 
to technology. Among the Information and Communication 
Technologies (ITs), online communities enabled a new fem-
inine activism. Non-governmental Organizations (NGOs) of 
empowered and entrepreneurial women emerged to inspire 
and lead women to study and work in technology. These 
groups have expanded significantly in Portugal and Brazil 
in the last decade. Technology became a way for women 
to establish new relations of gender (Judy Wajcman’s soci-
ological technofeminism) and power at NGOs against an 
emblematic patriarchy. Groups of Brazilian and Portuguese 
women in Information Technology (IT) build and spread sto-
rytelling throughout e-infocommunicational platforms with 
a discourse of engagement that transits between leaders 
and target audience in a transmedia perspective. However, 
the reinforcement of this feminine empowerment discourse 
bumps into technologies such as online content suggestion 
algorithms: their function is to choose the content presented 
to each user of these media according to individual interests 
that the algorithm can deduce and predict. Hence, as story-
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telling may take long or not be presented to women who belong to hard social 
contexts, the lack of contact with different perspectives and concepts weakens 
the transformation capacity of these discourses as Merleau-Ponty’s phenome-
nology of perception defends. This article explores the notion of technofeminism, 
the construction and diffusion of a feminine empowerment discourse, the idea of 
e-infocommunication technologies for this reality transformation and the collision 
of this feminist will in barriers of this same technology that should come in their 
favor.
Keywords: Technofeminism; Information technologies; Phenomenology of percep-
tion; E-infocommunication; Gender. 
Technology (daily use objects, industrial machines, computers, smartphones, 
tablets, computer programs etc.) has been conceived and consumed by men 
since time immemorial. Recently, the democratization of the Internet and 
the emergence of a networked society from the end of the twentieth century 
have brought about an unprecedented technological and communications 
revolution. The first two books of the trilogy The Information Age: Economy, 
Society and Culture (Castells, 2002, 2013, 2018) highlights historical facts 
related to gender issues that marked, in a profound way, the evolution of 
feminism, the presence of women in universities and in the labor market, in 
addition to the close relationship established with digital platforms and in-
formation technologies (IT). According to Castells, the struggles of women 
have always been present in all stages of human experience, especially the 
suffragist movement in the United States. However, in the last 25 years of 
the twentieth century, there has been a global intensification of the feminist 
cause against oppression, in the quest for greater social and professional 
representation, reflected in the private sphere in different degrees of inten-
sity in Western and Eastern countries.
The increase of awareness and struggle of women for equal rights and for 
control of their bodies and lives, especially in developed and industrialized 
countries, is an inexorable process due to four factors: the transformation of 
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the economy and the labor market related to opportunities for women in the 
field of education; the overthrow of patriarchalism resulting from economic 
and technological transformations; the extraordinary increase in the num-
ber of popular grassroots organizations, mostly created and led by women, 
in the metropolitan areas of developing countries, impacting on policies and 
institutions, but also on the emergence of a new collective identity through 
empowered women; and the fact that self-construction of identity is not the 
expression of an essence, but an affirmation of power by which women mo-
bilize to change from how they are to what they want to be. Claiming an 
identity is building power (Castells, 2002, 2013, 2018).
According to Castells (2002, 2013, 2018), Non-Governmental Organizations 
(NGOs) and women tend to express themselves more openly in digital net-
works because they feel more protected in the electronic media. The sum 
of these virtual expressions would represent a great opportunity to reverse 
traditional power games in communication processes. These groups are ex-
amples of these new forms of power and political engagement in Gender 
and Feminism, which seek, above all, greater female representation in the 
labor market and in academic research in IT.
These networks do more than simply organize activities and share infor-
mation. They represent the true producers and distributors of cultural 
codes. Not only for the network, but in its multiple forms of exchange 
and interaction. Its impact on society rarely comes from a highly articu-
lated strategy, commanded by a particular nucleus. Its most successful 
campaigns, its most surprising initiatives are often the result of “distur-
bances” in the multi-level interactive communication network (Castells, 
2018, Location 13083)
It is not possible to define a specific point on the Web where these com-
munication systems of women activist groups in technology have emerged. 
Leaders and volunteers are geographically dispersed, but it is common to 
belong to the same country. They have grouped and organized themselves 
in online communities moved by the primordial desire of profession-
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al and technological academic inclusion. The strength of corporate and 
e-infocommunicational flow is a catalyst for the personal development in 
IT for each member. There are operational and communicational rules of 
operation, common or not, for each group. Defined by leaders, they are 
disseminated by volunteers. Impacted women who agree to these organi-
zational guidelines are accepted to participate as students and members of 
campaigns, events and courses, for example, online and in person. These 
online IT activist communities share similar and specific characteristics in 
a sea of  knots of other natures in this space of complex and multidimension-
al cybernetic flow. Information (tangible as statistical data and courses, and 
intangible as narratives / witness stories of engagement and empowerment) 
is produced by leaders and shared by them and the groups’ volunteers, 
via digital platforms, to the target audiences (new members and opinion 
makers).
Sharing the optimism of cyber-gurus from Manuel Castells (1996) to 
Nicholas Negroponte (1995), feminist approaches of the 1990s and today 
are positive about the possibilities of information and communication 
technologies (ICTs) to empower women and transform gender relations 
(Green and Adam, 1999; Kemp and Squires, 1998; Kirkup et al., 2000). 
A common argument in this literature is that the virtuality of cyberspace 
and the internet spell the end of the embodied basis for sex difference 
(Millar, 1998; Plant, 1998). (Wajcman, 2010, p. 147)
Wajcman (2010) points that over time the theories in technofeminism have 
been approaching the role technology plays to build the gender concepts, 
which can be correlated with the phenomenology ideas alluded later in this 
article:
Over the last two decades, feminist writing within the field of STS [stud-
ies of technology science] has theorized the relationship between gender 
and technology as one of mutual shaping. A shared idea in this tradition 
is that technological innovation is itself shaped by the social circum-
stances within which it takes place. (p. 148-149) 
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The biggest complexity of this e-infocommunicational flow is presented in 
the analysis of the impact and the reuse of the information of the target 
groups of the women activist groups in IT. Engagement and empowerment 
should be considered beyond the mere sharing of information across dig-
ital platforms. Online communities of women’s IT activism produce and 
communicate information to their target audience on their digital plat-
forms. However, when its impact is positive or negative, it is reused with 
greater unpredictability by women who should be empowered, because 
information sharing is not always shared by the same digital platforms of 
the target audiences in their networks. The individual on the Web today oc-
cupies an active position as a content producer. Therefore, the information 
is shared with new aggregated information, which is beyond the control of 
the leaders and volunteers of these groups and can be accompanied by the 
propagation of new tangible and intangible data created by the impacted 
ones. Storytelling is the information with the greatest engagement potential 
for the leaders. The success of infocommunicational actions of the groups 
can also be gauged when this storytelling gains new stories from the shar-
ing in a transmedia chain of convergent media of online communities with 
additional digital platforms used by the target audience.
Leaders of technology activist women groups are experienced in the job 
market or academic research in IT. The success of this activism can be 
measured in face-to-face events, articulated internally by the organizations 
in their virtual communities and communicated to the external public on 
digital platforms. The IT women groups have emerged and developed quite 
expressively in the last decade, especially in Europe and Brazil, as a phe-
nomenon resulting from the technological revolution, from the emergence 
and expansion of the Web on a planetary level. There are some common 
purposes for the groups of women activists in Portuguese and Brazilian IT, 
which have arisen and developed especially in the last ten years with com-
mon organizational and communication characteristics:
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1. Culture Maker Training: teaching and training women to use different 
languages and computer programs in the creation of their own techno-
logical products (initiation of young people and deepening knowledge to 
those already acting at academic and professional level);
2. Educational: guiding and instructing adolescents in schools, namely in 
the transition phase from secondary to university, with the aim of con-
sidering IT as a career to be embraced, as scientists or professionals;
3. Entrepreneurship: network promotion, with a view to creating business, 
startups, as well as innovative and competitive IT projects;
4. Political / Social: collective articulation in the search for the creation and 
consolidation of labor inclusion laws for women in IT; the perspective of 
Information Technology to be a field of affirmation of identities (Feminist 
and of Gender).
Examples of groups that emerged from this configuration of the context of 
action are Geek Girls Portugal, Portuguese Women in Tech, IAMCP / Women 
in Technology; Chicas Poderosas Portugal and Girls Lean In (in Portugal); 
and Minas Programam, WoMakers Code, Mulheres na Tecnologia and Girls 
in Tech Brazil (in Brazil). In all groups, the women’s empowerment message 
is more than reinforced, being a motto for and purpose of all the women 
involved: leaders of the groups (information and narrative, project creators 
and actions), volunteers (women who are not leaders but become agents of 
support and support to leaders in programming and developing events and 
campaigns agenda), and members in general (recipients of the messages 
conveyed by digital platforms and taking part in face-to-face actions).
Technology is accessible to digitally literate women and, above all, to those 
with a degree of information which allows leaders and volunteers to align 
tangible and intangible objectives and information (such as statistical data 
and programming knowledge) of their choice of digital platforms whose 
operational functions fulfil the role of efficient and broad dissemination 
of technological, ideological, professional and educational information in a 
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complex, multiple communication chain connected to the digital platforms 
of women impacted. These groups are living multidimensional communi-
cation systems, which are flexible to the emergence of new technologies, 
digital platforms and social dynamics in a macro perspective. 
Technofeminism conceives of technology as mutually shaping relation-
ship between gender and technology, in which technology is both a 
source and a consequence of gender relations. For me, the distinguish-
ing insight of feminist STS or technofeminism is that gender is integral 
to this sociotechnical process: that the materiality of technology affords 
or inhibits the doing of particular gender power relations. Women’s 
identities, needs and priorities are configured together with digital tech-
nologies. For all the diversity of feminist voices, feminist scholars share 
a concern with the hierarchical divisions marking relations between 
men and women. (Wajcman, 2010, p. 149-150)
As mentioned above, it is appropriate to link Wajcman’s idea that digital 
technologies are part of the configuration of identities, needs and priorities 
to women and the phenomenology of perception as proposed by Merleau- 
-Ponty (2005). This is possible because his idea of phenomenal field, in 
which subject and object lie, takes into consideration the self, the other and 
the things to the interpretation of the world having history and culture as a 
basis for understanding and classifying sensations. The being and the world 
are inseparable and perception is a bodily experience that is more subjec-
tive than objective.
Therefore, perception is not an exhaustive and complete knowledge of 
the object, but an always provisory and incomplete interpretation. (…) 
Under the embodied subject, we correlate body, time, the other, affec-
tion, the world of culture and social relations. (Nóbrega, 2008, p. 141)
In turn, each encounter of subjects or of them with objects claim and build 
concepts to individuals and societies. Thus, when in contact with a dis-
course of feminine empowerment or even with different concepts of what 
women can be and do, getting to know even slight differences between the 
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observer and the one who is observed will change the perception of the for-
mer and of the world around her/him, changing also the personal concept of 
women. Hence, the storytelling produced by these NGOs is not ineffective, 
although it might not be consciously noticed, just as “the pure impression is 
(…) not only undiscoverable, but also imperceptible and so inconceivable as 
an instant of perception” (Merleau-Ponty, 2005, p. 4), which means that the 
idea of being a woman depends on information acquired, but the concept to 
each individual will change without a conscious awareness of it.
Therefore, if according to Merleau-Ponty (2005) the subject is a living body, 
that is, not composed by a soul and a body, but a soul in a body, this subject 
is experiencing the world always based on what is already known but also 
building new ideas. Because the information technologies are so present in 
the lives of subjects, they necessarily alter the perception of the world and 
of the subject in the world. As Wajcman (2010) observes, 
the notion that technology is simply the product of rational technical im-
peratives has been dislodged. Objects and artefacts are no longer seen 
as separate from society, but as part of the social fabric that holds socie-
ty together; they are never merely technical or social” (p. 149). 
Also, the infinite points of view that the Web stores change the known field 
that involves subject and objects when they are shared. Thus the work of 
the NGOs here mentioned are capable of expanding the concept of women 
as they mediatize ideas and experiences of and to many cultures (even with-
in a society) transforming the field from which the living body will dive into 
the world to build it as is inherent to all individuals.
Nevertheless, the storytelling shared by the mentioned feminist groups is 
among an infinitude of content that each platform—such as social network 
and video and text sharing websites or research engines—host. This general 
quantity of data hosted is so great that it would be impossible to deliver it 
all to users without a rank. To that end, suggestion algorithms are used to 
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calculate what is shown to whom based on usage data but also on the result 
of inference about psychological traits from users. 
These algorithms use data collected from cookies and usage data (from one 
website or from a network that shares this type of data), demographic in-
formation and even psychographics. A recent and well-known example of 
the latter was the Cambridge Analytica case for Donald Trump’s election as 
United States’s president. In 2016, Alexander Nix, Chief Executive Officer 
of Cambridge Analytica (the company responsible for Donald Trump’s on-
line presidential campaign in the United Sates) explained, in a talk for the 
Concordia Summit, how they use psychographics to target specific groups 
of people. He says: “Today communication is becoming ever increasing-
ly targeted. It’s being individualized for every single person in this room” 
(Concordia, 2016, excerpt 8:35 – 8:46). To arbitrate, they consider geograph-
ic data such as age, gender, religion or education but also consumption 
habits and lifestyle, what users read and watch, “what car you drive (…) 
what golf club you belong to, what churches you attend, and, of course, per-
sonality or behavior data (…), how you see the world, what actually drives 
you” (Concordia, 2016, excerpt 6:02 – 6:22). 
Thereby it is possible to see that some women will not be reached by the 
storytelling that drive and urge women’s empowerment: the way they con-
duct their life is much different from the message of the feminist NGOs 
mentioned, their beliefs do not comprehend the idea of empowered and en-
trepreneurial women so suggestion algorithms would show them content 
that has the most proximity to their habits and ways of acting and thinking, 
excluding what they still ignore and that could—at least start to—change 
their points of view.
Considering this, it is possible to say that there is a technological paradox: 
even though information technologies were meant to and could work for 
sharing information and therefore expand the phenomenal field, its plat-
forms are designed to limit information and not show contradictions. 
Wacjman (2010) mentions that “technofeminism exposes how the concrete 
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practices of design and innovation lead to the absence of specific users, such 
as women” (p. 150), but it is important to notice that, even among women 
who do have access to IT, there is also alienation of a part of this group from 
the feminist storytelling produced by these NGOs, regardless of the granted 
access they are having.
Another inconsistency in the use of IT to spread an empowerment sto-
rytelling to women in general is that the groups of women who work for 
empowering females are themselves wielding power, for the women in tech 
activist groups are still a social, political, economic, cultural product of an 
era, or result of the expansion of the creation of everyday computer appa-
ratus and programs. Each online community sets up a communication and 
information system that goes beyond its intended purpose. In a macro plan 
there are rules on how and for what purposes their platforms can be used or 
their actions will be taken; the leaders are also guided by the logic of capital 
when they consider entrepreneurship as power, and there is also a false 
idea of autonomy when a platform is chosen, because each platform has a 
policy with restrictions by design.
For this reason, technology policies call for renegotiation of gender relations 
and generates new information in the phenomenal field:
While it is not always possible to specify in advance the characteris-
tics of artefacts and information systems that would guarantee more 
inclusiveness, it is imperative that women are involved throughout the 
processes and practices of technological innovation. (…) Drawing more 
women into design—the configuration of artefacts—is not only an equal 
employment opportunity issue, but is also crucially about how the world 
we live in is shaped, and for whom. We live in a technological culture, a 
society that is constituted by science and technology, and so the politics 
of technology is integral to the renegotiation of gender power relations. 
(Wajcman, 2010, p. 150).
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This means that a storytelling that aims to promote empowerment to wom-
en and change the patriarchal thought should think of freedom in a way 
that everyone should participate to build the concept of women. As follows, 
Wajcman’s idea of participation can be related to Merleau-Ponty’s notion of 
freedom. To him, no one can be completely free, seeing that, as mentioned 
above, one depends on the interaction with other subjects and objects to 
give meaning to the world and to recognize oneself in it and as an individual 
part of a community. In addition, a subject is always limited by the field and 
the historical phenomenality of it. As raised above, the NGO leaders are 
under the perspective of a structure of power themselves, since they cannot 
be apart from the perspectives that surround them. However, paradoxically 
there is space for creation: if the subject is constantly making the field that 
limits him/her, the boundaries of subject’s freedom are given by the free 
subject, so
There is, then, ultimately nothing that can set limits to freedom, except 
those limits that freedom itself has set in the form of its various initi-
atives, so that the subject has simply the external world that he gives 
himself. Since it is the latter who, on coming into being, brings to light 
significance and value in things, and since no thing can impinge upon 
it except through acquiring, thanks to it, significance and value, there 
is no action of things on the subject, but merely a signification (in the 
active sense), a centrifugal Sinngebung”. (Merleau-Ponty, 2005, p. 507)
Therefore, if the subject recognizes that the world is a collective construction 
and that the phenomena are stated views among infinite shared conceptions 
(that are themselves among infinite unknown and never to be known mean-
ings), there is always the possibility of creating or of maintaining. Freedom 
is a matter of engagement with itself under the knowledge that one’s body in 
its way to living—that is, one’s actions, including one’s body, intentions and 
movement—will bring consequences to all the field, which contains other 
objects and subjects that influence each other permanently, or, in Merleau- 
-Ponty’s words: “the parts of my body together compromise a system, so my 
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body and the other’s are one whole, two sides of one and the same phenom-
enon, and the anonymous existence of which my body is the ever-renewed 
trace henceforth inhabits both bodies simultaneously” (p. 412). 
If “there is free choice only if freedom comes into play in its decision, and 
posits the situation chosen as a situation of freedom” (Merleau-Ponty, 2005, 
p. 508), then even though the discourse of empowerment and entrepre-
neurship that aims to encourage women to change their perceptions about 
themselves is under the influence of design, of suggestion algorithms and of 
power within the group that promotes it, it will empower and help unleash 
women from patriarchal views if the work of the NGOs presented above 
pursuits freedom. 
Some paradoxes were mentioned here, freedom in IT is another. Using 
online media to spread a storytelling of empowerment claims the commit-
ment/freedom paradox Merleau-Ponty (2005) reasons by saying:
A freedom which has no need to be exercised because it is already ac-
quired could not commit itself in this way: it knows that the following 
instant will find it, come what may, just as free and just as indetermi-
nate. The very notion of freedom demands that our decision should 
plunge into the future, that something should have been done by it, that 
the subsequent instant should benefit from its predecessor and, though 
not necessitated, should be at least required by it. If freedom is doing, 
it is necessary that what it does should not be immediately undone by a 
new freedom. Each instant, therefore, must not be a closed world; one 
instant must be able to commit its successors and, a decision once taken 
and action once begun, I must have something acquired at my disposal, 
I must benefit from my impetus, I must be inclined to carry on, and 
there must be a bent or propensity of the mind. (p. 508)
On this wise, empowerment as freedom is in the possibility of transforma-
tion, on choices determined by what is given, the influences of the subject, 
but of a subject that chose and acted with a commitment with the future. 
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Even in face of limited information, individuals are free. Freedom is in the 
moral decision, in the option between maintenance or creation. Thus the 
effort to expand the concept of women to of empowered and entrepreneur 
women is in the actions taken to grant different possibilities to create, and 
is not in vain, although it will come across with barriers. The paradox will 
always be present, but that should not nullify the struggle to accredit power 
to a historically less empowered gender when it is committed to contest and 
change the phenomenal field.
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Abstract: Education methodologies have always been sub-
ject of discussion and controversy, which increased with 
the advent of massive public educational systems and its 
relationship with the concept of ‘qualified’ workforce. 
Simultaneously, societal changes and the relationship be-
tween Education actors, namely teachers and students, 
demanded solutions in addressing the latter’s bad behavior, 
which seems to be an interstitial problem in Western culture. 
The use of medical drugs, such a Ritalin, to address this issue 
not only raises ethical questions regarding present students 
but also of human and social consequences in the future 
taskforce. Simply put, does the price of Ritalin use not only 
are the Child’s rights but also the full potential of the future 
adult, as a worker and citizen? This work explores how the 
current status quo in Educational policies regarding the use 
of Ritalin or other drugs can be assessed through dystopias 
on the subject, and investigates how the present Educational 
1.  Acknowledgments: Ana S. Moura and M.Natália D. S. Cordeiro acknow-
ledge the support by Fundação para a Ciência e a Tecnologia (FCT/MEC) 
through national funds and co-financed by FEDER, under the partnership 
agreement PT2020 (Projects UID/MULTI/50006 and POCI-01-0145-FE-
DER-007265).
2.  PhD, LAQV-REQUIMTE, Departamento de Bioquímica e Química da Fa-
culdade de Ciências da Universidade do Porto, Portugal. ana.de.m.pessoa@
gmail.com. 
3.  Author of Speculative Fiction, Portugal. joao.seixas@gmail.com. 
4.  Associated Professor with Aggregation, LAQV-REQUIMTE, Departa-
mento de Bioquímica e Química da Faculdade de Ciências da Universidade 
do Porto. ncordeir@fc.up.pt. 
5.  Author of Speculative Fiction, Portugal. jrbarreiros@netcabo.pt. 
Educational Superavit: Human rights versus Education Policies160
policies affect the human identity in the name of both economy and school place 
behavioral conformity and personality formatting. Research methodology encom-
passes two approaches: (a) transversal analysis of selected dystopian narratives; 
and (b) inclusion of an organizational/social quantum-based model, adapted 
through mathematical inspired tool Reductio ad dystopia. The use of speculative fic-
tion on quantum-based models regarding societal dynamics is, to our knowledge, 
pioneer and it can be a feasible methodology feasible to explore social concerns 
and ethical issues, as the dystopias provide enough details that not only suffice as 
variables but can be juxtaposed with real and present ones.
Keywords: Education Policies; Children Rights; Educational dystopia; Social 
Quantum based model; Reductio ad dystopia 
1. Introduction
Ritalin, a three sylable word used to explain mass shooting in the USA, 
according to NRA president Oliver North [1]. Any average attentive person 
nowadays has heard the term and locates easily the context where it is most 
used: education. Ritalin is one common prescription for attention deficit 
hyperactive disorder (ADHD), which can cause problems in the social inter-
action of the child or teen, as it may generate, for example, hyperactivity or 
inability to control impulses. And the school, or pedagogical environment, 
is part of the social space of the child, prompting the concern of how that 
affects the child, the peers and the teachers or pedagogical supervisors. 
Ideally, the students should be attentive and motivated and focused, not to 
mention well-behaved, and as the obvious effects of Ritalin were becom-
ing common knowledge, i.e., how its prescription can help control impulses 
and, as side effect, prompt a tone down in misbehavior, the scenario soft-
ly changed from using it adequately for diagnosed ADHD children to more 
widespread application in cases of disorderly conduct [2].
In fact, and according to recent media investigation, there is a tacit agree-
ment among many parents that the use of certain prescribed drugs can solve 
many educational situations [2]. Other than the ubiquitous Ritalin, there are 
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mention of the use of Melatonin as aider for children to sleep more easily 
or even Rivotril as solution for a child’s whining and throwing tantrums. In 
the latter, the child became ‘almost a zombie’, in the words of the pediatri-
cian which took over the case and ordered the stop of the medication. After 
withdraw, the child become lively normal again. And this is one of the key 
ethical issues of the use of these and other drugs on children for behavioral 
reasons other than certified diagnosed cases: the side effects. 
Apathy, growth disturbances, addiction, glandular alterations, and so on 
and so forth, the list is as endless as are the possibilities for side effects of 
the drugs. And questions can and should be made: do any of us, as a par-
ent, a teacher or doctor, has the right to risk these side effects in the name 
of the normative of classroom or the social/parental peace of mind? Does 
this presents an attempt to the integrity of the child, that though not yet a 
full citizen is a person and has unquestionable rights as such? And can you 
answer these questions in an objective and yet humane manner? Moreover, 
can you, in face of those answers, propose and apply harmonious measures 
where all the players, i.e., children parents, teachers, all citizens of the so-
cial body, can have a maximum of benefit versus a minimal of detriment?
We address this questions and context assuming several postulates and 
building from them. We propose that imagination and art can be the de-
parting material for answering some of these questions in an objective and 
humane manner, for the humanity cannot be lost when the issue stands at 
both its roots and fringes. Imagination is being considered more and more 
as a serious subject, as a neurocognitive talent to speculate, allowing to pre-
vent and correct real and virtual scenarios [3]. 
Taking that in consideration along with the premise that literature, and 
speculative literature in particular, weave imagination with storytelling and 
storytelling with hypothetical scenarios, which allow to explore variables 
in social controlled context, we collect our data from selected dystopias and 
apply it to a social quantum based model. The model is based on an educa-
tional proposal to evaluate the prospective future of distance learning in 
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Higher Education systems [4, 5]. We adjust and elaborate further the model, 
not only to meet the demands of the specifics of our work but also to accom-
modate the speculative data, and develop a new tool, Reductio ad dystopia, 
to evaluate such data. 
In short, what we developed is a synergetic model to evaluate the present 
and predict the future through speculative data, as seen by the scheme pre-
sented in Figure 1. The model is dynamic enough to accommodate ethic and 
mathematics, either from the most empathic point of view to the coldest 
economic spectrum. For only within the full realm of complexity can an-
swers for human problems be thoroughly addressed with integrity.
Figure 1: Dynamics of the proposed Reductio ad dystopia social quantum model.
2. Selected dystopias: how education versis human rights is presented in 
Science Fiction
The scope of the body of speculative literature which approaches the themes 
of drug use for affecting behavior in society and in educational context in 
particular is vast and three narratives were chosen: Beyond Beldlam, by 
Wyman Guin; Metaquine, by François Rouiller; and Fast Times at Fairmont 
High, by Vernon Vinge [6-8]. In this section we briefy summarize the main 
aspects of these stories, whose some of front cover editions are displayed 
on Figure 2.
Beyond Bedlam was first published in 1951, and depicts a society in the 29th 
Century where war is inexistent, as aggressiveness and all negative uncon-
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scious impulses have been eradicated form all human beings through the 
use of drugs. As consequence, all human beings are peaceful and schizo-
phrenic. Each physical body shares two distinct personalities, a hyperalter 
and a hypoalter, democratically scheduled to assume prominence in five 
days shifts. As long as the hypo and hyper alter remain in harmony with 
each other, world peace and ordered society is preserved. In similar was 
as to the Brave New World, by Aldous Huxley, extramarital sex is bleached 
from any guilt and encouraged [9]. The story focus on a couple, Bill Walden/
Conrad Manz and Helen Walden/Clara Manz, where the Waldens are the 
hyperalters and the Manzs, the hypoalters. Two bodies, four persons. And 
two of the personalities engage in an affair. Bill Walden betrays his wife 
with her own alter ego and with this the narrative explores a story with 
humor and controversy.
Figure 2: Front cover of some editions of the selected speculative stories
Metaquine is more recent, having been published in 2016, in full online so-
cial network era. As such, cybernetics underlines the context. The Simdom 
is a virtual reality cyber world which allows a full immersive experience to 
users through direct neuronal interface. In this world, Metaquine is drug 
used at first to treat mental issues such as problems in concentration and 
attention deficit but which is becoming attractive to a pharmaceutical com-
pany, Globantis, as it can increment the daily productivity while it inhibits 
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emotions and turns brain into a more lenient state. A more obedient state, 
at the cost of individual personality. And one way to apply it is to students.
Fast Times at Fairmon High is the third and final selected narrative. 
Published at the turn of the century, is set on a bear-future American high 
school where pressure for success pushes the students to use cognition en-
hancing drugs. The main protagonist, Juan, is only an eight-grader and feels 
the need to use the drug as he cannot absorb the information in the steady 
fast pace the society demands. Information access and assimilation in the 
shortest time period possible is cornerstone and keeping that pace has such 
prominence that not only is information downloaded in computers but also 
into the student’s networked brains. Those unable to do so or maintain the 
absorbing rhythm are the new social outcasts, if they are of young age, or 
simply obsolete, if they are elders. Though the drugs are not legal, as consid-
ered cheating, the protagonist, as many others, choses them over this fate.
The stories were read, analyzed and several descriptors extracted as spec-
ulative data. They were discriminated in substance effect, individual effect 
and social effects, i.e., the physiological effect on the individual, the individ-
ual consequences and the overall changes in society as result of widespread 
use of the drug. The summary of the descriptors is displayed on Table 1, per 
horizontal entry of each story. The data will be used on the reduction ad 
dystopia social quantum model presented on section 3. 
Table 1: Summary of main data collected from the selected narratives













refusal for physical 
existence
Fast Time at Fairmont 
High
Cognition enhancers Addition
Creation of new social 
outcasts
 
Ana S. Moura, João Seixas, M. Natália D. S. Cordeiro & João Barreiros 165
One can reduce the speculative data to three types of substance effect (elim-
ination of aggressiveness, emotional inhibition + brain performance, and 
cognitive enhancers), with three types of individual effects (schizophrenia, 
individual personality deterioration, and addition with its known conse-
quences of the individual). However, there is a tendency underlining the 
social consequences as the paradigm of ‘conform or be held outside the 
gates’ emerges on the three stories. Being outcast as result of refusing the 
use of the drug (or of obtaining the consequences it gives) is smoothly weav-
ing the column of social effects of the selected narratives on Table 1.
3. Model: predicting the future as the past becomes non-linear
Data per itself has as much meaning as enumerating in correct order the 
letters of the alphabet. The fact they are the correct letters and in proper 
order does not imply the action has meaning, not until they are used in 
words and sentences with proper syntax. So does data from the speculative 
narratives needs to have a formal syntax and form synergetic relations in 
order to gain meaning. 
To develop the model, we departed from the Distance Learning Quantum 
Model from Marquez-Ramos and Mourelle [5]. The model groups the stu-
dents options versus the higher education offers in order to understand how 
one can predict the most likely social scenarios of future Higher education. 
We adjusted the concept and add it an original systematic tool inspired by 
the mathematical tool of reductio ad absurdum. When presented with a math 
problem, one can conclude about the certainty of a solution by exploring the 
answer through an absurd counterpart hypothetical answer. If the absurd 
hypothesis is proven to be impossible, i.e., absurd, then its counterpart is 
the answer. 
In our case, we created the reductio ad dystopia, where you depart from 
an absurd (imaginary) hypothetical future, extract its premises and by ap-
plying logic and even mathematical operations, as statistical techniques, 
within the model, you meet a scenario that can be compared with reality. 
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The closest the juxtaposition of model versus reality, the nearer the ulti-
mate consequences of the dystopia are of coming to be. 
Indeed, there are other variables not being taken in account in this ap-
proach, as in all models, as reality, physical or social, has a complex nature 
ungraspable by approximations but the key is approximations can make re-
ality perceivable and forecastable and that has been proven once and again. 
We propose this model can be one of such approximation, probing the ave-
nue to come but also the present and even the past.
In this particular case, the situation is the drug use on children and students 
to obtain conformity of behavior and increment educational success. Since 
it would be impossible in the scope of this chapter to approach all situations, 
we focus on the case of Ritalin. In the present, parents have two options for 
altering their child conduct when presented with a scenario of a turbulent 
and/or misbehaved child in school context: one, to administer Ritalin, that 
is, to opt for a chemical solution; and two, to endeavor in a more long-term 
human intervention, such as dialogue, familiar intervention, that is a non 
chemical solution. The school can present two scenarios, one of conformity, 
where children are all expected to behave with no further do and comply 
with what is requested, or empathy, where it accepts as logic and inevitable 
that not all humans are equal and have different paths to become socially 
apt to behave without being normalized. 
This choice for empathy as oppose to conformity in the model is not casual. 
Though all values can be questioned, it is accepted in democratic societies 
that though majorities may decide they cannot do so without acknowledg-
ing and respecting minorities. And it is empathy, not conformity, the human 
characteristic which allows for this democratic and political value to be as-
sumed, integrated and lived. 
Finally, the model is completed with determinants, which were also present 
in the Marquez-Ramos and Mourelle model [5]. In our case, the determi-
nants can be familiar, social, economic or other parameters that are suited 
for analyzing the reasons for the choices on the parent’s options and school 
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scenarios. For example, choosing the chemical solution could be motivated 
by economic reasons, as the non chemical solutions could delay the child’s 
success and parents cannot cope with a long-term solution. Eventually, 
though not in absolute, this could lead to conformity and the school accept-
ing the situation in order to maintain peace in the classroom. This type of 
situation is exemplified of Figure 3.
Figure 3: Proposed Social model to apply reduction ad dystopia, based on the Marquez- 
-Ramos and Mourelle Model [5].
Nevertheless, that does not mean that Economy as determinant always 
imply the choice of the chemical solution. For example, the parents may 
consider that the future professional success of the child is dependent of 
the capacity to question and think outside the box, as many companies also 
consider as essential trait in their employees, and opt for a non- chemical 
solution that will not erase, even that temporarily, such characteristic of the 
child. As such, the model is not bias regarding the determinants and com-
prises the several possibilities.
To use the reductio ad dystopia in the model we shall use the data selected 
from the stories. As all approximations bear error, in minor or higher de-
gree, so does collecting data from complex environment such as a literature 
piece. As scavengers, we probe the stories, aiming at reducing the creative 
and human elements into simple and mutually exclusive qualities. Despite 
the amazing questions raised at Beyond Beldlam, Metaquine and Fast Times 
at Fairmont High, focusing in the problem in are studying, the data suitable 
for the model and the use of Ritalin in children in the context of simple mis-
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behavior, when obtained the data displayed in Figure 4, which is juxtapose 
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Figure 4: Data collected from the selected stories within the model
The premise was that if the dystopian scenario came to a reasonable resem-
blance with the ‘reality’ scenarios, then the dystopian consequences would 
be an expected future. And that is happening clearly. Though the blunt re-
sult may not be schizophrenia, the abusive use of Ritalin in order to obtain 
conformity of behavior in the classroom or at home and overall acceptance 
by class peers, teachers and family, can lead to alterations in the mental 
state on the long term. 
Further, when focusing in the third story, Fast Times at Fairmont High, the 
juxtaposition of using the drug to guarantee the expected student behav-
ior is too close to comfort. One may point out that Ritalin is not meant to 
enhance brain capacity but the issue in the story can be broken down to a 
simple colloquial phrase: My way or the highway. Use it, behave, or get out 
of here.
The dystopian scenario that seems more far from the present is the one 
of Metaquine, as the cyberaddition is not yet a social consequence. But 
can we truly say, as the cybernetic experience becomes more immersive, 
through virtual and augmented reality, and as, and with good reasons, vid-
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eogames are becoming a more educational and cultural tool, that is such a 
far off future?
In fact, what one can truly say is that many aspects of these dystopias are to 
close to our neighborhood, whether you consider time or space for vicinity. 
And if that is the case, what can we say about us as citizens, as parents, as 
teachers, if we condone or at least turn our eyes in other directions as the 
use of drugs to deal with misconduct are unofficially accepted?
Democracy lives through the health, mental, social and physical of its 
citizens, by acknowledging them as individual entities with multifacets. 
Democracy lives through the patterns it allows for the weakest of the weak 
to be treated. Democracy lives through the future, as it takes the present to 
ensures dignity and respect to all human beings. It comes to a sad irony that 
centuries of democratic fight to establish that children have rights would 
collapsed through some pills. Not in the name of freedom but in the name 
of quietness.
4. Conclusions and Future Perspectives
Disraeli said that there three types of lies: lies, damn lies and statistics. 
And numbers can lie, indeed, as much as words. But as words they can also 
speak the truth and sustain it with facts otherwise overlooked or unnoticed. 
And as such, the model should have a quantification attached. But how do 
you quantify the critical point of democracy become something else, and 
something else that is contrary to empathy?
Let us be quantic. The model for polielectronic atoms, that is atoms with 
more than one electron, could be an interesting approximation to include in 
the reduction ad dystopia social model [10]. In a very simplified manner they 
use several statistic tools and the inclusion of the spin moment of the elec-
tron that could be adjusted to social variables such as the ones of Figure 4. 
For example, if one considers the most democratic stable for the use of 
Ritalin, the situation where only children with ADHD are prescribed with 
the drug, one has the lowest orbital of the quantic model filled, with an ar-
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row downwards, as in Figure 5 a). If you have the exact number of students 
using the drug for misconduct, as the true number of ADHD children in 
need of Ritalin is very residual comparing with the overall student popula-
tion, you will fill the least energetic state of the model and though far from 
ideal, the situation does not reach a critique platform. But as the number 
increases, so does the levels of energy where the arrows representing chil-
dren using Ritalin without ADHD diagnosed and also the instability of the 
system increases. 
Obviously it can be reached a point where the instability is so high the sys-
tem loses integrity. If it was a molecule, one would say it was the moment 
it separated in its composing atoms. So in order to have a prominent model 
that can pin point the exact moment when a democracy collapses by over-
throwing its citizens rights, only two aspects need to be addressed. First, 
can we adjust the statistic methodologies used in the quantic models for this 
reduction ad dystopia model? Second, which is the number of destroyed 
persons that qualifies for a democracy be no more? 
Figure 5: Example of juxtaposing by approximation the quantic model for polielectronic at-
oms and the reduction ad dystopia model. In a), the arrow stands for only ADHD children 
using Ritalin, while b) presents a situation where that number equals the number of chil-
dren using Ritalin for misconduct problems, and c) represents an hypothetical situation 
where the number of children forced to use Ritalin for misconduct reaches a critical plat-
form of democratic destruction.
Because, as we said in the beginning of this section, numbers can lie but 
they can also speak too loud the truth. And the model can be invaluable to 
monitor situations, to prevent scenarios, to detect cracks on the system, but 
it cannot pin point the critical point without knowing its percentage. And if 
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you, with the logic of the democratic majority simply said that such number 
is 50 + 1, as that is the percentage to achieve majority in democratic sys-
tems, maybe we should pause for a moment a be filled with the notion that 
such number could represent half of the small children of a country and to 
reach half would mean the whole was lost a long time ago.
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AYLAN KURDI AS THE AWAKENING IMAGE OF  
THE REFUGEE CRISIS: THE FRAMEWORK  
OF THE IBERIAN PRESS
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Abstract: Considering the background of the refugee crisis, 
September 2, 2015 unequivocally marks the media coverage 
given to this issue around the world. The appearance of a 
corpse of a three-year-old Syrian child on a Turkish beach 
has greatly contributed to a different framework of the crisis 
that has come to have a face and a name: Aylan Kurdi.
Without setting a comparison between the before and after 
this media event, the purpose is to analyze how this event in-
fluenced media coverage of the refugee crisis in subsequent 
moments.
Using a convenience sample will be analyzed four specific 
moments relying on the image of Aylan Kurdi that seem sig-
nificant to us of what this photo came to signify, during the 
framing process. This paper aims to extract the analysis of 
the online version of two quality newspapers from Portugal 
and Spain, at a time of the refugees’ crisis. Through the dis-
course analysis of the collected data related with framing 
and priming effects one tries to add a new concept to the 
many ones already existing in the field of effects theory: the 
concept of awakening-image, as an element that triggers a set 
of memories and latent knowledge associated with an issue, 
subject or protagonist.
Keywords: Framing; Priming; Awakening Image; Refugee 
Crisis; Migration; Media Representations
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Introduction
At the beginning of the 21st century, Europe faces an exponential increase 
in the number of migrants arriving from other countries. This trend has 
been accentuated since 2015, with the arrival of refugees coming from the 
Middle East and North Africa. These refugees have spread throughout the 
European continent, but their arrival has not been equally well-accepted by 
all the countries. The animosity towards refugees was boosted by terrorist 
acts perpetrated in cities representative of European political and economic 
power, such as Paris, London or Brussels. Thus, refugees have often been 
identified as terrorists. Using the effects theory, one finds useful and perti-
nent to understand how the media framed this crisis
Considering this background, we will try to answer to some questions re-
lated with the manner how the media construct social reality, framing and 
recreating contexts, presenting ideas often related with prejudices and la-
tent cognitive processes, that become explicit trough stimulus and typified 
references. 
One intends to comparatively analyze the media coverage of the issue by 
the quality press from Portugal and Spain. 
Bearing in mind the development of the refugee’s crisis in Europe, it seems 
relevant to focus the analysis on a crucial moment, consisting on the ap-
pearance of the corps of one Syrian child, Aylan Kurdin in a Turkish beach 
in September 2015. 
So, one will proceed to the analysis of some news contents from the Publico 
(Portugal) and El Pais (Spain). The choice of two newspapers from both 
countries is justified by the geographical and historical proximity between 
both, despite its also notorious cultural differences.
Framing: meaning and conceptual evolution
The relevance of framing theory is indisputable, particularly in 
Communication Sciences field. 
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Being a metacommunication, the frame is a set of rules and instructions 
that gives meaning to discourse, in the same manner as personal interac-
tions are ruled by a order and meaning in shared behaviors and codes. The 
frame is what we call to this set of rules that gives a specific meaningful 
order either to a behavior or to a discourse
In one of his most important papers on the subject – Framing: Towards 
the Clarification of a Fractured Paradigm –, Robert Entman, summarizes 
this idea supporting that “to frame is to select some aspects of a perceived 
reality and make them more salient in communicative text, in such a way 
as to promote a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral 
valuation, and/or treatment recommendation. Typically, frames diagnose, 
evaluate and prescribe.” (Entman, 1993: 53). 
According to McCombs and Ghanem (2001), “the origins of the term framing 
within the Communication refers to photography and to cinematography, 
where framing means variables such as the camera angle and the perspec-
tive in the style of a visual message” (p.71).
The anthropologist and epistemologist Gregory Bateson was, by the 1950s, 
one of the pioneers in using the notion of “frame” within the Social and 
Human Sciences. In one of his most important works, “The Theory of Play 
and Fantasy” (1954; 1972), Bateson focuses his analysis on what he calls 
the “paradoxes of abstraction of verbal communication” (Bateson 1972: 177), 
using the term frame as a psychological concept, relating it to the idea of 
“context”. That is, the author argues that to frame is to circumscribe a num-
ber of messages (or significant actions) that end up making sense, for having 
logic, in a certain situation that is shared by all the interlocutors.
In this essay on the psychology of perception, Bateson takes the frame as 
a psychological concept but underlines the importance of messages as rel-
evant conditioners of the construction and definition of the concept itself. 
As the author points out: “Any message that implicitly or explicitly defines 
a framework, ipso facto gives instructions or helps to the receiver in his at-
tempt to understand the messages contained in the framework” (1972: 188). 
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Bateson believes that framing is simply circumscribing a set of messages 
that make sense for interlocutors in a shared context. The framing process 
helps us, for example, to differentiate simulation from reality.
Previously, in a context of an epistemological debate on social sciences, the 
idea of latent mental schemes for the understanding of the surrounding en-
vironment by the social actor was used drawing in the concept of Alfred 
Schutz’s typification (1979: 110). In the lifeworld analysis, these cognitive 
schemes were considered as based on a priori experimentation of the world 
and the objects that make up it. Schutz defended an observation of typi-
cal actions, coordinating them with models constructed by equally typical 
agents. The perception of the social and cultural lifeworld it is only made 
possible by the typification as a process of selecting situations, objects, 
contexts, based on past events, which give to the actors of future actions 
a social stock of knowledge, that Schutz classifies as “thinking as always”.
Erving Goffman (1974, based on Schutz), is the author who, in the 70’s, gives 
us a more specifically sociological idea on the concept. The author assumes 
the frame as a social framework and as a mental schema that allows organ-
izing an experience.
With Goffman, there’s a shift, in the original concept, from an individual to 
a collective point of view, from the psychological to the sociological, since 
the frame is taken as a social instrument that enables a shared interpreta-
tion of reality. Goffman emphasizes the relevance of knowing how reality 
is understood by individuals rather than considering “the reality” by itself, 
supporting the idea of an existing interaction between the social frame-
works and the mental schemas of everyone.
Goffman tells us: “(The definition of) a situation is based on an agreement 
with organization principles, those governing events – at least the social 
ones – and our subjective involvement in them; “frame” It is a word that I 
use to refer to such basic principles ... “(1974: 10 and 11).
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One must give the credits of the adaptation of the concept of “frame” to the 
journalism field to Gay Tuchman (1978). Using the concepts of Schutz and 
Goffman’s typification the American sociologist uses the concept as profes-
sional organizing principles, used to provide meaning to events.
According his approach, in his daily routine, the journalist works bearing 
in mind organizational rules that condition his field of action. Considering 
that the sense of belonging to one professional group, is associated with the 
objectives of news organization, the news production works as part of the 
social construction of reality. 
Tuchman stated that the news does not just reflect reality. They build it, act-
ing dialectically. While sharing certain conceptions of social reality, news, 
simultaneously, contribute to change the perception of the reality. The so-
cial experience categories, the facts, and social meanings are determined by 
“natural attitude”, as Alfred Schutz theorized it. So in spite of being taken 
by a-historical and reified, those social facts and meanings are historically 
and socially settled by social interactions, social institutions, and, obvious-
ly, by the news making process. The news, in spite of being codified and 
restrained by social institutions, will go on, as Tuchman concluded, to re-
produce itself as historical and indisputable facts ; “It not only defines and 
redefines , constitute and reconstitutes social meanings; it also but also 
defines and redefines , constitutes and reconstitutes ways of doing things,– 
existing processes in existing institutions” (1978: 182).
From priming to awakening image
Being a recent concept in the field of journalism, priming has been studied 
in the fields of social psychology and neuropsychology for about 50 years, 
focus on the manner as how an initial stimulus influence individual’s re-
sponse to later stimulus. It is a mental process by which the individual 
search in the field of previous experiences for latent references in his mem-
ory to obtain an explanation for a specific issue, allowing the formation of 
opinions.
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Shanto Iyengar and Donald Kinder (1987) were the first researchers that 
applied the concept of priming to the area of Communication. Both authors 
sustained that the priming effect refers to changes in the way people eval-
uate political phenomena in the broad sense. During the evaluation process 
of the behavior and the performance of the political player, the individual 
recurs to previous mental schemes, using his experience, overlapping the 
media information.
The theorization of the priming effect first began at the mid-80s following 
the media effects studies, initiated in the early 70s. It’s a concept that tries 
to enlighten the media effects that go beyond agenda-setting process, using 
Psychology to clarify the memory activation during the political evaluation 
process.
Weaver (2007) already had previously supported some considerations on 
the evolution of the agenda and public evaluation that effectively took shape 
with the Iyengar and Kinder’ study. These authors have used experimental 
methodologies to study the consumption of TV news broadcasts by ordi-
nary American citizens, relating it to the analysis of the way as the public 
critically evaluated the president on some specific subjects.
In “News That Matters: television and American Opinion,” Iyengar and 
Kinder defend that, “when calling the attention to some matters, ignoring 
the others, TV news broadcasts are influencing the standards by which 
governments, Presidents, and candidates are being judged. Priming re-
fers to changes in the standards that people use to make the assessment. “ 
(1987: 63)
The authors also verify through their experimentation that the priming 
effect is usually noticed “when the news frames a problem as if it as a mat-
ter of the president’s life, when the viewers are prepared to consider the 
problem as important, and when they see the problem as entangled in the 
presidency’s duties and obligations” (1987: 97). This process happens, pre-
cisely, by the stimulus of an awakening image.
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The priming effect, to most of the authors engaged with the concept, come 
in the sequence of the agenda-setting effects, as it deals with a debate about 
how mental maps are activated in the information receivers minds by news 
contents and how does this influence the permanence or change of the pub-
lic assessment on a certain issue, a political protagonist or a media event. 
It is, therefore, a mental procedure that goes beyond the simple process-
ing of the received information, because of the concept attempt to explain 
the media effects through memory activation. That is, the priming process 
concerns with a set of processes of activating s mental associations in the 
receiver’ mind from which one tries to identify a specific moment baptized 
as wakening image, which stands out for its intensity and its disruptive ca-
pacity. It is the way how these processes are activated, through specific 
contents, that will determine the assessment by the public or the informa-
tion receiver.
On this aspect, Jo and Berkowitz (1996) refer to the notion of “associative 
networks” according to which the presentation of certain stimuli of a certain 
meaning favors other semantically related concepts, fueling the probabili-
ty of invoking thoughts of meaning similar to those stimulated by the self 
presentation” (p.70).
The typification process addressed by Schutz is not effective without the 
presence of one or more reference points that are able to combine the pres-
ent moment with an entire previous background.
However, often this previous background, precisely because of its latent and 
often unconscious nature, needs a strong stimulus. In our point of view, this 
arises when it is verified what Schutz (1972) once called “leap” or “shock”, 
a phenomenon that is provoked in the media field by the awakening image.
The awakening image intensifies the perception, originating a second phase 
of the cognitive process. It awakens latent memories grounded in the stock 
of knowledge and simultaneously it allows to develop a reference mark, a 
cognitive code of classification of situations, influencing the agenda-setting 
and framing mechanisms.
Aylan Kurdi as the awakening image of the refugee crisis: 
the framework of the Iberian press180
In this way, awakening a priming effect, intensifying the importance of the 
issue in the agenda-setting process, gives rise to new frames.
Framing can only happen when there is a strong mental association which 
demands an awakening -image, where the frame is a replica with respect 
to something that exists previously. In order to become possible, the ap-
pearance of a new frame, it lacks an element that allows the creation of 
associative networks with latent memories. Often, the priming effect oc-
curs unconsciously and what makes it conscious is the awakening image.
The crossing of the Mediterranean: a context for the refugee crisis
On October 18, 2013, Italy implemented the operation “Mare Nostrum” 
after the sinking of a ship of clandestine migrants, where more than 360 
people died, trying to cross the Mediterranean Sea. This operation ended 
a year later, after the exponential increase in the number of refugees and 
migrants arriving in southern Italy and the refusal of funding from several 
EU countries.
The European agency for the management of operational cooperation at the 
external borders of the EU Member States (Frontex) went forward with a 
search and rescue mission through the “Triton” assisted by three ships and 
two surveillance aircraft.
Of the 626,000 asylum applications in 2014, EU member states have accept-
ed 185,000. During this year, according to the International Organization 
for Migration (IOM), more than three thousand people died or disappeared 
during the crossing of the Mediterranean. In total, more than 280,000 mi-
grants entered the European Union.
But 2015 was the year that marked the refugee crisis decisively. Fleeing 
the Syrian war, many people have abandoned – often precariously – the 
country, trying to look for better living conditions and, above all, security, 
throughout all Europe.
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During this year, about one million migrants arrived in Europe, main-
ly through the Mediterranean Sea, in what is the largest migratory flow 
since World War II. On the 19th April 2015, the sinking of a trawler in the 
Mediterranean killed at least 800 refugees.
In May, the European Union launched the US Navfor Med operation – based 
in Rome – with the mission to identify, capture and destroy vessels used 
to smuggle migrants. On the 22nd June the first phase of the operation was 
launched, with the main mission of marking traffickers and controlling 
routes and patterns of migrant smuggling, from Libya to Italy and Malta.
July marked the start of the construction – by order of the Hungarian gov-
ernment – of a barbed wire fence along the Hungarian border with Serbia, 
in order to halt the entry of refugees into Europe. On the 20th of this month 
the leaders of the European Union agreed to receive 32,256 refugees from 
Italy and Greece. In May, the president of the European Commission, 
Jean-Claude Juncker, had proposed 40 thousand. At the end of the month, 
British Prime Minister David Cameron warned of what he called “a multi-
tude of people crossing the Mediterranean to go to the United Kingdom.”
In August, the bodies of 71 Syrians were found in a cold van in Austria. 
On the 22nd May, British interior minister Theresa May announced a joint 
United Kingdom and France border operation (Calais) to increase the safety 
of the English Channel after a number of attempts and dead of Syrian refu-
gees trying to reach England.
On the first day of September, the Budapest railway station is closed after 
the massive influx of refugees, of which at least 2300 were reported to have 
been illegally entered, 353 of them minors. Hundreds of refugees pile up at 
the Keleti station, protesting against the Hungarian authorities and asking 
them permission to move on to Austria and Germany.
A day later, probably the most mediated event since the refugees began to 
emerge massively from their countries from North Africa and the Middle 
East to Europe took place: the appearance on the Turkish beach of the corpse 
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of Aylan Kurdi, a three-year-old boy who died drowned during the family’s 
attempt to reach Greece through Turkey. Perhaps because it is a strong im-
age of a child’s corpse, this event triggered a wave of popular solidarity, 
alerting many Europeans to the refugee problem. The slogan “Welcome 
Refugees” becomes viral and David Cameron says that the UK will fulfill its 
“moral obligations”.
September was also the month of the reopening of Budapest’s main railway 
station after a two-day shutdown. Hundreds of refugees were now on trains 
to the Austrian border, others on foot to Germany.
At this stage, Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban said the crisis was 
a “German problem”, and on September 4 the Hungarian parliament even 
passed a series of laws providing for sentences of up to three years in prison 
for the illegal passage of its borders. A day later, civil society mobilized itself 
and random acts of solidarity took place with the Finnish Prime Minister, 
Juha Sipilä, offering his villa to house refugees who came to Finland for asy-
lum. President Maryano Rajoy promises that Spain will be solidary.
On September 7, David Cameron states the UK will receive another 20,000 
refugees within five years, and France agrees to receive 24,000. Germany, 
whose Chancellor Angela Merkel had appealed to European partners to re-
ceive migrants, said it needed €6 billion in order to help 800,000 refugees, 
which the country hopes to host by the end of the year.
Jean-Claude Juncker, President of the European Commission, called on 
the Member States on 9th September to welcome 120,000 more refugees, 
bringing the total up to 160,000, to be distributed on the basis of a quo-
ta system. Initial plans had foreseen that three fifths of the new refugees 
would be distributed between Germany, France and Spain.
On September 13, a record number of 5,809 people arrived in Hungary, 
when the border fence build by the government was almost completed. 
Germany imposed emergency controls at the Austrian border, temporarily 
suspending the Schengen agreement. Officials said the country had received 
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63,000 refugees since the end of August. A day later, Austria and Slovakia 
announced the reintroduction of border controls. Germany has warned that 
it could register up to one million entries this year and Hungary declared 
a state of emergency and threatened to arrest anyone who illegally entered 
the country. The 23rd marked the summit of the European Union, promoted 
to discuss the phenomenon of migration.
In November, Ankara and the European Union signed a three billion euros 
agreement of European aid for Turkey. In return, the Turkish authorities 
have committed themselves to improve the border control and to cooperate 
in the fight against human trafficking networks.
December was the month of the European Union’s announcement of a pro-
ject to control external borders. On the other hand, a mechanism has been 
set up to permanently move refugees with no number limits. This obligato-
ry mechanism was not accepted unanswered across Europe, with Slovakia 
and Hungary expressing displeasure, while Austria closed the border with 
Slovenia. The 17th of last month of 2015 also marked the arrival of the first 
(24) refugees in Portugal under the European Union program.
Aylan Kurdi: the power of an image
The photo of Aylan Kurdi, the Syrian boy drowned on a Turkish beach and 
considered to be a turning point in the media’s agenda setting of the refugee 
crisis, was taken by the Turkish photographer Nilüfer Demir of the Dogan 
agency and broadcasted by the Reuters Ankara / DHA agency on the 2nd 
September, 2015. The case of Aylan was one of millions of Syrians who fled 
their country at war. In the case of this three-year-old child, he fled from 
Kobane with his family heading to the Greek island of Kos.
According to Reuters, 23 people divided in two ships were shipwrecked. 
Aylan Kurdi was not even the youngest to drown in the Mediterranean wa-
ters. In the same boat were the Jafer twins, who were a year and a half old. 
The corpses were on the Turkish beach in Bodrum, Mugla Province.
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Two thousand people passed through the Mediterranean in small rubber 
boats in the previous four weeks, but it was Aylan Kurdi who provoked a 
media boom in the refugee tragedy. Until the appearance and diffusion of 
the corpse of this Syrian child, the refugee crisis was reported as a whole, 
with a mass of people succumbing in the waters of the Mediterranean Sea. 
As of September 2, 2015, the world has come to recognize a face, a body, a 
name that personifies all this tragedy: Aylan Kurdi.
Image 1 – Aylan Kurdi’s fotografy, by Nilüfer Demir / Dogan Agency (Reuters, 2015).
It was broadcast by most of the major media around the world, in a remark-
able amount of first pages and news. The leading newspapers in Portugal 
and Spain – Público and El País, respectively – have maintained this trend. 
But even before appearing in the newspapers, this image ends up being 
spread in a viral way through social networks. In such a scale that Reuters 
emphasized the very power of “viralization”, writing: “The disturbing image 
of a child captures the eye, horrifies” (Reuters, 2015).
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Aylan Kurdi and the Iberian framework 
On September 3, 2015, the day after the shipwreck that struck Aylan, 
Público tells the story behind the number, something that had not happened 
until then. “The drowning boy’s family would be trying to get to Canada – 
Journalists in Turkey, Canada and Syria report that little Aylan’s family was 
refused asylum in June. Only the father survived. “
Image 2 - Printscreen from Público, September 3, 2015. Available at: https://www.publico.
pt/2015/09/03/mundo/noticia/familia-do-menino-afogado-da-imagem-estaria-a-tentar-che-
gar-ao-canada-1706729. Consulted the 22th March, 2018.
Up to this point, refugees and their deaths were invariably counted in the 
thousands and refugees considered a mass of people, faceless, nameless. 
They were only known to flee the war, often confused and associated with 
the phenomenon of terrorism from which they fled. A day later, it’s the 
Spanish El País to publish a story, featuring the father of Aylan Kurdi, who 
died with another brother (a fact that the media refer almost as additional 
information, which also helps us to perceive the force of the image of the 
dead boy).
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Image 3 - Printscreen from El País, September 4, 2015. Available at https://elpais.com/inter-
nacional/2015/09/03/actualidad/1441232434_109669.html. Consulted the 22nd March, 
2018.
The proximity to the tragedy of a father who loses his two small children is 
given to us by the title: “The hands of my two children have escaped mine”; 
and reinforced in the first paragraph, descriptive and appealing to the senti-
ment and solidarity with a boy who “was only three years old.”
Image 4 - Printscreen from El País, September 4, 2015. Available at: https://elpais.com/inter-
nacional/2015/09/03/actualidad/1441232434_109669.html. Consulted the 22nd March, 2018.
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“He survived the bombs and the war, but not the sea, nor the geographi-
cal and legal barriers separating a burning Middle East from Europe. The 
Syrian boy whose photograph has become the symbol of the refugee drama 
– in his little red sweater and blue shorts, stretched lifeless on the Turkish 
beach of Ali Horca Burnu, licking his face with the same waves of sea that 
killed him – was identified as Aylan Kurdi. He was only three years old. His 
family had tried to seek asylum in Canada. “
This paragraph alone summarizes, the media’s framing of this refugee cri-
sis – and in this case, both by the Público newspaper and El País –, provided 
by the appearance and diffusion of the photograph of Aylan Kurdi, a boy 
who had survived to the harsh reality of a country at war, but who had not 
resisted geographical barriers – and (seems to be in between) policies – sep-
arating the Middle East from Europe. This is a boy who succumbs in the 
same waters, on the same beach where others – more fortunate – habitually 
bathe during the holidays.
Aylan Kurdi has become an icon for the refugee crisis and the need for a cer-
tain humanization of the problem and solidarity, something that seems clear 
on September 22, 2015, when the Público newspaper reported: “Caravan 
Aylan Kurdi has already arrived in Croatia with Portuguese help – With 
them traveled almost 60 tons of clothing, footwear, food, hygiene items, 
medicines and toys “;
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Image 5 - Printscreen from Público, September 22, 2015. Available at: https://www.publico.
pt/2015/09/22/sociedade/noticia/aylan-kurdi-caravan-ja-chegou-a-croacia-1708621. 
Consulted the 22nd March, 2018.
and the day after, September 23: “Inatel prepares to give training and em-
ployment to 100 refugees – The Aylan program of the foundation includes 
development of professional courses in hospitality to provide refugees with 
skills. At the end, work contracts will be signed. Each one of the 12 units 
will be responsible for one family. “
Image 6 - Printscreen from Público, September 23, 2015. Available at: https://www.publico.
pt/2015/09/23/sociedade/noticia/inatel-preparase-para-dar-formacao-e-emprego-a-100-ref-
ugiados-1708821. Consulted the 22nd March, 2018.
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Therefore, it shows, on one hand, the humanitarian concern that exists 
around the refugees, but, above all, the strength and influence that Aylan 
Kurdi once again assumes in this crisis. In two days the news of the 
“Aylan Kurdi Caravan” and the “Aylan Program”, promoted by the Inatel 
Foundation, come up. About a year after the shipwreck, Público echoed the 
request for more humanity. The newspaper writes in its September 16, 2016 
online version: “A year after Aylan, there are more and more walls to fight 
refugees – Deaths in the Mediterranean have increased, although fewer are 
trying to reach Europe. UN General Assembly kicks off with initiatives call-
ing for more coordination and a “more humane” approach. There are more 
than 65 million refugees in the world, meaning one in each 113 people.”
Image 7 - Printscreen from Público, September 19, 2016. Available at: https://www.publico.
pt/2016/09/19/mundo/noticia/um-ano-depois-de-aylan-refugiados-sao-mais-e-encontram-
ainda-mais-muros-1744453. Consulted the 22nd March, 2018.
Within the same logic of marking a date that was acknowledged to be a 
turning point in the refugee crisis, exactly one year after the appearance of 
the Syrian boy’s corpse, on September 2, 2016 an online edition of El El País 
made Aylan Kurdi a kind of metonymy of the refugee children’s suffering: 
“A year later, more than 400 Aylan drowned in the Mediterranean,” it says. 
In the subtitle, a lament of the father of the Syrian boy, adds to the need to 
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do something more for the refugees: “Everyone wanted to do something. 
The photograph of my dead son touched the world, but we continue to die 
and nobody does anything. “
Image 8 – Printscreen from El País, September 2, 2016. Available at: https://elpais.com/el-
pais/2016/09/02/mamas_papas/1472793420_323195.html. Consulted the 22nd March, 
2018.
To note the image used of a child standing outside the door of the Congress 
of Deputies in Spain at a demonstration organized by Save The Children. 
Just like a year ago at the Turkish beach of Ali Horca Burnu, once again a 
face: “I survived. Other 423 boys, no”, can be read on a poster wielded by 
the child.
Conclusions
Over the last few years, the refugee crisis has made thousands of dead 
people, who succumb to the Mediterranean Sea and are caught up in the 
European dream of greater security and peace. However, Aylan Kurdi 
and the disclosure of the photograph of his corpse on a Turkish beach on 
September 2 came to give another media dimension to this tragedy. From 
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the analysis to the online versions of the main reference newspapers of 
Portugal and Spain – Público and El País, respectively – we perceive the 
transformative power of Aylan Kurdi’s image, which even acquired a politi-
cal dimension and became a collective manifestation banner around of the 
refugee problem.
This media event arises after several years of war in Syria, becoming the 
symbol of a social problem on a global scale and to which the media gave 
echo and form. Aylan Kurdi also promoted solidarity and in a context that is 
not new. The image of this child has also succeeded in framing the refugee 
crisis, considered as a whole, as a mass of people with no face or name. The 
frame, the angle, the vision of the problem was altered. We were moved to 
feel identified, close to this tragedy.
Embodying the entire refugee crisis, Aylan Kurdi’s photography worked as 
what we may call of awakening image. The awakening image, created by 
the media, awakened associative networks that allowed the appearance of 
a priming effect and simultaneously the trigger of a framing. Because there 
is no framing without memory, without former references. In order for the 
framing process to take place, cognitive recognition must first occur, which 
does not arise spontaneously. It arises from something that is already latent 
in the subject’s memory. Thus, framing is associated with priming – which, 
in turn, gives rise to a number of ideas – but it is thanks to the impact of a 
awakening image that causes the priming to be triggered, allowing the for-
mation of a new media framing, in which the image of Aylan Kurdi’s corpse 
on the beach is associated with the refugee crisis.
On the other hand, framing, individually considered, is a cognitive scheme, 
but lacks scheduling. And it needs the priming effect in order to accomplish 
the association of ideas that guarantee the survival of the framing. It is at 
this point that the importance of the awakening image emerges in the jour-
nalistic field. The awakening is what causes a startle in the consciousness. 
Aylan Kurdi was the awakening image of the refugee crisis, contributing 
decisively to an awareness of this problem. The image of Aylan Kurdi recon-
figured the way in which the refugee crisis itself came to be spread by the 
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media and from which the world became aware of the one that has been the 
largest migratory flow since World War II and which has harvested thou-
sands of lives.
References
BATESON, G. (1972). A theory of play and fantasy. Psychiatric research reports, 
2, 39- 51. New Jersey: Janson Aronson Inc..
EL PAÍS (2015). Las manos de mis dos niños se escaparon de las mías. 
Available at: https://elpais.com/internacional/2015/09/03/actuali-
dad/1441232434_109669.html. Consulted the 22th March, 2018.
EL PAÍS (2016). Un año después más de 400 ‘Aylan’ han muerto ahogados en 
el Mediterráneo. Available at: https://elpais.com/elpais/2016/09/02/
mamas_papas/1472793420_323195.html. Consulted the 22th March, 
2018.
ENTMAN, R. M. (1993). Framing: toward clarification of a fractured 
paradigm. Journal of Communication, vol. 43, n. 4, pp. 51-58. https://
doi.org/10.1111/j.1460-2466.1993.tb01304.x
GOFFMAN, E. (1974). Frame Analysis: An Essay on the Organization of 
Experience. Boston: Northeastern University Press.
IYENGAR, S. & Kinder, D. R. (1987). News That Matters: television and 
American Opinion. Chicago, University of Chicago Press. 
JO, E. & Berkowitz, L. (1996). Análisis del efecto priming sobre la influencia 
de los media: una puesta al día. In J. Bryant & D. Zillmann (Orgs.), Los 
efectos de los médios de communicación – Investigaciones y teorias (pp. 
67-88). Barcelona: Paidós.
JORNAL DE NEGÓCIOS (2015). Cronologia: Crise dos refugiados na Europa 
em 2015. Available at: https://www.jornaldenegocios.pt/economia/
europa/detalhe/cronologia_crise_dos_refugiados_na_europa_
em_2015. Consulted the 20th March, 2018.
McCOMBS, M., & Ghanem, S. I. (2001). The Convergence of Agenda Setting 
and Framing. In S. Reese, O. Gandy & A. Grant (Eds.), Framing Public 
Life. Perspectives on Media and Our Understanding of the Social World 
(pp. 67-81). Mahwah, New Jersey: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.
Rafael Mangana 193
PÚBLICO (2015). Caravana Aylan Kurdi já chegou à Croácia com ajuda 
portuguesa. Available at: https://www.publico.pt/2015/09/22/
sociedade/noticia/aylan-kurdi-caravan-ja-chegou-a-croacia-1708621. 
Consulted the 22th March, 2018.
PÚBLICO (2015). Família do menino afogado estaria a tentar chegar ao 
Canadá. Available at: https://www.publico.pt/2015/09/03/mundo/
noticia/familia-do-menino-afogado-da-imagem-estaria-a-tentar-
chegar-ao-canada-1706729. Consulted the 22th March, 2018.
PÚBLICO (2015). Inatel prepara-se para dar formação e emprego a 100 ref-
ugiados. Available at: https://www.publico.pt/2015/09/23/sociedade/
noticia/inatel-preparase-para-dar-formacao-e-emprego-a-100-refu-
giados-1708821. Consulted the 22th March, 2018.
PÚBLICO (2016). Um ano depois de Aylan, são cada vez mais os muros para 
travar refugiados. Available at: https://www.publico.pt/2016/09/19/
mundo/noticia/um-ano-depois-de-aylan-refugiados-sao-mais-e-
encontram-ainda-mais-muros-1744453. Consulted the 22th March, 
2018.
REUTERS (2015). Troubling image of drowned boy captivates, horrifies. 
Available at: http://reut.rs/1ExFCO8 . Consulted the 20th March, 
2018.
SCHUTZ, A. (1976). Collected papers: studies in social theory, Vol. II, The 
Hague, Martinus Nijhoff.
SCHUTZ, A. (1979). Fenomenologia e Relações Sociais – textos escolhidos de 
Alfred Schutz, Rio de Janeiro, Zahar Editores.
SCHUTZ, A. (1972).  On Multiple Realities In   M.A. Natanson & H.L. van 
Breda (Eds.). Collected Papers I. The Problem of Social Reality (pp. 207-
259). Deordrecht: Springer.
TUCHMAN, G. (1978). Making News, a Study in the Construction of Reality. 
New York: The Free Press. 
WEAVER, D. H. (2007). Thoughts on Agenda Setting. Framing, and Priming. 










Democracy and political practices are suffering a major shift. Political 
participation and deliberation take place in the context of strategically 
manipulated information. Opportunities to mobilize data, in order to reinforce 
manifestations of panic or alarm, are becoming more evident. Concepts such as 
"information", "agenda-setting " and "participation" are being challenged today by 
an almost belligerent mobilization of media resources.
Recent developments on the recognition of women’s rights and promotion of 
new affirmative policies intended to improve gender equality coincides with an 
ever-increasing controversy around the concept of "political correctness".
At the same time, while affirmations concerning human dignity appears 
to be progressively incorporated in political discourse, phenomena such as 
xenophobia, misogyny, racism, cultural, racial and ethnic confrontation, and, 
at the limit, the proliferation of genocides, rise to a previously unimaginable 
proportion and extent.
Emphasis was placed on empirical and theoretical works involving relatively 
recent political debates, such as the creation of the "left majority" (or 
"geringonça") in Portugal; the Brexit; the Brazilian process; the American 
elections; the debates on the political correctness, the emergence of illiberal 
democracies and  the political impact of migratory fluxes.
